Contents

pp.：  5 – 18

Preface

pp.：  19 – 20

Introduction

pp.：  21 – 32

Chapter One The Concept of transcendens in Medieval Thought: What is beyond and what is common

pp.：  33 – 54

1.1 Introduction: Transcendentalis and transcendens

pp.：  33 – 34

1.2 The ambivalence of the term transcendens: The Declaratio difficilium terminorum of Armand of Bellevue

pp.：  35 – 40

Structure of the work

pp.：  36 – 36

Explanation of the term transcendens

pp.：  37 – 40

1.3 Transcendens (1): A philosophy of the Transcendent

pp.：  41 – 44

1.4 Transcendens (2): Transcendental philosophy

pp.：  45 – 54

Another transcensus: A “semantic” transcendence

pp.：  45 – 47

The emergence of the term transcendens (2)

pp.：  48 – 51

Treatises De transcendentibus

pp.：  52 – 54

Chapter Two Conditions, Presuppositions and Sources of a Doctrine of the Transcendentals

pp.：  55 – 128

2.1 The aetas Boetiana

pp.：  55 – 65

Metaphysics without the Metaphysics

pp.：  56 – 56

Porphyry’s Isagoge: Equivocity of being

pp.：  57 – 57

“Boethian transcendentals”

pp.：  58 – 63

Equivocity revised

pp.：  64 – 65

2.2 Change of perspective in the thirteenth century

pp.：  66 – 73

Albert the Great’s logical commentaries

pp.：  66 – 68

The treatise De natura generis

pp.：  69 – 72

Conclusion

pp.：  73 – 72

Sources

pp.：  73 – 73

2.3 The reception of Aristotle

pp.：  74 – 94

2.3.1 The Metaphysics

pp.：  74 – 79

The ambiguity of First Philosophy

pp.：  74 – 76

The medieval “basic question” as to the proprium subiectum

pp.：  77 – 79

2.3.2 The Philosopher and the common notions

pp.：  80 – 90

“Being” is not a genus

pp.：  81 – 81

The convertibility of being and one

pp.：  82 – 83

Truth is twofold: in the mind and in things

pp.：  84 – 86

Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s Idea of the Good

pp.：  87 – 90

2.3.3 Equivocity and “analogy”

pp.：  91 – 94

2.4 Avicenna: “The second beginning of metaphysics”

pp.：  95 – 120

2.4.1 The inquiry into the “subject” of metaphysics

pp.：  96 – 100

“Common being”

pp.：  96 – 99

Averroes’s criticism: The “theological” conception

pp.：  100 – 100

2.4.2 The doctrine of the primary notions

pp.：  101 – 120

The beginning of thought: “The first impressions in the soul”

pp.：  102 – 105

“Thing” and “Being”

pp.：  106 – 109

The accidentality of the “one”

pp.：  110 – 115

The commonness of the primary notions: Analogical or Univocal?

pp.：  116 – 118

Conclusion: A doctrine of the transcendentals in Avicenna?

pp.：  119 – 120

2.5 Dionysius the Areopagite and the doctrine of the transcendentals

pp.：  121 – 128

The divine names and the transcendentals

pp.：  122 – 122

The primacy of the “good”

pp.：  123 – 124

The beautiful

pp.：  125 – 125

Analogy

pp.：  126 – 126

Critiques of transcendental metaphysics

pp.：  127 – 128

Chapter Three The Beginning of the Doctrine of the Transcendentals (ca. 1225): Philip the Chancellor

pp.：  129 – 154

3.1 The prologue of the Summa de bono

pp.：  130 – 134

3.2 The communissima: Their ratio and order

pp.：  135 – 141

The good (bonum)

pp.：  135 – 136

The true (verum)

pp.：  137 – 138

Indivisio: The model of the “one”

pp.：  139 – 141

3.3 God and the commonness of the good

pp.：  142 – 144

3.4 The communissima as the “firsts” (prima)

pp.：  145 – 145

3.5 The Summa de bono: A metaphysics of the good

pp.：  146 – 147

3.6 The beginning of the doctrine of the transcendentals?

pp.：  148 – 154

William of Auxerre

pp.：  149 – 149

William of Auvergne

pp.：  150 – 154

Chapter Four The Doctrine of the Transcendentals in Franciscan Masters

pp.：  155 – 196

4.1 The expansion of the doctrine in the Summa Halensis

pp.：  155 – 166

The place of the transcendentals in the Summa

pp.：  156 – 157

The expansion of the doctrine

pp.：  158 – 159

The “firstness” of the transcendentals

pp.：  160 – 161

The systematic order

pp.：  162 – 166

4.2 Bonaventure: Transcendentals and the ascent of the mind to God

pp.：  167 – 179

“The noblest and most general conditions of being”

pp.：  168 – 169

First step in the ascent: Transcendentals as “vestiges” of God

pp.：  170 – 171

Second step: The “complete resolution” of knowledge

pp.：  172 – 175

The first known: The divine being

pp.：  176 – 179

Concluding observations

pp.：  180 – 180

4.3 Excursus: The transcendentality of the beautiful (pulchrum)

pp.：  181 – 196

4.3.1 Dionysius the Areopagite: The good and the beautiful

pp.：  181 – 182

4.3.2 The medieval reception of Dionysius: The good, the beautiful and the true

pp.：  183 – 187

4.3.3 The beautiful: A distinct transcendental property?

pp.：  188 – 196

In support of the transcendentality of beauty

pp.：  189 – 191

The silence of medieval authors

pp.：  192 – 194

Conclusion

pp.：  195 – 196

Chapter Five Albertus Magnus: Different Traditions of thought and the Transcendentals

pp.：  197 – 228

5.1 The treatise De bono: Albert and Philip the Chancellor

pp.：  198 – 202

5.2 Commentary on the Sentences: The ‘philosophus’ versus the ‘sancti’

pp.：  203 – 205

5.3 The Dionysian tradition and the doctrine of the transcendentals

pp.：  206 – 215

5.3.1 The commonness of the good: Univocatio analogiae

pp.：  206 – 209

5.3.2 The primacy of the good

pp.：  210 – 211

5.3.3 Albert’s accounts of the transcendentals

pp.：  212 – 215

First account

pp.：  212 – 213

Second account

pp.：  214 – 215

5.4 Aristotle’s Metaphysics and the transcendentia

pp.：  216 – 223

5.4.1 The disputation on the “subject” of metaphysics

pp.：  216 – 219

5.4.2 The primacy of being: “the first that is created” (Liber De causis)

pp.：  220 – 223

5.5 Summa theologiae

pp.：  224 – 225

Conclusion

pp.：  226 – 228

Chapter Six Thomas Aquinas: A First Model

pp.：  229 – 292

6.1 Aquinas’s systematic account of the transcendentals

pp.：  231 – 249

The Avicennian analogy argument: The “resolution” into something first

pp.：  231 – 232

The first conception of the intellect: “Being” (ens)

pp.：  233 – 234

The problem of the addition to “being”

pp.：  235 – 237

Explication of the special modes of being: The categories

pp.：  238 – 237

Explication of the general modes of being: The transcendentals

pp.：  238 – 242

Innovations

pp.：  243 – 246

The account in De veritate q. 21, a. 1

pp.：  247 – 249

6.2 Metaphysics as the scientia communis

pp.：  250 – 258

The “subject” of metaphysics: Ens commune

pp.：  251 – 254

“The common science”

pp.：  255 – 257

Being as being and the idea of creation

pp.：  258 – 258

6.3 Transcendentals and the foundations of knowledge

pp.：  259 – 266

6.3.1 Foundation of theoretical knowledge: “Being”

pp.：  260 – 261

6.3.2 Foundation of practical knowledge: “The good”

pp.：  262 – 266

“Being” and “good”

pp.：  265 – 266

6.4 Transcendentals as “the firsts”

pp.：  267 – 280

6.4.1 The genesis of the primary notions

pp.：  267 – 268

6.4.2 The debate on what is first known and “the proper object” of the intellect

pp.：  269 – 277

Critique: God is not what is first known

pp.：  269 – 271

The proper object of the intellect: Being or the quiddity of a material thing?

pp.：  272 – 275

The limits of philosophical knowledge

pp.：  276 – 277

6.4.3 The first known and analogy: Praedicatio concreti de abstracto

pp.：  278 – 280

6.5 Transcendentals and the divine

pp.：  281 – 289

6.5.1 Transcendental terms as the primary divine names

pp.：  282 – 283

6.5.2 The legitimacy of the Platonic-Dionysian method of reduction: God as cause of the maxime communia

pp.：  284 – 285

6.5.3 “Analogical” commonness

pp.：  286 – 289

No univocity

pp.：  287 – 287

No equivocity

pp.：  288 – 288

Conclusion: Analogical predication

pp.：  289 – 289

Concluding observations

pp.：  290 – 292

Chapter Seven Henry of Ghent: The onto-theological transformation of the doctrine

pp.：  293 – 334

7.1 After the example of Thomas Aquinas: Henry’s accounts of the transcendentals

pp.：  293 – 305

7.1.1 On truth (and Aquinas’s De veritate q. 1, a. 1)

pp.：  294 – 301

The analogy argument: The reduction to a first

pp.：  295 – 295

The first concept: “Being” (ens)

pp.：  296 – 296

The problem of the addition to “being”

pp.：  297 – 297

The “explication of being”

pp.：  298 – 298

The ratio of the “true”

pp.：  299 – 299

The priority of “being” and of “true”

pp.：  300 – 300

Conclusion

pp.：  301 – 301

7.1.2 On goodness (and Aquinas’s De veritate q. 21, a. 1)

pp.：  302 – 305

7.2 “Thing” (res) and “being” (ens)

pp.：  306 – 316

7.2.1 The two modes of res

pp.：  307 – 309

7.2.2 A “new” metaphysics?

pp.：  310 – 311

7.2.3 The primacy of “thing” and of “being”

pp.：  312 – 316

The stages in the process of scientific knowledge

pp.：  312 – 313

“Being”: The “first object” of the intellect and the “subject” of metaphysics

pp.：  314 – 316

7.3 The transcendentals and the divine

pp.：  317 – 333

7.3.1 The analogical community of being

pp.：  317 – 321

7.3.2 A new way to God from the first concepts

pp.：  322 – 328

A synthesis of Avicenna and Augustine

pp.：  322 – 324

The three degrees of quidditative knowledge of God

pp.：  325 – 328

7.3.3 God as what is first known

pp.：  329 – 333

Concluding observations

pp.：  334 – 334

Chapter Eight The German Dominican School: Dietrich of Freiberg and Meister Eckhart

pp.：  335 – 390

8.1 Dietrich of Freiberg

pp.：  336 – 349

8.1.1 A “Copernican revolution” in the Middle Ages?

pp.：  336 – 342

8.1.2 Dietrich’s doctrine of the transcendentals

pp.：  343 – 349

The primacy of “being” (ens)

pp.：  343 – 345

The second transcendental: Quid

pp.：  346 – 346

The ratio of “one” (unum)

pp.：  347 – 348

“The good” (bonum)

pp.：  349 – 349

8.2 Meister Eckhart: Deus communis est

pp.：  350 – 387

8.2.1 The project of the Opus tripartitum: “Metaphysics of the transcendentals”

pp.：  350 – 356

8.2.2 The special nature of Eckhart’s doctrine

pp.：  357 – 369

The inclusion of the “spiritual perfections”

pp.：  357 – 358

The doubling of the general terms in abstracta and concreta

pp.：  359 – 360

Identification of the transcendentals with God

pp.：  361 – 364

Transcendentals and the Trinity

pp.：  365 – 366

By way of a summary: Eckhart’s explanation of the text “In propria venit” (John 1,11)

pp.：  367 – 369

8.2.3 The order of the transcendentals

pp.：  370 – 378

The primordiality of unum

pp.：  371 – 372

Verum and bonum: Hierarchisation of the transcendentals

pp.：  373 – 377

The order of the transcendentals and soul’s ascent to God

pp.：  378 – 378

8.2.4 The German Eckhart: The transcendentals in The Book of Divine Consolation

pp.：  379 – 380

8.2.5 Analogy or Univocity?

pp.：  381 – 387

Concluding observations

pp.：  388 – 390

Chapter Nine Duns Scotus: A Turn in the Doctrine of the Transcendentals

pp.：  391 – 452

9.1 Tradition and innovation: “Scientia transcendens”

pp.：  391 – 401

9.1.1 “Scientia transcendens”: A “programmatic” phrase?

pp.：  392 – 397

9.1.2 “Metaphysica transcendens” and the question as to the “subject” of metaphysics

pp.：  398 – 401

9.2 Scotus’s new conception of transcendentality

pp.：  402 – 412

9.2.1 Separation from commonness

pp.：  402 – 408

The inclusion of the divine

pp.：  402 – 403

Another determination of transcendens

pp.：  404 – 406

Disjunctive transcendentals

pp.：  407 – 408

9.2.2 Transcendentality and perfection

pp.：  409 – 412

9.3 Transcendentality and univocity

pp.：  413 – 420

9.3.1 Arguments for the univocity of being

pp.：  414 – 417

9.3.2 “Destruction of the whole of philosophy?”

pp.：  418 – 420

9.4 The cognitive primacy of “being”

pp.：  421 – 437

9.4.1 A new stage in the debate on the first object of the intellect

pp.：  421 – 422

9.4.2 What is first known in the order of origin: “Being”

pp.：  423 – 426

“Being” is not what is first known confusedly

pp.：  423 – 424

“Being” is what is first distinctly known

pp.：  425 – 426

9.4.3 The first object in the order of adequation: Negative proofs

pp.：  427 – 432

God is not the first adequate object (versus: Henry of Ghent)

pp.：  427 – 427

“The quiddity of a material thing” is not the first adequate object (versus: Thomas Aquinas)

pp.：  428 – 430

Verum is not the first adequate object

pp.：  431 – 432

9.4.4 The primacy of “being” in the order of adequation and the problem of its univocal predication

pp.：  433 – 437

The problem of the univocal predication of “being”

pp.：  433 – 435

Scotus’s solution: The double primacy of “being”

pp.：  436 – 437

9.5 Being and transcendental differences

pp.：  438 – 450

9.5.1 The (simple) convertible transcendentals: Formal distinction

pp.：  438 – 445

The convertibility of “being” and “one”

pp.：  438 – 441

Real identity and formal difference

pp.：  442 – 445

9.5.2 The disjunctive transcendentals: The modes of being

pp.：  446 – 450

Being and the disjunctive transcendentals: Modal distinction

pp.：  446 – 448

The modal explication of being: The completion of the transcendental science

pp.：  449 – 450

Concluding observations

pp.：  451 – 452

Chapter Ten Discussions on the Scotist Conception

pp.：  453 – 534

10.1 Peter Auriol: An alternative doctrine

pp.：  454 – 476

10.1.1 The unity of the concept of “being”

pp.：  455 – 462

Not a plurality of analogy

pp.：  457 – 458

Not a unity by univocity

pp.：  459 – 459

Unity by “indetermination” or “confusion”

pp.：  460 – 462

10.1.2 The first object of the intellect

pp.：  463 – 466

The first known in the order of origin: The confused concept of “being”

pp.：  463 – 464

The fourfold object of the intellect in the order of adequation

pp.：  465 – 466

10.1.3 Metaphysics as the transcendental science: Deconstruction?

pp.：  467 – 471

Possibility of metaphysics and the doctrine of supposition

pp.：  468 – 468

Categorial and transcendental

pp.：  469 – 471

10.1.4 A new model: Connotative transcendentals

pp.：  472 – 476

10.2 Francis of Meyronnes: Tractatus de transcendentibus

pp.：  477 – 486

The concept of transcendentality

pp.：  477 – 482

Extension of what is transcendental to the “second intentions”?

pp.：  483 – 486

10.3 Peter Thomae: “Scotizare” on being and the transcendentals

pp.：  487 – 500

De ente or De transcendentibus

pp.：  488 – 488

Thomae’s Quodlibet

pp.：  489 – 496

Being and identity: A new transcendental logic

pp.：  497 – 500

10.4 Nicholas Bonet: The first systematic account of a transcendental metaphysics

pp.：  501 – 513

10.4.1 The subject of metaphysics and the univocity of being

pp.：  504 – 506

10.4.2 The first object of the intellect and the subject of metaphysics

pp.：  507 – 510

The dissociation

pp.：  507 – 508

“Our metaphysics”: not onto-theology but “pure” ontology

pp.：  509 – 510

10.4.3 The dissociation of the transcendental properties from the subject of metaphysics

pp.：  511 – 513

The first complex principle

pp.：  511 – 511

Simpliciter transcendens versus aliqualiter transcendens

pp.：  512 – 513

Concluding observations

pp.：  514 – 514

10.5 Francis of Marchia

pp.：  515 – 534

10.5.1 The new order of transcendental notions

pp.：  517 – 524

The reduction to a first concept: intentio neutra and the transcendental concepts

pp.：  517 – 519

Pluralization of the first concept: Material and formal priority

pp.：  520 – 521

Not “being” (ens), but “thing” (res) is the materially first concept

pp.：  522 – 522

Not “being”, but “something” (aliquid) is the formally first concept

pp.：  523 – 524

10.5.2 The subject of metaphysics: “Thing as thing”

pp.：  525 – 529

10.5.3 Duplex metaphysica: The splitting up of metaphysics

pp.：  530 – 534

Chapter Eleven The Doctrine of the Transcendentals in Nominalism

pp.：  535 – 564

11.1 William of Ockham: A semantic account

pp.：  535 – 556

11.1.1 Is there a doctrine of the transcendentals in Ockham?

pp.：  535 – 541

The logic of terms in the Summa logicae

pp.：  537 – 539

“Transcendental categories” in Ockham? The interpretation of Gottfried Martin

pp.：  540 – 541

11.1.2 Transcendental being

pp.：  542 – 552

Common predicability: Univocity, equivocity and analogy

pp.：  542 – 546

Being: The first and adequate object of the intellect?

pp.：  547 – 550

Being: not the “proper” but the “partial” subject of metaphysics

pp.：  551 – 552

11.1.3 Being and one: The identity and difference between the transcendentals

pp.：  553 – 556

Conclusion

pp.：  556 – 556

11.2 John Buridan

pp.：  557 – 561

The proper subject of metaphysics: Being

pp.：  557 – 559

The common predicability of “being”

pp.：  560 – 560

Being and one: The connotation model

pp.：  561 – 561

Concluding observations

pp.：  562 – 564

Chapter Twelve Neoplatonic Critiques of Transcendental Metaphysics

pp.：  565 – 588

12.1 Berthold of Moosburg: The superiority of Platonism over “Aristotle’s” transcendental philosophy

pp.：  565 – 572

12.2 Nicholas of Cusa: Another transcensus

pp.：  573 – 588

Docta ignorantia: The transcensus towards the principle of coincidence

pp.：  575 – 579

“Unity”: Rejection of the convertibility with being

pp.：  580 – 581

Non-aliud: Cusanus’s transcensus and the transcendentals

pp.：  582 – 588

Chapter Thirteen The Doctrine of the Transcendentals in Renaissance Philosophy

pp.：  589 – 606

13.1 Lorenzo Valla: “Reform” of the doctrine: Res as the king (rex) of the transcendentals

pp.：  589 – 595

The resolution of “being” to “thing”

pp.：  591 – 592

“One” and “true”

pp.：  593 – 594

Thing and transcendence

pp.：  595 – 595

13.2 Pico della Mirandola: De ente et uno

pp.：  596 – 606

Concord of Plato and Aristotle

pp.：  597 – 599

Transcendence and transcendentality

pp.：  600 – 600

The four transcendentals

pp.：  601 – 603

Moral dimension

pp.：  604 – 606

Chapter Fourteen The “Metaphysical Disputations” of Francisco Suárez: Between Scholasticism and Modernity

pp.：  607 – 654

14.1 The adequate object of metaphysics: Ens inquantum ens reale

pp.：  609 – 613

The “supertranscendental” conception

pp.：  609 – 611

The “theological” conception

pp.：  612 – 612

The “categorial” conception

pp.：  613 – 613

Conclusion: Metaphysics a transcendental science

pp.：  614 – 613

14.2 Transcendental being

pp.：  614 – 623

14.2.1 The unity of the concept of being

pp.：  615 – 617

14.2.2 The ‘ratio’ of “being”: “Reality” and “actuality”

pp.：  618 – 621

A twofold sense of “being”

pp.：  618 – 620

The identification of ens and res

pp.：  621 – 621

14.2.3 The transcendentality of being

pp.：  622 – 623

14.3 The properties of being in general

pp.：  624 – 630

14.3.1 Does being as being have properties?

pp.：  625 – 627

14.3.2 Suárez’s reduction of the transcendentals

pp.：  628 – 630

There are three transcendental properties: unum, verum, bonum

pp.：  628 – 628

Res and aliquid no distinct transcendentals

pp.：  629 – 629

There are no other transcendental properties

pp.：  630 – 630

14.4 The transcendental properties of being in particular

pp.：  631 – 644

14.4.1 Unity

pp.：  632 – 634

14.4.2 Truth

pp.：  635 – 638

14.4.3 Goodness

pp.：  639 – 644

The ratio of good: Convenientia

pp.：  639 – 642

Is every being conveniens?

pp.：  643 – 644

14.5 Unity, analogy and univocity

pp.：  645 – 650

14.6 Conclusion: Suárez’s place in the history of metaphysics

pp.：  651 – 654

Chapter Fifteen The Doctrine of the “Supertranscendentals”: An Alternative Model?

pp.：  655 – 676

15.1 The rise of the doctrine of the supertranscendentia

pp.：  655 – 657

15.2 Early-modern metaphysics and the “supertranscendentals”: The missing link?

pp.：  658 – 662

15.3 Supertranscendental tendencies in medieval philosophy

pp.：  663 – 676

Thomist tradition?

pp.：  663 – 663

The concept of res in Henry of Ghent

pp.：  664 – 664

Duns Scotus: A “super-transcendental” understanding of being in the third Quodlibet?

pp.：  665 – 667

Nicholas Bonet: A new kind of univocity

pp.：  668 – 669

Francis of Marchia: Transcendental as an intentio neutra

pp.：  670 – 669

Walter Burley: Degrees of transcendentality

pp.：  670 – 671

John Baconthorpe: Scope of intelligibility

pp.：  672 – 675

Conclusion

pp.：  676 – 676

Chapter Sixteen Conclusion: The importance of the transcendental way of thought for medieval philosophy

pp.：  677 – 726

16.1 Transcendentality

pp.：  677 – 691

16.1.1 Logical transcensus

pp.：  677 – 682

Towards the communia

pp.：  677 – 679

The problem of the transcendental predication: From equivocity to analogy and to univocity

pp.：  680 – 682

16.1.2 Ontological transcensus

pp.：  683 – 687

Towards the transcendentia

pp.：  683 – 683

The ratio of transcendens

pp.：  684 – 685

The “modernity” claim

pp.：  686 – 687

16.1.3 Epistemological transcensus

pp.：  688 – 691

Towards the first concepts (prima)

pp.：  688 – 689

The debate on what is first known

pp.：  690 – 691

16.2 Transcendentals and metaphysics

pp.：  692 – 699

The transcensus of metaphysics

pp.：  692 – 693

Transcendentals and the divine: Onto-theology

pp.：  694 – 696

The ratio of “being” (ens)

pp.：  697 – 699

16.3 Metaphysics of the one

pp.：  700 – 705

Ontology and henology

pp.：  700 – 702

“One” and “being”: Difficulties

pp.：  703 – 705

16.4 Metaphysics of the true

pp.：  706 – 714

Truth and being

pp.：  707 – 711

“Verum et factum convertuntur” (Vico)

pp.：  712 – 713

Priority of the true?

pp.：  714 – 714

16.5 Metaphysics of the good

pp.：  715 – 726

The ratio of the good

pp.：  717 – 720

Is every being good?

pp.：  721 – 726

Bibliography

pp.：  727 – 760

Index Nominum

pp.：  761 – 766

Index Rerum

pp.：  767 – 776