Chapter
2 The Independent Treasury System, 1840–1914
pp.：
31 – 32
1 The Two Banks of the United States, 1791–1836
pp.：
31 – 31
3 The Federal Reserve System, 1914–Present
pp.：
32 – 35
4 The Independence of the Fed
pp.：
35 – 38
4.1 Subservience to the Treasury during World War I
pp.：
38 – 40
4.2 The Great Depression: Failure and Reform
pp.：
40 – 42
4.3 Subservience to the Treasury Again: World War II and After
pp.：
42 – 45
4.4 The Treasury-Fed Accord of 1951
pp.：
45 – 45
4.5 The Controversial 1965 Discount Rate Increase
pp.：
45 – 46
4.6 Partisan Monetary Politics? The 1972 Election
pp.：
46 – 47
4.7 Congressional Oversight, 1975
pp.：
47 – 48
4.8 1979: Changes in Fed Operating Procedures
pp.：
48 – 49
4.9 Pressure from the Supply Side, 1981–1985
pp.：
49 – 50
5 Conclusion
pp.：
50 – 51
Chapter 3. The Bank of England: Relationships with the Government, the Civil Service, and Parliament
pp.：
52 – 53
1.2 After Nationalisation
pp.：
53 – 61
1.1 The Period before the Nationalisation in 1946
pp.：
53 – 53
1 Historical
pp.：
53 – 53
2 Analytical
pp.：
61 – 75
2.1 The Legal Position and the Working Relationship
pp.：
75 – 81
2.2 The Working Relationship
pp.：
81 – 83
3 Conclusion
pp.：
83 – 84
Chapter 4. The Banque de France and the State from 1850 to the Present Day
pp.：
86 – 87
1 The Problems of Being a Historian
pp.：
87 – 87
2 The Manifold and Complex Factors that Determine Relations Between the State and the Banque de France
pp.：
87 – 89
3 New Developments from 1850 to 1936
pp.：
89 – 91
3.1 The Development of State Control in the 19th Century
pp.：
91 – 91
3.2 The Ups and Downs of the Period 1920 to 1936
pp.：
91 – 96
4 Change and Continuity from 1936 to the 1980s
pp.：
96 – 101
4.1 1936–1944
pp.：
101 – 101
4.2 1945–1986
pp.：
101 – 102
References
pp.：
102 – 116
Chapter 5. Relations between Monetary Authorities and Governmental Institutions: The Case of Germany from the 19th Century to the Present
pp.：
116 – 119
1 Introduction
pp.：
119 – 119
2 The Historical Evolution
pp.：
119 – 121
2.2 From the Beginning of the First World War to the End of Germany’s Great Inflation 1923
pp.：
121 – 127
2.1 From the Foundation of the Reich to the First World War
pp.：
121 – 121
2.3 From the End of Hyperinflation to the End of the Weimar Republic
pp.：
127 – 132
2.4 The Nazi Period (1933–1945)
pp.：
132 – 147
2.5 From 1945 to the Present
pp.：
147 – 153
3 Conclusion: The Prime Motives for the Legal Changes in Relations between Germany’s Central Bank and Government and a Summary of Arguments Pro and Con the Bank’s Autonomy
pp.：
153 – 164
References
pp.：
164 – 168
Chapter 6. A Central Bank Between the Government and the Credit System: The Bank of Italy after World War II
pp.：
168 – 175
1 Credit Legislation and the Bank of Italy
pp.：
175 – 176
Introduction
pp.：
175 – 175
2 The Bank of Italy’s Structural Superversion and the Evolution of the Financial System
pp.：
176 – 179
2.1 Alternative Views on the Financial Structure
pp.：
179 – 179
2.2 The Development of the Structure of the Credit System under Menichella
pp.：
179 – 181
2.3 The Rationale of the Bank of Italy’s Choices with Regard to the Structure of the Credit System in the Period 1948–59
pp.：
181 – 182
2.4 The Early Sixties and the Start of Carli’s Governorship
pp.：
182 – 185
2.5 Carli and the Structure of the Financial System
pp.：
185 – 186
2.6 The Structure of the Financial System and the Relationship with the Government
pp.：
186 – 188
2.7 Monetary Versus “Real” Policy Making
pp.：
188 – 190
2.8 The Change in Strategy During the Seventies
pp.：
190 – 193
3 The Major Monetary Policy Choices
pp.：
193 – 196
3.1 Monetary Policy Between 1947 and 1960
pp.：
196 – 196
3.2 From 1964 to 1973
pp.：
196 – 198
3.3 From 1973 to the Present
pp.：
198 – 200
4 From (Italian) History to (General) Theory
pp.：
200 – 202
References
pp.：
202 – 207
About the Authors
pp.：
207 – 211
Central banks' independence in historical perspective
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