The Hidden Advantage of Delegation: Pareto Improvements in a Gift Exchange Game

Author： Charness Gary Cobo-Reyes Ramón Jiménez Natalia Lacomba Juan A. Lagos Francisco

Publisher： American Economic Association

ISSN： 0002-8282

Source： The American Economic Review, Vol.102, Iss.5, 2012-08, pp. : 2358-2379

Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.

Previous Menu Next

Abstract

Related content

The gift of advice: communication in a bilateral gift exchange game

By Cooper David Lightle John

Experimental Economics, Vol. 16, Iss. 4, 2013-12 ,pp. : 443-477

Springer Publishing Company

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Information acquisition, political game and the delegation of authority

By Laffont J.-J. Zantman W.

European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 18, Iss. 3, 2002-09 ,pp. : 407-428

Elsevier

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Evolution and Information in a Gift-Giving Game

By Johnson P. Levine D.K. Pesendorfer W.

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 100, Iss. 1, 2001-09 ,pp. : 1-21

Academic Press

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

The Currency of Reciprocity: Gift Exchange in the Workplace

By Kube Sebastian Maréchal Michel André Puppea Clemens

The American Economic Review, Vol. 102, Iss. 4, 2012-06 ,pp. : 1644-1662

American Economic Association

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

How Robust is Laboratory Gift Exchange?

By Charness Gary

Experimental Economics, Vol. 7, Iss. 2, 2004-06 ,pp. : 189-205

Springer Publishing Company

Access to resources Recommend Favorite