Quine and the Limit Assumption in Peirce's Theory of Truth

Author： Creath R.  

Publisher： Springer Publishing Company

ISSN： 0031-8116

Source： Philosophical Studies, Vol.90, Iss.2, 1998-05, pp. : 109-112

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