Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study

Author： Potters Jan   Sefton Martin   Vesterlund Lise  

Publisher： Springer Publishing Company

ISSN： 0938-2259

Source： Economic Theory, Vol.33, Iss.1, 2007-10, pp. : 169-182

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