Appointing central bankers: The politics of monetary policy in the United States and the European Monetary Union. Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions

Author： Toma Mark  

Publisher： Springer Publishing Company

ISSN： 0048-5829

Source： Public Choice, Vol.125, Iss.1-2, 2005-07, pp. : 235-238

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