Private Wealth and Public Revenue in Latin America :Business Power and Tax Politics

Publication subTitle :Business Power and Tax Politics

Author: Tasha Fairfield;  

Publisher: Cambridge University Press‎

Publication year: 2015

E-ISBN: 9781316916452

P-ISBN(Paperback): 9781107088375

P-ISBN(Hardback):  9781107088375

Subject: D034 State institutions;D52 世界政治制度与国家机构

Keyword: 政治、法律

Language: ENG

Access to resources Favorite

Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.

Description

This book identifies sources of power that help business and economic elites influence policy decisions. This book develops a theoretical framework that refines and integrates the classic concepts of business's instrumental (political) power and structural (investment) power to explain the scope and fate of tax initiatives targeting economic elites in Latin America after economic liberalization. This book develops a theoretical framework that refines and integrates the classic concepts of business's instrumental (political) power and structural (investment) power to explain the scope and fate of tax initiatives targeting economic elites in Latin America after economic liberalization. Inequality and taxation are fundamental problems of modern times. How and when can democracies tax economic elites? This book develops a theoretical framework that refines and integrates the classic concepts of business's instrumental (political) power and structural (investment) power to explain the scope and fate of tax initiatives targeting economic elites in Latin America after economic liberalization. In Chile, business's multiple sources of instrumental power, including cohesion and ties to right parties, kept substantial tax increases off the agenda. In Argentina, weaker business power facilitated significant reform, although specific sectors, including finance and agriculture, occasionally had instrumental and/or structural power to defend their interests. In Bolivia, popular mobilization counterbalanced the power of economic elites, who were much stronger than in Argentina but weaker than in Chile. The book's in-depth, medium-N case analysis and close attention to policymaking processes contribute insights on business power and prospects for redistribution in unequal democracies. 1. Tax policy and economic elites: going where the money is; 2. The power of economic elites; 3. Organized business and direct taxation in Chile: restricting the agenda; 4. Circumventing business power in Chile: progress at the margins; 5. Weak economic elites and direct tax policy successes in Argentina; 6. Sectoral tax politics in Argentina: finance; 7. Sectoral tax politics in Argentina: agriculture; 8. Bolivia's tax-policy tightrope: powerful elites and mobilized masses; 9. Tax developments under left rule in Bolivia and right rule in Chile; 10. Conclusions. 'Tasha Fairfield's conceptually ambitious and empirically rich study is a landmark contribution to literature on elites and Latin American political economy. Her thorough comparative analysis of Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile reveals that strong business associations tied closely to the state augment elite capacity to block progressive tax reforms. Conversely, social movement influence over the state can undermine elite capacity to resist taxation needed to redistribute wealth in a region long plagued by vast income disparities.' Eric Hershberg, American University 'Despite long-standing concerns about economic inequality in Latin America and the growing attention to social policies that might address these concerns, there has been remarkably little political economy research on the tax side of these issues. Tasha Fairfield's new book, Private Wealth and Public Revenue in Latin America, takes an important step in filling this gap. Building on power resource theories, the book goes beyond the conventional focus on the impact of left parties and unions and shines a spotlight on the role and relative influence of busin

Chapter

1.5 Research Strategy

2 The Power of Economic Elites

2.1 Instrumental Power

Relationships

Partisan Linkages

Institutionalized Consultation

Recruitment into Government, Election to Public Office, and Informal Ties

Resources

Cohesion

Expertise

Media Access

Money

2.2 Structural Power

2.3 Integrating Analysis of Instrumental and Structural Power

A Note on “Discursive Power”

2.4 Reform Strategies: Circumventing Elites’ Power

Tax-Side Strategies

Attenuating Impact

Obfuscating Incidence

Legitimating Appeals

Vertical Equity

Horizontal Equity

Nationalism

Benefit-Side Strategies

Linking to Popular Benefits

Linking to Universal Benefits: Emphasizing Stabilization

Compensation

2.5 Popular Mobilization: Counteracting (or Reinforcing) Elites’ Power

2.6 Conclusion

3 Organized Business and Direct Taxation in Chile

3.1 The Rationale for Increasing the Corporate Tax

3.2 Business’s Weak Structural Power

3.3 Business’s Strong Instrumental Power

Cross-Sectoral Cohesion

Partisan Linkages

Government-Business Concertation

The Limited Role of Technical Expertise

3.4 Restricting the Agenda: The Dynamics of Policy Proposals under Lagos

The Anti-Evasion Reform

The 2001 Corporate Tax Increase

Corporate Tax Nonreform, 2003 and 2005

3.5 Continuity and Change: Corporate Tax Nonreform under Bachelet

Instrumental Power

Business-Right Relations: The Distancing Trend

Business as the Right’s Less Overt Core Constituency

An Exception that Highlights the Rule

New Factors Discouraging Direct Tax Reform

3.6 The 1990 Reform in Retrospect

3.7 Conclusion

4 Circumventing Business Power in Chile

4.1 The Concertación’s Strategy Repertoire

4.2 The 2001 Anti-Evasion Reform

4.3 Taxing the Mining Sector

Mining Sector Under-Taxation

Instrumental Power and Institutional Constraints

Successive Reform Attempts, 1998–2001

Building Momentum for Reform

From Avoiding Conflict to Initiating a Royalty

The 2004 Royalty Proposal

The 2005 Mining Tax

The Important but Limited Impact of Public Opinion

4.4 Eliminating a Regressive Income Tax Benefit

Pinochet’s Stock Owner Tax Benefit

Instrumental Power and Limited Prospects for Reform

The 2005 Reform Opportunity

4.5 Curtailing a Regressive VAT Credit

Business Power Deters Reform

Parliamentary Activism

Strategic Reform Design

Successes and Limitations

Modest Progress in a Context of Strong Business Power

4.6 Conclusion

5 Weak Economic Elites and Direct Tax Policy Successes in Argentina

5.1 Limited Structural Power

5.2 Weak Instrumental Power

Lack of Cohesion

Weak Relationships with Legislators

Absence of Partisan Linkages

Limited Effectiveness of Informal Ties

Sector-Specific Relationships with the Executive Branch

5.3 Corporate Taxes

The 1998 Reform

Reform Design

Dividing and Conquering Business Opposition

Equity Appeals

Comparison with Chile

The 2003 Transfer-Price Reform

Reform Design

Chronicle of a Lobbying Failure Foretold

Unsuccessful Attempts to Invoke Structural Power

Comparison with Chile

The Unsuccessful 1991 Income Tax Overhaul

Radical Reform Design

Broad, Intense Business Opposition

Circumstantial Business Allies

Concessions Erode Revenue Capacity

Fortuitous Convergence of Interests with Legislators

Contrast with the 1998 Reform

A Successful Alternative: The 1992 Reform

5.4 Individual Taxes

The 1999 Reform

Reform Design

Business Noninvolvement and Cross-Partisan Support

The 2008 Reform

5.5 Conclusion

6 Sectoral Tax Politics in Argentina: Finance

6.1 Bank-Information Access and Interest Earnings

Bank Information

Interest Earnings

Structural and Instrumental Power Preclude Reform, 1990s

Investors’ Structural Power

The Banks’ Instrumental Power

The Aborted 1995 Bank Information Resolution

Taxing Interest Earnings by Obfuscation

Bank information Access Post-2001: Weakened Financial-Sector Power

Interest Earnings Post-2001: Persistent Structural Power

6.2 Comparative Perspective: Bank-Information Access in Chile

6.3 Taxing Financial Transactions

2001 Reform: Weak Structural Power and Government Reform Strategies

The Impact on Checking Accounts

Post-2001: Weak Instrumental Power and Financial Sector Indifference

6.4 Conclusion

7 Sectoral Tax Politics in Argentina: Agriculture

7.1 VAT Politics

The Unsuccessful 1998 Initiative

Producers’ Weak Structural Power

Producers’ Tenuous Instrumental Power

Chronicle of a Lobbying Success Un-foretold

The Successful 2002 Initiative

Producers’ Weakened Power

Exporters’ Structural Power Promotes Reform

The Producers’ Failed Attempts to Block Reform

7.2 Export Taxes

Producers’ Weak Structural Power

Producers’ Weak Instrumental Power

Failure to Coordinate Protest, 2002–2007

Emergence of Large-Scale Protest, 2008

Components of Business Protest

Reversal of the 2008 Reform

7.3 Conclusion: Argentina’s Sectoral Tax Politics

Variation in Instrumental Power

Variation in Structural Power

Economic Crisis and Reform

8 Bolivia’s Tax Policy Tightrope

8.1 Business’s Instrumental Power

Cohesion

Tempered Informal Ties to Parties

Tempered Informal Ties to the Executive

8.2 Popular Mobilization

8.3 Sánchez de Lozada’s Ill-Fated 2003 Income Tax

The Modest Proposal

Business Opposition

Popular Protest

Inopportune Context

Strategic Errors

Circumstantial Popular Sector-Business Alliance

The Proposal’s Legacy

8.4 Mesa’s 2004 Tax Reform

Reform Design

Business Opposition to the Wealth Tax

Business’s Instrumental Power

Coordinated Opposition Defeats the Wealth Tax

Absence of Popular Support

Business Acquiescence to the Transaction Tax

8.5 The 2005 Hydrocarbon Reform

Business Power and the Hydrocarbons Sector

Popular Mobilization Overwhelms Business Power

Comparison with Copper Taxation in Chile

8.6 Conclusion

9 Tax Developments under Left Rule in Bolivia and Right Rule in Chile

9.1 Morales’s Tax Agenda

9.2 Piñera’s Tax Increases

9.3 Partisanship and Tax Policy

10 Conclusions

10.1 Business Power and Influence

10.2 Business Politics and the “Public Good”

10.3 Elite Cohesion and Taxation

10.4 The Politics of Policies

10.5 On Politics and Explanation

Appendix 1.1 Latin America’s Tax Problem

Appendix 1.2 Tax Revenue and Commodity Booms

Appendix 1.3 Case Selection

Appendix 4.1 Chilean Case Universe

Appendix 5.1 Expected Revenue Yield of Direct Tax Reforms

References

Index

The users who browse this book also browse