Cheap Talk and Burned Money

Author： Austen-Smith D.   Banks J.S.  

Publisher： Academic Press

ISSN： 0022-0531

Source： Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.91, Iss.1, 2000-03, pp. : 1-16

Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.

Previous Menu Next

Abstract

We augment the standard Crawford–Sobel (1982, Econometrica 50, 1431–1451) model of cheap talk communication by allowing the informed party to use both costless and costly messages. The issues on which we focus are the consequences for cheap talk signaling of the option to burn money and the circumstances under which both cheap talk and burned money are used to signal information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, D8. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.

Related content

MONEY TALKS? AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF CHEAP TALK AND BURNED MONEY

By  

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Vol. 56, Iss. 4, 2015-11 ,pp. : 1385-1426 (42)

John Wiley & Sons Inc

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Persuasion by Cheap Talk

By Chakraborty Archishman   Harbaugh Rick  

The American Economic Review, Vol. 100, Iss. 5, 2010-12 ,pp. : 2361-2382 (22)

American Economic Association

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games

By Blume A.   Arnold T.  

Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 46, Iss. 2, 2004-02 ,pp. : 240-259 (20)

Elsevier

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Co-ordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk

By Baliga S.   Morris S.  

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 105, Iss. 2, 2002-08 ,pp. : 450-468 (19)

Academic Press

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap-Talk Coordination Games

By Banerjee A.   Weibull J.W.  

Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 32, Iss. 1, 2000-07 ,pp. : 1-24 (24)

Elsevier

Access to resources Recommend Favorite