Trading Hot-Air. The Influence of Permit Allocation Rules, Market Power and the US Withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol

ISSN： 0924-6460

Source： Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol.32, Iss.2, 2005-10, pp. : 205-228

Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.

Previous Menu Next

Abstract

Related content

Market power and hot air in international emissions trading: the impacts of US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol

By BÖhringer Christoph LÖschel Andreas

Applied Economics, Vol. 35, Iss. 6, 2003-01 ,pp. : 651-663

Routledge Ltd

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

The Kyoto Protocol, market power, and enforcement

By de Brauw Alan

Applied Economics, Vol. 38, Iss. 18, 2006-10 ,pp. : 2169-2178

Routledge Ltd

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Market Power, Permit Allocation and Efficiency in Emission Permit Markets

By Hintermann Beat

Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 49, Iss. 3, 2011-07 ,pp. : 327-349

Springer Publishing Company

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

On Pollution Permit Banking and Market Power

By Liski Matti Montero Juan-Pablo

Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 29, Iss. 3, 2006-05 ,pp. : 283-302

Springer Publishing Company

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Sulfur Allowance Trading and the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market: A Comparative Design Analysis of two Major Cap-and-Trade Permit Programs?

By Schwarze R.

Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 17, Iss. 3, 2000-11 ,pp. : 279-298

Springer Publishing Company

Access to resources Recommend Favorite