

Author: Sloan Geoff
Publisher: Routledge Ltd
ISSN: 0268-4527
Source: Intelligence and National Security, Vol.28, Iss.4, 2013-08, pp. : 453-494
Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.
Abstract
The teleological narrative that has dominated the handling of intelligence by the British state in the events that led up to the 1916 Irish Rebellion in Dublin has been characterised as a cocktail of incompetence and mendacity. Using new and existing archive material this article argues that both the cabinet in London and key members of the Irish Executive in Dublin were supplied with accurate and timely intelligence by the Admiralty's signals intelligence unit, the Royal Irish Constabulary and the Dublin Metropolitan Police with respect to this event. Far from being a failure of intelligence here is evidence to show that there occurred a failure of response on behalf of key decision-makers. The warnings that were given by intelligence organisations were filtered through the existing policy preferences and assumptions. As a result of these factors accurate evaluations and sound judgement were not exercised by key officials, such as Sir Matthew Nathan, in Dublin Castle.
Related content


British Welfare State: Success and Failure
Review of Politics, Vol. 32, Iss. 2, 1970-04 ,pp. :




9/11: The Failure of Strategic Intelligence
Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 18, Iss. 4, 2003-12 ,pp. :

