The English Auction Is Optimal Among Simple Sequential Auctions

Author： Lopomo G.  

Publisher： Academic Press

ISSN： 0022-0531

Source： Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.82, Iss.1, 1998-09, pp. : 144-166

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