Author: Alweiss Lilian
Publisher: Routledge Ltd
ISSN: 1466-4542
Source: International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol.17, Iss.3, 2009-07, pp. : 415-434
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Abstract
Michel Henry wishes to salvage Descartes's first principle 'I think, I am' by claiming that there is no need to appeal to the world or others to make sense of the self. One of his main targets is Edmund Husserl, who claims that thought is necessarily intentional and thus necessarily about something that is other to thought. To show that this is not so, Henry draws on passages from Descartes's texts which emphasize that we should not equate the cogito with thinking but with sensation and imagination. This allows Henry to explore the notion that the self has its own form of manifestation. This paper questions Henry's reading of Descartes and his critique of Husserl on two fronts. First, the passages Henry draws upon, if anything only confirm, rather than question Husserl's claim that consciousness is intentional. Second, Henry believes that he can show that the life of the self is infinitely rich without having to appeal to other persons or, indeed, to the world. Yet, I wish to contend that Henry is mistaken: as Husserl has shown convincingly, a life without others and the world is not only impoverished and bereft of meaning, but remains entirely indeterminate. The self only manifests itself with respect to others and the world.
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