Concepts

pp.：  3 – 4

CONTENTS

pp.：  5 – 8

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

pp.：  9 – 10

INTRODUCTION

pp.：  11 – 20

The Diversity of Concepts

pp.：  13 – 17

Why Concepts Matter

pp.：  18 – 20

PART I: CONTEMPORARY THEORY

pp.：  21 – 44

CHAPTER ONE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONCEPTS

pp.：  23 – 44

The Classical Theory of Concepts

pp.：  26 – 29

Some Reflections on Aristotle

pp.：  30 – 31

Prototypes , Exemplars and Ideals

pp.：  32 – 33

Theory Theory and Semantic Networks

pp.：  34 – 35

What Has Been Learnt from Analytical Approaches

pp.：  36 – 37

The Problem with the Analytical View

pp.：  38 – 40

Analysis

pp.：  41 – 41

The Sociocultural Turn

pp.：  42 – 44

CHAPTER TWO: NARRATIVES AND METAPHORS

pp.：  45 – 56

The Narrative Turn

pp.：  45 – 49

Metaphors, Models and Analogy

pp.：  50 – 51

Analogy in Creating Concepts

pp.：  52 – 56

CHAPTER THREE: CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND LINGUISTICS

pp.：  57 – 70

Piaget

pp.：  57 – 58

Thomas Kuhn’s Sociology of Science

pp.：  59 – 61

Misconceptions and Conceptual Change

pp.：  62 – 63

Linguistics

pp.：  64 – 66

Wittgenstein

pp.：  67 – 70

CHAPTER FOUR: ROBERT BRANDOM ON CONCEPTS

pp.：  71 – 86

Introduction

pp.：  71 – 71

Brandom’s Theory of Concepts

pp.：  72 – 77

Brandom’s Critique of the Psychology of Concepts

pp.：  78 – 79

Critique of Brandom’s Theory of Concepts

pp.：  80 – 84

Conclusion

pp.：  85 – 86

CHAPTER FIVE: WHERE WE ARE NOW WITH CONCEPTS

pp.：  87 – 96

Thought-Forms and Mental Images

pp.：  87 – 91

Networks, Plots, Categories, Theories and Institutions

pp.：  92 – 93

Conclusion

pp.：  94 – 96

PART II: HEGEL

pp.：  97 – 122

CHAPTER SIX: THE STORY OF THE CONCEPT

pp.：  99 – 122

Descartes and the Mind/Matter Dichotomy

pp.：  99 – 103

Kant and the Subject/Object Relation

pp.：  104 – 104

Herder, Goethe and Culture

pp.：  105 – 111

Hegel’s Appropriation of the Urphänomen

pp.：  112 – 114

Hegel and Mediation

pp.：  115 – 118

Formations of Consciousness

pp.：  119 – 121

The Concept

pp.：  122 – 122

CHAPTER SEVEN: HEGEL’S LOGIC

pp.：  123 – 144

The Subject Matter of the Logic

pp.：  123 – 125

A Presuppositionless Philosophy?

pp.：  126 – 127

Moving Concepts

pp.：  128 – 128

The Logic Concerns Real Situations

pp.：  129 – 130

Being Is the Concept In-Itself

pp.：  131 – 133

Essence Is Reflection

pp.：  134 – 135

The Abstract Concept

pp.：  136 – 138

The Genesis of the Concept

pp.：  139 – 140

Each Division Has a Distinct Form of Movement

pp.：  141 – 142

Hegel’s Logic and Categorisation

pp.：  143 – 144

CHAPTER EIGHT: THE GENESIS OF THE CONCEPT

pp.：  145 – 154

Being

pp.：  145 – 147

Reflection

pp.：  148 – 154

CHAPTER NINE: THE REALISATION OF THE CONCEPT

pp.：  155 – 172

The Abstract Concept

pp.：  155 – 159

Being and the Concept

pp.：  160 – 160

Development of the Concept

pp.：  161 – 161

The Individual, Universal and Particular

pp.：  162 – 164

The Immediate Concept

pp.：  165 – 168

Objectification

pp.：  169 – 169

Hegel’s Critique of the Individual/Society Dichotomy

pp.：  170 – 172

CHAPTER TEN: HEGEL’S PSYCHOLOGY

pp.：  173 – 188

The Subjective Spirit

pp.：  173 – 175

Subject and Object

pp.：  176 – 177

The Psyche

pp.：  178 – 179

Consciousness

pp.：  180 – 182

Intelligence or “Free Mind”

pp.：  183 – 185

Practical and Theoretical Spirit

pp.：  186 – 186

The Individual Self

pp.：  187 – 187

Conclusion

pp.：  188 – 188

PART III: FROM PHILOSOPHY TO THE HUMAN SCIENCES

pp.：  189 – 206

CHAPTER ELEVEN: THE CRITICAL APPROPRIATION OF HEGEL

pp.：  191 – 206

Hegel and Activity

pp.：  192 – 193

Hegel’s Idealism

pp.：  194 – 194

Concepts Are Processes Not Entities

pp.：  195 – 196

The Structure of the Concept

pp.：  197 – 198

Marx

pp.：  199 – 206

CHAPTER TWELVE: SOURCES OF CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY

pp.：  207 – 232

German Natural Science

pp.：  208 – 218

French Sociology

pp.：  219 – 221

American Pragmatism

pp.：  222 – 232

PART IV: VYGOTSKY

pp.：  233 – 258

CHAPTER THIRTEEN: CONCEPTS IN CHILDHOOD

pp.：  235 – 258

Concepts

pp.：  240 – 240

The ‘Double Stimulation’ Experiment

pp.：  241 – 244

Infancy

pp.：  245 – 245

Syncretic Concepts

pp.：  246 – 247

Complexes

pp.：  248 – 254

Potential Concepts and Preconcepts

pp.：  255 – 256

Conclusion

pp.：  257 – 258

CHAPTER FOURTEEN: VYGOTSKY ON ‘TRUE CONCEPTS’

pp.：  259 – 286

Scientifijic Concepts

pp.：  259 – 259

The Concepts of Social Science

pp.：  260 – 261

The Method for Investigating Concepts

pp.：  262 – 261

True Concepts and Spontaneous Concepts

pp.：  262 – 263

The Concept and Its Defijinition

pp.：  264 – 264

Concepts and Word Meaning

pp.：  265 – 266

Concepts and Problem-Situations

pp.：  267 – 269

The Development of Concepts

pp.：  270 – 273

Conscious Awareness

pp.：  274 – 277

Defijinitions

pp.：  278 – 278

Concepts Are Part of a System

pp.：  279 – 281

Generalisation

pp.：  282 – 283

Conclusion

pp.：  284 – 286

CHAPTER FIFTEEN: CONCEPTS AND ACTIVITY

pp.：  287 – 300

Concepts and Activity Theory

pp.：  288 – 289

Concepts and Predicaments

pp.：  290 – 292

True, Scientifijic and Everyday Concepts in Social Life

pp.：  293 – 294

Concepts and Material Culture

pp.：  295 – 297

Dialogical and Cultural Theory

pp.：  298 – 298

Conclusion

pp.：  299 – 300

CONCLUSION

pp.：  301 – 310

Current Research in the Light of Hegel and Vygotsky

pp.：  301 – 301

What Is a Concept?

pp.：  302 – 304

Objectifijication and Reifijication

pp.：  305 – 306

Abstract Generality

pp.：  307 – 307

Self-Realisation and Sustainability

pp.：  308 – 310

REFERENCES

pp.：  311 – 314

INDEX

pp.：  315 – 318