Communication, Reputation, and Punishment in Sequential Bargaining Experiments

Author： Brosig Jeannette   Weimann Joachim   Yang Chun-Lei  

Publisher： Mohr Siebeck

ISSN： 0932-4569

Source： Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE, Vol.160, Iss.4, 2004-12, pp. : 576-606

Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.

Previous Menu Next

Abstract

Related content

Bargaining Before or After Communication?

By Wernerfelt Birger  

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE, Vol. 164, Iss. 2, 2008-06 ,pp. : 211-229

Mohr Siebeck

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Land Assembly and the Holdout Problem Under Sequential Bargaining

By Miceli Thomas J.   Segerson Kathleen  

American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2, 2012-12 ,pp. : 372-390

Oxford University Press

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Intentions Matter: Lessons from Bargaining Experiments

By Oechssler Jörg  

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE, Vol. 159, Iss. 1, 2003-03 ,pp. : 195-198

Mohr Siebeck

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Reasons for Conflict: Lessons from Bargaining Experiments

By Falk Armin   Fehr Ernst   Fischbacher Urs  

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE, Vol. 159, Iss. 1, 2003-03 ,pp. : 171-187

Mohr Siebeck

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

The Impact of Interactive Corporate Social Responsibility Communication on Corporate Reputation

By Eberle David   Berens Guido   Li Ting  

Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 118, Iss. 4, 2013-12 ,pp. : 731-746

Springer Publishing Company

Access to resources Recommend Favorite