Sharing Secrets: A Game Theoretic Analysis of International Intelligence Cooperation

ISSN： 1521-0561

Source： International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol.26, Iss.4, 2013-12, pp. : 666-692

Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.

Previous Menu Next

Abstract

Related content

International intelligence cooperation: an inside perspective

By Lander Sir Stephen

Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, Iss. 3, 2004-10 ,pp. : 481-493

Routledge Ltd

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 2, 1988-06 ,pp. : 445-466

Cambridge University Press

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-theoretic Analysis

American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 3, 1987-09 ,pp. : 833-850

Cambridge University Press

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Party Coalitions in Multiparty Parliaments: A Game-Theoretic Analysis*

American Political Science Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 3, 1974-09 ,pp. : 1093-1117

Cambridge University Press

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Bureaucratic Resistance to International Intelligence Cooperation - The Case of Europol

By Fagersten Bjorn

Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 25, Iss. 4, 2010-08 ,pp. : 500-520

Routledge Ltd

Access to resources Recommend Favorite