Author： Gehrlein W.V.
Publisher： Academic Press
ISSN： 0049-089X
Source： Social Science Research, Vol.28, Iss.1, 1999-03, pp. : 36-44
Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.
Abstract
The Condorcet winner in an election is a candidate who could defeat each of the other available alternatives by majority rule in a series of pairwise votes. The Condorcet efficiency of a voting procedure is the conditional probability that it will elect the Condorcet winner, given that a Condorcet winner exists. The study considers the Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule, which assigns weights of (1, ½, 0) respectively to each voter's first, second, and third ranked candidates, and elects the candidate with the most total points. A closed form representation is obtained for the Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with large electorates under the dual culture condition for three-candidate elections. Borda Rule is shown to perform very well over the range of dual culture probability vectors.
Related content
Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach
Theory and Decision, Vol. 71, Iss. 2, 2011-08 ,pp. :
Access to resources
Recommend
Which Scoring Rule Maximizes Condorcet Efficiency Under Iac?
Theory and Decision, Vol. 58, Iss. 2, 2005-03 ,pp. :
Borda and Condorcet: Some Distance Results
Theory and Decision, Vol. 59, Iss. 2, 2005-09 ,pp. :
Scoring Rules, Condorcet Efficiency and Social Homogeneity
By Lepelley D. Pierron P. Valognes F.
Theory and Decision, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, 2000-09 ,pp. :