The issue of instability in a simple policy game between the central bank and a representative union

Author： Bartolomeo Giovanni Pauwels Wilfried

ISSN： 0048-5829

Source： Public Choice, Vol.126, Iss.3-4, 2006-03, pp. : 275-296

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