Moral hazard, competition and contract design: empirical evidence from managerial, franchised and entrepreneurial businesses in Norway

Author： Nygaard Arne Myrtveit Ingunn

Publisher： Routledge Ltd

ISSN： 1466-4283

Source： Applied Economics, Vol.32, Iss.3, 2000-02, pp. : 349-356

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