Description
To survive, all forms of government require popular support, whether voluntary or involuntary. Following the collapse of the Soviet system, Russia's rulers took steps toward democracy, yet under Vladimir Putin Russia has become increasingly undemocratic. This book uses a unique source of evidence, eighteen surveys of Russian public opinion from the first month of the new regime in 1992 up to 2009, to track the changing views of Russians. Clearly presented and sophisticated figures and tables show how political support has increased because of a sense of resignation that is even stronger than the unstable benefits of exporting oil and gas. Whilst comparative analyses of surveys on other continents show that Russia's elite is not alone in being able to mobilize popular support for an undemocratic regime, Russia provides an outstanding caution that popular support can grow when governors reject democracy and create an undemocratic regime.
Chapter
Mixing support and compliance
Worldwide support for regimes of all kinds
2
Changing the supply of regimes
Ideology and fear: the Stalinist approach
Promoting positive support
Yeltsin struggles to fill the void
3
Putin consolidates a new regime
Repatriating power to the Kremlin
A floating system of parties
Emergence of a party of power
Institutionalizing a noncompetitive party system
4
Increasing support for an undemocratic regime
Support with and without democratization
Empirical responses to democracy as symbol
Dynamics of regime support
Contrasting elite evaluations of change
The changing views of Russians
A
lifetime of learning and relearning
5
Individual influences on regime support
Social differences inevitable; their influence is not
Political performance matters
The regime that Russians want
6
Time tells: there is no alternative
Stable and variable influences
Combining context and individual evaluations
7
Finessing the challenge of succession
The problem of term limits
Speculating about alternatives
Organizing the right result
Substantively, voters endorse Putin's
choices
Contrasting views of electoral fairness
Politics influences perceptions of fairness
Influence of election unfairness on regime support
8
The challenge of economic reversal
Vulnerability at the bottom
Crisis creates new anxieties
Depression more subjective than objective
The economy reverses, support remains high
Political support predictably affected by crisis
Crisis evaluations of the economy
9
Maintaining a regime - democratic or otherwise
Maintaining an undemocratic regime
Containing would-be
opponents
Gaining support from skeptics and the compliant
Insulation from external influences
The durability of post-Soviet
regimes
Challenges, predictable and otherwise
Political support helps undemocratic and democratic regimes
Support promotes durability
Appendix A: New Russia Barometer samples
New Russia Barometer I: 26 January-25 February 1992 (SPP
205)
New Russia Barometer II: 26 June-22
July 1993 (SPP 216)
New Russia Barometer VII: 6 March-13
April 1998 (SPP 303)
New Russia Barometer VIII: 13-29
January 2000 (SPP 328)
New Russia Barometer IX: 14-18
April 2000 (SPP 330)
New Russia Barometer X: 17 June-3
July 2001 (SPP 350)
New Russia Barometer XI: 12-26
June 2003 (SPP 378)
New Russia Barometer XII: 12-22
December 2003 (SPP 384)
New Russia Barometer XIII: 18-23
March 2004 (SPP 388)
New Russia Barometer XIV: 3-23
January 2005 (SPP 402)
New Russia Barometer XV: 13-23
April 2007 (SPP 426)
New Russia Barometer XVI: 7-17
December 2007 (SPP 442)
New Russia Barometer XVII: 14-23
March 2008 (SPP 443)
New Russia Barometer XVIII: 18-24
June 2009 (SPP 462)
Appendix B: Coding of variables