

Author: Li Sujuan Zhang Futai Sun Yinxia Shen Limin
Publisher: Springer Publishing Company
ISSN: 1386-7857
Source: Cluster Computing, Vol.16, Iss.4, 2013-12, pp. : 797-806
Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.
Abstract
For an encryption scheme to be applied in practical applications, it should withstand various leakage attacks. In this paper, we present a new leakage-resilient public key encryption scheme whose security is based on the classical DDH (decisional Diffie-Hellman) assumption. In the computational cost, our proposed scheme is more efficient than the original Cramer-Shoup leakage-resilient public key encryption scheme. At the same time, our new scheme also enjoys a shorter (public and secret) key length, and a higher relative key leakage ratio. We formally prove our new proposal is semantically secure against adaptive posteriori chosen ciphertext key-leakage attacks assuming the hardness of the DDH problem without random models.
Related content







