Chapter
2 The Foundations of Public International Aviation Law
2.1. Introduction to the Chicago Convention
2.1.1. Background to the Chicago Convention
2.1.2. States, Not Airlines, Define Chicago’s Commercial Environment
2.1.3. Overview of Topics
2.2. The “Prehistory” of the Chicago Convention
2.2.1. From Paul Fauchille to the Paris Convention of 1919
2.2.2. Novel Features of the Paris Convention
2.2.3. Regionalism of the Paris Convention
2.3. The Cosmopolitanism of the Chicago Convention
2.3.1. A Cosmopolitan Tenor
2.3.2. A Successful Treaty
2.3.3. A Logic of Coordination
2.4. The Historical Impact of the Chicago Convention
2.4.1. Conflicting Agendas and the Triumph of Managed Trade
2.4.2. Clashing Interests of the United States and Europe
2.4.3. Deflecting Criticisms of the Chicago Convention’s Outcome
2.4.4. The Chicago Convention Did Not Hinder Later Liberalization
2.4.5. The Chicago Convention’s Significant Economic Impact
2.5. The Core Elements of the Chicago Convention
2.5.1. Airspace Sovereignty: Articles 1 and 2
2.5.2. A Concessionary Principle of Market Access: Article 6
2.5.3. Restricted or Prohibited Zones: Article 9
2.5.4. Reasons for a Treaty-Based Airspace Sovereignty
2.5.5. Regulatory Scope and Harmonization: Articles 11 and 12 and the Annexes
2.5.6. Tax Treatment of the International Airline Industry: Article 15
2.5.7. Another Rule on Tax Treatment: Article 24
2.5.8. Facilitating Air Navigation: Articles 25–28
2.5.9. Uniform Documentation, Technical Specifications, and Licensing: Articles 29–33
2.5.10. Aircraft Registration and Nationality: Articles 17–21
2.5.11. State-Based Aircraft Registration: Articles 18–19
2.5.12. Introduction to Cabotage
2.5.13. History and Legal Basis of Cabotage
2.5.14. Cabotage and Article 7 of the Chicago Convention
2.5.15. Current Concerns About Cabotage
2.6. The International Civil Aviation Organization
2.6.1. The Chicago Convention as a Charter for ICAO
2.6.2. Tensions Between Some ICAO Goals
2.6.3. Assessing ICAO’s Roles in Economic Regulation and Technical Coordination
2.6.4. ICAO’s Structure (1): The Council
2.6.5. ICAO’s Structure (2): The Assembly and Secretariat
2.6.6. Binding Nature of SARPs
2.6.7. Differences in Legal Effect Between Standards and Recommended Practices
2.6.8. ICAO Dispute Settlement: Article 84
2.6.9. A Critique of Dispute Settlement Under Article 84
2.6.10. Another Available Remedy: Article 87
2.6.11. A Brief Proposal on ICAO Dispute Settlement
2.6.12. ICAO’s Continuing Mission
2.6.13. A More Muscular ICAO?
3 The International Law Regime for Trade in Air Services
3.1. Introduction to the Bilateral System
3.1.1. Parallel Frameworks: The Chicago Convention and ASAs
3.1.2. The Nationality Rule
3.1.3. Recent Liberalization Initiatives
3.1.4. Overview of Topics
3.2. Aviation Trade After the Chicago Convention
3.2.1. Concessionary Regime of the Chicago Convention
3.2.2. Failure of Multilateralism: The Two Freedoms and Five Freedoms Agreements
3.2.3. Rise of Bilateralism and Managed Trade
3.2.4. Bilateralism Is Not Ordained in the Chicago Convention
3.3. The Freedoms of the Air
3.3.1. At the Core of All Aviation Trade Agreements
3.3.2. The “Noncommercial” First and Second Freedoms
3.3.3. Traffic Rights (1): The Third and Fourth Freedoms
3.3.4. Traffic Rights (2): The Fifth Freedom
3.3.5. Nuances in the System (1): The Sixth Freedom
3.3.6. Nuances in the System (2): The Seventh Freedom
3.3.7. All-Cargo Services and the Seventh Freedom
3.3.8. Cabotage (Again): The Eighth and Ninth Freedoms
3.3.9. Distinction Between Cabotage and the Right of Establishment
3.3.10. Cabotage in the U.S./EU Negotiations
3.4. The Nationality Rule
3.4.1. Restrictive Logic of Bilateralism
3.4.2. Citizenship Purity and the Absence of Multinational Airlines
3.4.3. Reasons for the Nationality Rule: Security and Strategic Trade Policy
3.4.4. Protectionist Effects of the Nationality Rule
3.4.5. Interplay of the Nationality Rule with Domestic Law
3.4.6. Operation of the Nationality Rule
3.4.7. External and Internal Components of the Nationality Rule: A Double-Bolted Lock
3.4.8. Destabilizing the Nationality Rule
3.4.9. Reasons for Destabilization
3.4.10. Returning to the Nationality Rule
3.5. The Core Elements of Air Services Agreements: The Open Skies Model
3.5.2. Grant of Traffic Rights: The First Five Freedoms
3.5.3. Grant of the Sixth and Seventh Freedoms
3.5.4. EU Single Aviation Market: Exchange of All Nine Freedoms
3.5.5. Regional Exchanges of Traffic Rights
3.5.6. Authorization/Designation Requirements
3.5.7. Designation Requirements
3.5.9. Capacity and Frequency
3.5.10. “Doing Business” Assurances
3.5.11. Customs, Duties, and Charges
3.5.12. Dispute Settlement
3.5.13. Strategic Considerations in Dispute Settlement
3.6. Looking Beyond Bilateralism
3.6.1. Preparing for Multilateralism
3.6.2. Air Services and the World Trade Organization (WTO)
3.6.3. Challenges of Liberalizing Aviation Under WTO Trade Rules: “Most Favored Nation”
3.6.4. “National Treatment”
3.6.5. A GATS Counterfactual
3.6.6. Multilateralizing Liberalization: The MALIAT
3.6.7. Other Multilateral Initiatives
3.7. Remaining Challenges to Trade in Air Services
3.7.2. Capacity Constraints
3.7.3. Congestion Pricing and Slots
3.7.6. Competition Law Harmonization
3.8. Some Concluding Comments on Trade in Air Services
3.8.1. Assessing the Progress of Liberalization
3.8.2. A Continuing (and Vulnerable) Project
4 The International Law Regime for Airline Investment and Global Alliances
4.1.1. The Nationality Rule Excludes Single-Carrier Networks
4.1.2. Rise of Strategic Alliances
4.1.3. Overview of Topics
4.2. The (Airline) Nationality Rule in Action
4.2.1. Operation of the Nationality Rule in ASAs
4.2.2. Meaning of Effective Control
4.2.3. Origins and Purpose of the Nationality Rule
4.2.4. Foreclosing the Techniques of Cross-Border Investment
4.2.5. Domestic Enforcement of the Nationality Rule
4.2.6. Viewpoint of Organized Labor
4.2.7. Viewpoint of Other Interests
4.3. A Quick Look at How International Law (Normally) Regulates Foreign Investment
4.3.1. A Regime to Encourage Foreign Capital
4.3.2. Another Bilateral Treaty System
4.3.3. Potential Mechanisms for Investment in Foreign Airlines
4.3.4. Foreign Investors and National Treatment
4.3.5. “Better than National Treatment” (Dispute Settlement)
4.3.6. Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)
4.3.7. No Single Global Investment Treaty
4.4. An Emerging International Investment Regime for Airlines
4.4.1. Is There a Regime for Foreign Airline Investment?
4.4.2. Destabilizing the Nationality Rule (Continued)
4.4.3. EU Common Licensing Regime
4.4.4. Rolling Back of Domestic Ownership Restrictions
4.4.5. Multi-State Initiatives
4.4.6. Effective Waivers and Waning Enforcement
4.4.7. Liberalizing Breezes from Latin America and Asia
4.4.8. Air Transport Industry Advocacy
4.4.9. A Note on Rational Interests and the Nationality Rule
4.5. Circumventing the Nationality Rule: Global Alliances
4.5.1. Antitrust Immunity for “Mergers Without a Transfer of Ownership Rights”
4.5.2. Consolidation of Alliances After the 2007 U.S./EU Agreement
4.5.3. Why Global Alliances Exist
4.6. The Legal (and Policy) Framework for Global Alliances
4.6.1. U.S. and EU Regulatory Approaches
4.6.3. U.S. DOT Recognizes Two Types of Code-Sharing Authority
4.6.4. DOT’s Antitrust Immunity Power in International Aviation
4.6.5. DOT’s Ex Ante Evaluation of Alliances: 49 U.S.C. Sections 41308 and 41309
4.6.6. DOT’s Pro-Immunity Record
4.6.7. European Commission’s Ex Post System of Review
4.6.8. European Commission’s Investigative Practice
4.6.9. A Quick Comparison of the U.S. and EU Approaches
4.7. Ongoing Issues of Law and Policy for Alliances: “Metal Neutrality” and “Spillover”
4.7.1. Meaning of Metal Neutrality
4.7.2. Contrasting U.S. and EU Approaches to Metal Neutrality
4.7.3. Viewpoint of Organized Labor on Metal Neutrality
4.7.4. Risk of Domestic and International Spillover
4.8. A Survey of U.S. and EU Antitrust Oversight of the Three Global Alliances
4.8.2. SkyTeam Alliance: DOT Review
4.8.3. SkyTeam Alliance: EU Review
4.8.4. Star Alliance: DOT Review
4.8.5. Star Alliance: EU Review
4.8.6. Oneworld Alliance: DOT Review
4.8.7. Oneworld Alliance: EU Review
4.8.8. A Final Appraisal of the U.S. and EU Approaches
4.9. Beyond the Alliance System
4.9.1. A Contingent System
4.9.2. Rise of Multinational Airlines?
4.10. Conclusion: A New EU Initiative
4.10.1. An Emerging Normative Order
4.10.2. A New EU Démarche on the U.S. Foreign Ownership Rule
5 The International Law Regime for Aviation Safety and Security
5.1.1. A Collaborative Process of Ensuring Aviation Safety
5.1.2. Aviation Security and the Challenges of a Global Solution
5.2. The Basic Principles of International Air Safety Regulation
5.2.1. Defining the Category
5.2.2. A Positive Political Attitude to Globalized Safety Standards
5.3. Ensuring International Aviation Safety Through ICAO Harmonization and State Obligations
5.3.1. Mutual Recognition in the Paris and Chicago Conventions
5.3.2. ICAO Harmonization and Standard Setting
5.3.3. Ensuring Compliance and Enforcement
5.3.4. Monitoring Safety through National Programs
5.3.5. ICAO’s Safety Oversight Program
5.3.6. The Coming of Annex 19
5.4. The Basic Principles of International Aviation Security Regulation
5.4.1. A Conceptual Clarification: Aviation Piracy
5.4.2. Evolution of the Universal Crime of Piracy
5.4.3. From Piracy to Political Terrorism
5.4.4. A More Expansive Conception of Piracy?
5.5. The Role of ICAO in International Aviation Security
5.5.1. Background to Multilateral Legal Action
5.5.2. ICAO’s Treaty Initiatives
5.5.3. Other ICAO Initiatives: Interfering with Domestic Security Policy?
5.5.4. Limitations of ICAO
5.6. Exercising State Criminal Jurisdiction in International Law
5.6.1. State Jurisdiction in Matters of Criminal Law
5.6.2. At Least Two States Have Potential Jurisdiction
5.6.3. Can a Universal Jurisdiction Be Asserted?
5.6.4. Alternative Jurisdictional Bases
5.6.5. Responsibility of the Landing or Custodial State: To Prosecute or Extradite?
5.7. The Tokyo Convention (1963)
5.7.1. Summary of the Tokyo Convention
5.7.2. Offenses Under and Application of the Tokyo Convention
5.7.3. Jurisdiction Under the Tokyo Convention
5.7.4. Achilles Heels of the Tokyo Convention: No Mandatory Extradition and the Freedom Fighter Exception
5.7.5. Powers of the Aircraft Commander Under the Tokyo Convention
5.8. The Hague Convention (1970)
5.8.1. Context of The Hague Convention
5.8.2. The Hijacking Offense Under The Hague Convention
5.8.3. Jurisdiction Under The Hague Convention
5.8.4. Undermining The Hague Convention’s Strong Extradition Provisions
5.9. The Montreal Convention (1971)
5.9.1. Summary of the Montreal Convention and Its Later Protocol
5.9.2. Meaning of Aircraft “in Service” Under the Montreal Convention
5.9.3. Other ICAO Initiatives, Including the Montreal Protocol
5.10. Beyond the ICAO Treaty Regime
5.10.1. Inadequacies of the ICAO Treaty System
5.10.2. The Bonn Declaration on Hijacking
5.10.3. Other State-Based Approaches to Combating Aviation Crimes
5.11. Preventing Aviation Crimes and Other Hostile Incidents Within the Limits of Law
5.11.1. Reactive and Proactive Approaches to Aviation Crimes
5.11.2. Use of Passenger Data
5.11.3. Passenger Screening Procedures
5.11.4. Air Cargo Screening Procedures
5.11.5. Meaning of “Air Rage”
6 The International Law Regime for Aviation and the Environment
6.1.1. ICAO’s Response to a Politically Contentious Issue
6.1.2. Political Problem of the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme
6.1.3. Noise Pollution and Localized Emissions
6.1.4. Seeking a Global Response
6.2. An Overview of International Environmental Law
6.2.2. A General Obligation of States but Few Binding Global Standards
6.2.3. Subject-Specific Regulatory Regimes of International Environmental Law
6.2.4. The U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
6.2.5. Competing Priorities of the Environment and Economic Growth
6.2.6. The UNFCCC as an Incremental Model
6.2.7. The Kyoto Protocol
6.2.8. Future of International Environmental Law
6.2.9. Divergent Paradigms of Airspace Sovereignty and the Global Atmosphere
6.3. The Role of ICAO in Environmental Issues Affecting International Aviation
6.3.1. ICAO’S Competence for Environmental Issues
6.3.2. Path to ICAO Oversight
6.3.3. Role of SARPs: Annex 16
6.3.4. Legal Status of SARPs
6.3.5. Exclusivity of ICAO’s Emissions Reduction Competence and the Issue of MBMs
6.3.6. An Aviation Emissions Reduction Regime Outside ICAO?
6.4. The Chicago Convention and Aviation Emissions Regulation
6.4.1. Key Principles of Multilateralism, Reciprocity, and Mutual Consent
6.4.2. Constraints on Unilateral Action (1): Articles 1, 12, and 15 of the Chicago Convention
6.4.3. Constraints on Unilateral Action (2): Article 24 of the Chicago Convention
6.4.4. No Constraints on Curbing National Airline Emissions
6.4.5. The Chicago Convention and Non-ICAO Emissions Agreements
6.4.6. Absence of Authoritative Rulings
6.5. The Role of Air Services Agreements in Environmental Regulation
6.5.1. Environmental Measures in ASAs
6.5.2. A Criticism of ASA Safeguard Provisions
6.6. The Legal and Political Prospects for a Multilateral Aviation Emissions Treaty
6.6.1. An Alignment of Political Will
6.6.2. A Regional Approach to Aviation Emissions Reduction: The U.S./EU ASA
6.6.3. Regulatory Features of a U.S./EU Aviation Emissions Agreement
6.6.4. Geographic Scope of a U.S./EU Aviation Emissions Agreement
6.6.5. A Work of Governance as Much as of Economics
6.7. The International Regulation of Noise Abatement
6.7.1. ICAO’s Benchmark Standards
6.7.2. Interaction Between International and State-Based Noise Regulation
6.7.3. A Final Comment on Noise Pollution
6.8.1. An Intensifying Dialogue
6.8.2. Two Final Observations
7 The International Law Regime for Air Carrier Liability and Surface Damage
7.1.1. A Hybridized Structure
7.1.2. The Warsaw Convention (1929)
7.1.3. The Montreal Convention (1999)
7.1.4. The Montreal Convention Replaces, Not Augments, the Warsaw Convention
7.1.5. Either the Warsaw or the Montreal Conventions May Apply
7.1.6. Terminology and Scope of the Warsaw System
7.1.7. Third-Party Surface Liability
7.2. The Choice Between Private and Public Oversight of Air Carrier Liability
7.2.1. Contrasting Public and Private Regulation of Liability
7.2.2. Integrating the Private and Public Regulatory Approaches
7.3.1. The Warsaw System Created a Unique Concept in International Law
7.3.2. A Search for a Universal Cap on Liability
7.3.3. Integration of the Warsaw Convention with National Law and Carrier Contracts of Carriage
7.3.4. Basic Principles of Liability Under the Warsaw Convention
7.3.5. Surviving Early U.S. Skepticism
7.4. Reforming the Warsaw Convention (1): The Treaty Instruments
7.4.1. The Hague Protocol (1955): A Doubling of the Liability Cap
7.4.2. Reforming the Principle of “Wilful Misconduct”
7.4.3. U.S. Failure to Ratify The Hague Protocol
7.4.4. Problem of Successive Carriage
7.4.5. Successive Carriage Under the Guadalajara Supplementary Convention (1961)
7.4.6. The Guatemala City Protocol (1971): A Failure to Set an Absolute Liability Cap
7.4.7. The Montreal Protocols (1975): A Basket of Changes
7.4.8. Aftermath of the Montreal Protocols
7.5. Reforming the Warsaw Convention (2): Government and Non-Government Initiatives
7.5.1. Continued U.S. Dissatisfaction with Warsaw
7.5.2. The U.S./IATA Montreal Agreement (1966)
7.5.3. The IATA Intercarrier Agreement (1995)
7.5.4. Effect of the IATA Intercarrier Agreement on the Warsaw System
7.5.5. The Japanese Initiative on Liability (1992)
7.5.6. Response of the European Union (EU)
7.6. The Warsaw Convention: Conclusion
7.6.1. A Sustained Onslaught on the Warsaw Convention
7.6.2. Need for a New Treaty
7.7. The Montreal Convention (1): Introduction
7.7.1. Preserving a System of Uniform Liability
7.7.2. Role of ICAO in Creating the Montreal Convention
7.7.3. Issues of Restitution and Corrective Justice
7.7.4. Basic Principles of Liability and Jurisdiction
7.8. The Montreal Convention (2): The Basic Principles
7.8.1. Scope of Application of the Montreal Convention
7.8.2. Successive Carriage Through Interlining
7.8.5. Air Passenger Ticketing
7.9. The Montreal Convention (3): Activating the Liability Regime (Accidents, Death, Injury)
7.9.1. An “Accident” Causing Death or Injury
7.9.2. A Subjective Approach to Defining “Accident”
7.9.3. The “Characteristic of Air Travel” Approach to Defining “Accident”
7.9.5. How Does the Montreal Convention Affect the Definition of “Accident”?
7.9.6. Distinction Between “Bodily” and “Psychic” Injury
7.9.7. Approach of Non-U.S. Courts to Psychic Injury
7.9.8. U.S. Supreme Court’s Decisions in Floyd and Tseng
7.9.9. Issue of Psychic Injury Under the Montreal Convention
7.9.10. Embarking and Disembarking
7.10. The Montreal Convention (4): The New Liability Regime
7.10.1. A Mandatory System of Liability
7.10.2. Strict Liability Under the Montreal Convention
7.10.3. Disproving Negligence
7.10.4. Forensic Reality of the Montreal Convention Liability Regime
7.10.5. The “Escalator” Clause
7.10.6. Other Provisions for Calculating Liability
7.10.7. Advance Compensation
7.10.9. Exclusivity of Actions Under the Montreal Convention
7.10.10. Exclusivity and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Tseng
7.10.11. Some Further Implications of the Tseng Ruling
7.11. The Montreal Convention (5): Expanding the Bases for Jurisdiction
7.11.1. Five Jurisdictional Choices
7.11.2. More on the Fifth Jurisdiction
7.11.3. More on the First Four Jurisdictional Choices
7.11.4. Procedural Questions Under the Montreal Convention
7.12. The Montreal Convention (6): A Final Miscellany of Provisions
7.12.1. A Right of Recourse
7.12.2. The Question of Insurance
7.12.3. Legal Effect of the Montreal Convention
7.12.4. An Anomalous Effect That May Flow from a Plaintiffhairsp’s Jurisdictional Choices
7.12.5. State Reservations to and Withdrawal from the Montreal Convention
7.12.6. Absence of a Dispute Settlement Mechanism
7.12.7. Liability Regime for “Delays” Under the Montreal Convention
7.12.8. Alternatives to the Montreal Convention’s Delay Provisions
7.13.1. An Unfinished Regime
7.13.2. Effect of Divergent Judicial Interpretation
7.14. The International Law Regime for Surface Damage Liability
7.14.1. A “Doomed” System?
7.14.2. Policy Challenges to a Uniform System of Surface Damage Liability
7.14.3. The Rome Convention (1952)
7.14.4. The Rome Convention’s Terms of Liability
7.14.5. Rejection of the Rome Convention
7.14.6. The Montreal Protocol (1978)
7.14.7. A New Rome Regime?
7.14.8. The Unlawful Interference Convention
7.14.9. State Resistance to the Unlawful Interference Convention
7.14.10. The General Risks Convention
7.14.11. Outlook for Ratification of the New Surface Damage Liability Conventions
8 The International Law Regime for Aircraft Financing and Aircraft Nationality
8.1.1. Distinction Between Equity and Debt
8.1.2. Private Aircraft Financing and International Aviation Law
8.1.3. Government Aid for Aircraft Manufacturing and Financing
8.2. A Quick Look at International Aircraft Financing
8.2.2. Aircraft Financing and the (Airline) Nationality Rule
8.2.3. Aircraft Financing and the (Aircraft) Nationality Rule
8.2.4. Macroeconomic Climate for Aircraft Financing
8.2.5. Cash-Based Financing of Aircraft
8.2.6. Sources of Debt Financing
8.3. The Third-Party Effects of Secured Financing of Aircraft
8.3.1. Distinction Between Proprietary and Contractual Rights
8.3.2. Blue Sky Case (1): Factual Background
8.3.3. Blue Sky Case (2): Renvoi Doctrine
8.3.4. Blue Sky Case (3): Distinction Between Lex Registrii and Lex Situs
8.3.5. Blue Sky Case (4): Court Applied No Special Rule for Aircraft
8.3.6. Blue Sky Case (5): Lex Registrii as the Better Rule
8.3.7. Blue Sky Case (6): An International Law Solution
8.4. An Overview of International Aircraft Leasing
8.4.2. Growing Significance of Leases
8.4.3. Aircraft Leasing Companies
8.4.4. Distinction Between Finance (or Capital) Leases and Operating Leases
8.5. The International Law Regime for Aircraft Nationality
8.5.1. Basic Principles of Aircraft Nationality
8.5.2. Distinction Between Aircraft Nationality and Airline Nationality
8.5.3. Aircraft Nationality and Aircraft Financing
8.5.4. Article 83bis of the Chicago Convention
8.6. An Overview of International Aviation Law and Aircraft Financing
8.6.1. Protection of Security Interests
8.6.2. Problem of Aircraft Mobility
8.6.3. Problem of Nonuniform Legal Concepts
8.6.4. Introduction to the Geneva and Cape Town Conventions
8.7. The Geneva Convention (1948)
8.7.2. The Geneva Convention as a Choice of Law Treaty
8.7.3. Two Unsettled Choice of Law Issues
8.7.4. Problem of Insolvency
8.7.5. An Ill-Suited Instrument
8.8. The Cape Town Convention (2001) (1): Background and Overview
8.8.1. Context of the Cape Town Convention
8.8.2. Unidroit, the Aviation Working Group, and the Convention/Protocol Solution
8.8.3. The Aircraft Protocol
8.8.4. A Single Instrument, but the Protocol Prevails over the Convention
8.8.5. Use of Declarations
8.8.6. Effect of Declarations on Party Autonomy and the Availability of Financing
8.8.7. Role of the Cape Town Convention in Aircraft Financing
8.8.8. Implementation of the Cape Town Convention in Domestic Law
8.8.9. Importance of Remedies
8.8.10. Jurisprudential Significance of the Cape Town Convention
8.9. The Cape Town Convention (2): Application and Scope
8.9.1. A One-Sentence Summary
8.9.2. Three Broad Types of Covered Agreement
8.9.3. Creating an International Interest in Aircraft Objects
8.9.4. Location of the Debtor Determines Applicability of the Cape Town Convention
8.9.5. Autonomy of the International Interest
8.9.6. Internal Transactions Are Also Covered
8.10. The Cape Town Convention (3): The Registration and Priority System
8.10.1. A One-Sentence Summary
8.10.2. Setup of the Cape Town Convention Registry
8.10.3. Using the Registry
8.10.4. Obtaining Priority Under the Registry
8.10.5. Priority of Nonconsensual Rights
8.11. The Cape Town Convention (4): Remedies in Default
8.11.1. Certainty for Creditors and Nonexclusivity of Remedies
8.11.2. Effect of Declarations and of Different Types of Agreement
8.11.3. Events of Default
8.11.4. A Range of Creditor Remedies
8.11.5. Process of Deregistration and Export
8.11.6. Distinction Between Self-Help Remedies and Need for a Court Order
8.11.7. Process of Interim or “Speedy” Relief
8.12. The Cape Town Convention (5): Insolvency
8.12.2. National Insolvency Laws and the Cape Town Convention’s Response
8.12.3. Application of the Cape Town Insolvency Rules: Alternatives A and B
8.12.4. Insolvency Alternative A
8.12.5. Insolvency Alternative B
8.12.6. Priority Differences Under Alternatives A and B
8.13. The Cape Town Convention (6): Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
8.13.1. Party Autonomy on the Choice of the Forum State
8.13.2. No Choice of Law Rules
8.14. The Cape Town Convention (7): The Convention’s Impact on Aviation Financing and on International Law
8.14.1. Ratifications of the Cape Town Convention and Aircraft Protocol
8.14.2. Impact of the Cape Town Convention on Aircraft Financing
8.14.3. Two Models of Transnational Commercial Lawmaking
8.14.4. The Cape Town Convention as a Policy-Based Model of Transnational Commercial Lawmaking
8.15. An Overview of the Governmental Role in Aircraft Financing
8.15.1. Relationship Between Subsidization and Financing
8.15.2. The OECD and the Control of Export Credits
8.15.3. Regulating Subsidies in International Trade
8.15.4. The GATT/WTO Aircraft Agreement
8.15.5. Airbus/Boeing Saga (1): Background
8.15.6. Airbus/Boeing Saga (2): Brief Analysis
8.15.7. Airbus/Boeing Saga (3): Ineffectiveness of the WTO
8.15.8. A New Regime of International Regulation of Aircraft Subsidies?
8.15.9. A Regime for Export Credits
8.15.10. The OECD 2011 Understanding on Export Credits
8.15.11. Some Shortcomings of the 2011 Understanding
8.15.12. Incentives for Compliance with the 2011 Understanding
8.15.13. Beyond the 2011 Understanding
Books (and Contributed Chapters to Books) Listed Alphabetically by Author
Journal Articles and Scholarly Working Papers Listed Alphabetically by Author
Periodical, Service, and Newspaper Articles Listed Alphabetically by Author
Speeches, Presentations, Interviews, and Briefing Papers Listed Alphabetically by Speaker
Reports, Studies, Papers, Press Releases, and Other Documents Listed Alphabetically
Treaties and Other International Agreements Listed Alphabetically
International Civil Aviation Organization Assembly Resolutions Listed Chronologically
U.S. Federal and State Court Cases Listed Alphabetically
U.S. Administrative (CAB/DOT/FAA) Proceedings Listed Alphabetically
International Court of Justice Cases Listed Alphabetically
Court of Justice of the European Union Cases Listed Alphabetically
European Court of First Instance Cases Listed Alphabetically
National Court Cases Listed Alphabetically
Non-U.S. Administrative Proceedings Listed Alphabetically
U.S. Federal Legislation by U.S. Code Sequence
U.S. Federal Legislation by Popular Name Listed Chronologically
U.S. Code of Federal Regulations Listed by Code Sequence
European Commission Regulations Listed Chronologically
Other European Commission Documents Listed Alphabetically
EU Council Regulations Listed Chronologically
EU Council Directives Listed Chronologically
EU Legislative Proposals and Reports Listed Chronologically
Other National Laws and Regulations (Listed Alphabetically)
The Principles and Practice of International Aviation Law
Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.