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GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW

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Contents

Contributors

Acknowledgments

Introduction

I. THEORIZING JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

II. HOW JUSTICE GETS DONE IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

III. CRITICAL RESPONSES TO CONTEMPORARY THEORIZING ABOUT JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

PART I THEORIZING JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

1 Approaching Global Justice through Human Rights: Elements of Theory and Practice

INTRODUCTION

I. EQUAL POSITIVE FREEDOM, SOCIAL ONTOLOGY, AND A PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE

III. SOME PRACTICAL DIRECTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

2 Global Equality of Opportunity as an Institutional Standard of Distributive Justice

I. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO SAY THAT INSTITUTIONS “SHOULD” IMPLEMENT PRINCIPLES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE?

II. WHAT IS THE BEST PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNT OF INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE?

III. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: SHOULD INSTITUTIONS IMPLEMENT GLOBAL EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY?

IV. COSMOPOLITANISM AND LEGITIMACY

3 Human Persons, Human Rights, and the Distributive Structure of Global Justice

INTRODUCTION

I. GLOBAL DISTRIBUTIVE CIRCUMSTANCES

II. GLOBAL DISTRIBUTIVE STRUCTURE

A. Global Distributors

B. Global Distribuees

1. Responsible Agents

2. Patients and Addicts

C. Global Distribuenda

1. Welfare or Well-Being

2. Resources or Wealth

3. Opportunity or Access

III. GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION MECHANISMS

A. Mechanisms, Laws, and Governments

1. All Dressed Up with No Place To Go: Utilitarianism

2. More Tastefully Dressed but Still No Destination: Rawlsian Justice

3. Locally Determinate, Globally Indeterminate Prescription: Normative “Law and Economics”

B. One Satisfactory Mechanism

1. One Fully Specifiable Mechanism: Real Opportunity Spreading

2. Instantiability Challenges and Ordered “nth Bests”

3. The Role of Transnational Law

4. Comparative Transnational Legal and Institutional Competencies

IV. CONCLUSION

4 Global Economic Fairness: Internal Principles

I. THE INTERNAL–EXTERNAL DISTINCTION

II. SUGGESTIVE EXAMPLES FROM INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW

III. TRADE AS A SOCIAL PRACTICE OF MARKET RELIANCE

IV. DEPENDENT ISSUES

A. Fair Play

B. Fair Bargaining

C. Fair versus Free Trade

D. Fair Competition

E. Fair Wages

V. THE ISSUE OF SCOPE: CAPITAL MARKETS

PART II HOW JUSTICE GETS DONE IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

5 The Conventional Morality of Trade

I. INTRODUCTION

II. STRUCTURE

III. “THERE ARE NORMATIVE VALUES AT WORK”

IV. THE UNFOLDING OF SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT

A. The 1947 Debate on Infant Industries: “Equality as Sameness”

B. Havana to Tokyo: Winning Equal Treatment

C. The Haberler Report and Market Access

D. Deepening the Substantive Reading and the Argument for Status Equality: Debating Reciprocal Concessions

E. The Turn to Preferential Trade, Assault on Formal Equality, and Erosion of the MFN Obligation

V. FAIRNESS AS A GOVERNING CONCEPT: HUDEC REVISITED

VI. HUDEC’S “MORAL SKEPTICISM”

VII. EQUALITY AS A VALUE

VIII. THE EC – TARIFF PREFERENCES CASE

IX. CONCLUSION

6 The Political Geography of Distributive Justice

I. TWO APPROACHES TO GLOBAL JUSTICE

A. Macro and Micro Approaches to Global Justice

B. Mapping Global Justice

II. SHIFTS IN DEVELOPING STATE ADVOCACY FOR PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT: PRINCIPLED OR PRAGMATIC?

A. The Run-Up to the GATT

B. Developments after the GATTs Founding

III. DO PREFERENCE PROGRAMS WORK?

IV. TURNING THE DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE DEBATE INSIDE OUT

V. CONCLUSION

7 The Death of Doha? Forensics of Democratic Governance, Distributive Justice, and Development in the WTO

I. A BRIEF BACKGROUNDER TO THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA

II. COORDINATION PROBLEMS THAT SURFACED DURING THE DOHA NEGOTIATIONS

A. Increases in Numerical Scale and Substantive Scope

B. Fragmentation of Developing Countries as a Political Bloc

C. Parallel Negotiations in Bilateral and Regional North--South Agreements

III. NORMATIVE CONTRADICTIONS DESTABILIZING THE DOHA NEGOTIATING ENVIRONMENT

A. Internal Normative Contradictions from Mercantilism and Reciprocity: Do WTO Members Care About Free Trade?

B. External Normative Contradictions from National Security: Are WTO Members Friends or Enemies?

IV. LEGAL AND ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTIES REGARDING THE SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT PRINCIPLE

A. Open-Endedness in Law: Equality Jurisprudence48 in the WTO

B. Open-Endedness in Economics: The Need for Contextual Policies in Trade and Development

V. PHILOSOPHICAL CONUNDRUMS OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

A. Frank Garcias Rawlsian Argument for SD

B. Carol Goulds Human Rights Approach

VI. CONCLUSION

PART III CRITICAL RESPONSES TO CONTEMPORARY THEORIZING ABOUT JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

8 Global Justice and Trade

I. INTRODUCTION

II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: POVERTY, EQUALITY, AND EFFICIENCY

A. Some Caveats

III. THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION

A. Trade, Growth, and Poverty

B. Comparative Advantage

C. Endogenous Comparative Advantage

D. The Importance of Institutions

E. Conclusions Regarding the Economic Literature

IV. THE PHILOSOPHERS

A. The Failure to Recognize the Importance of Trade

B. The Problem of Stolen Goods

C. The Pauper-Labor Argument

D. Trade and Human Rights

E. Protectionist Fallacies

V. CONCLUSIONS

9 Jam Tomorrow: A Critique of International Economic Law

I. A MARXIST CRITIQUE

II. A POMO CRITIQUE

A. Incredulity toward Metanarratives

B. The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism

III. WHAT ABOUT TODAY?

10 Doing Justice: The Economics and Politics of International Distributive Justice

I. INTRODUCTION

II. LIMITED CONSENSUS

III. LIMITED KNOWLEDGE OF CAUSATION AND OF REMEDIES: JUSTICE ECONOMICS

IV. LIMITED INDUCEMENT: JUSTICE POLITICS

V. EXAMPLES OF POSSIBLE SITES FOR DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

A. Right to Health and TRIPS

B. International Tort: Bhopal

C. Special and Differential Treatment at the World Trade Organization

D. Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment

E. World Bank–International Monetary Fund Conditionality

VI. CONCLUSION: JUSTIFYING RULES AND INSTITUTIONS

Conclusion: An Agenda for Research and Action

Index