Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match

Author： Abdulkadiroğlu Atila   Pathak Parag A.   Roth Alvin E.  

Publisher： American Economic Association

ISSN： 0002-8282

Source： The American Economic Review, Vol.99, Iss.5, 2009-12, pp. : 1954-1978

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