Description
Individual decision making can often be wrong due to misinformation, impulses, or biases. Collective decision making, on the other hand, can be surprisingly accurate. In Democratic Reason, Hélène Landemore demonstrates that the very factors behind the superiority of collective decision making add up to a strong case for democracy. She shows that the processes and procedures of democratic decision making form a cognitive system that ensures that decisions taken by the many are more likely to be right than decisions taken by the few. Democracy as a form of government is therefore valuable not only because it is legitimate and just, but also because it is smart.
Landemore considers how the argument plays out with respect to two main mechanisms of democratic politics: inclusive deliberation and majority rule. In deliberative settings, the truth-tracking properties of deliberation are enhanced more by inclusiveness than by individual competence. Landemore explores this idea in the contexts of representative democracy and the selection of representatives. She also discusses several models for the "wisdom of crowds" channeled by majority rule, examining the trade-offs between inclusiveness and individual competence in voting. When inclusive deliberation and majority rule are combined, they beat less inclusive methods, in which one person or a small group decide. Democratic Reason thus establishes the superiority of democracy as a way of m
Chapter
CHAPTER TWO: Democracy as the Rule of the Dumb Many?
CHAPTER TWO: Democracy as the Rule of the Dumb Many?
1. The Antidemocratic Prejudice in Contemporary Democratic Theory
1. The Antidemocratic Prejudice in Contemporary Democratic Theory
2. What’s Wrong with the People?
2. What’s Wrong with the People?
CHAPTER THREE: A Selective Genealogy of the Epistemic Argument for Democracy
CHAPTER THREE: A Selective Genealogy of the Epistemic Argument for Democracy
1. The Myth of Protagoras: Universal Political Wisdom
1. The Myth of Protagoras: Universal Political Wisdom
2. Aristotle’s Feast: The More, the Wiser
2. Aristotle’s Feast: The More, the Wiser
3. Machiavelli: Vox Populi, Vox Dei
3. Machiavelli: Vox Populi, Vox Dei
4. Spinoza: The Rational Majority
4. Spinoza: The Rational Majority
5. Rousseau: The General Will Is Always Right
5. Rousseau: The General Will Is Always Right
6. Condorcet: Large Numbers and Smart Majorities
6. Condorcet: Large Numbers and Smart Majorities
7. John Stuart Mill: Epistemic Democrat or Epistemic Liberal?
7. John Stuart Mill: Epistemic Democrat or Epistemic Liberal?
8. Dewey: Democracy and Social Intelligence
8. Dewey: Democracy and Social Intelligence
9. Hayek: The Distributed Knowledge of Society
9. Hayek: The Distributed Knowledge of Society
CHAPTER FOUR: First Mechanism of Democratic Reason: Inclusive Deliberation
CHAPTER FOUR: First Mechanism of Democratic Reason: Inclusive Deliberation
1. Deliberation: The Force of the Better Argument
1. Deliberation: The Force of the Better Argument
2. Deliberation as Problem Solving: Why More Cognitive Diversity Is Smarter
2. Deliberation as Problem Solving: Why More Cognitive Diversity Is Smarter
3. Why More-Inclusive Deliberating Groups Are Smarter
3. Why More-Inclusive Deliberating Groups Are Smarter
5. Election versus Random Selection
5. Election versus Random Selection
CHAPTER FIVE: Epistemic Failures of Deliberation
CHAPTER FIVE: Epistemic Failures of Deliberation
1. General Problems and Classical Solutions
1. General Problems and Classical Solutions
2. A Reply from Psychology: The Argumentative Theory of Reasoning
2. A Reply from Psychology: The Argumentative Theory of Reasoning
CHAPTER SIX: Second Mechanism of Democratic Reason: Majority Rule
CHAPTER SIX: Second Mechanism of Democratic Reason: Majority Rule
1. The Condorcet Jury Theorem
1. The Condorcet Jury Theorem
2. The Miracle of Aggregation
2. The Miracle of Aggregation
3. Models of Cognitive Diversity
3. Models of Cognitive Diversity
Appendix 1: The Law of Large Numbers in the Condorcet Jury Theorem
Appendix 1: The Law of Large Numbers in the Condorcet Jury Theorem
Appendix 2: The Logic of Cognitive Diversity in Judgment Aggregation
Appendix 2: The Logic of Cognitive Diversity in Judgment Aggregation
Appendix 3: Information Markets and Democracy
Appendix 3: Information Markets and Democracy
CHAPTER SEVEN: Epistemic Failures of Majority Rule: Real and Imagined
CHAPTER SEVEN: Epistemic Failures of Majority Rule: Real and Imagined
1. Politics of Judgment versus Politics of Interest and the Irrelevance of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
1. Politics of Judgment versus Politics of Interest and the Irrelevance of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
2. The Problem of Informational Free Riding
2. The Problem of Informational Free Riding
3. The Problem of Voters’ Systematic Biases and Their “Rational Irrationality”
3. The Problem of Voters’ Systematic Biases and Their “Rational Irrationality”
CHAPTER EIGHT: Political Cognitivism: A Defense
CHAPTER EIGHT: Political Cognitivism: A Defense
1. Political Decision Making as Imperfect Procedural Justice
1. Political Decision Making as Imperfect Procedural Justice
2. Political Cognitivism: Weak versus Strong
2. Political Cognitivism: Weak versus Strong
3. The Three Sides of Political Questions
3. The Three Sides of Political Questions
4. Political Cognitivism: Culturalist versus Absolutist
4. Political Cognitivism: Culturalist versus Absolutist
5. Implications for the Epistemic Argument for Democracy
5. Implications for the Epistemic Argument for Democracy
6. Status of the Standard: Postulate or Empirical Benchmark?
6. Status of the Standard: Postulate or Empirical Benchmark?
7. The Antiauthoritarian Objection
7. The Antiauthoritarian Objection
CONCLUSION: Democracy as a Gamble Worth Taking
CONCLUSION: Democracy as a Gamble Worth Taking
2. Preconditions of Democratic Reason
2. Preconditions of Democratic Reason
3. Limits of the Metaphor of the Maze
3. Limits of the Metaphor of the Maze
4. Empirical Segue to the Theoretical Epistemic Claim
4. Empirical Segue to the Theoretical Epistemic Claim
5. The Wisdom of the Past Many and Democracy as a Learning Process
5. The Wisdom of the Past Many and Democracy as a Learning Process
6. Reason and Rationality
6. Reason and Rationality
Democratic Reason
：Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many
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