On Renegotiation-Proof Collusion under Imperfect Public Information

Author： Yoon K.  

Publisher： Academic Press

ISSN： 0022-0531

Source： Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.85, Iss.2, 1999-04, pp. : 328-336

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