Salience and sanctions: a principal-agent analysis of domestic win-sets in two-level games—the case of British European policy under the Blair government

Author： Oppermann Kai  

Publisher： Routledge Ltd

ISSN： 0955-7571

Source： Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol.21, Iss.2, 2008-06, pp. : 179-197

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