Lawlessness and Economics :Alternative Modes of Governance ( The Gorman Lectures in Economics )

Publication subTitle :Alternative Modes of Governance

Publication series :The Gorman Lectures in Economics

Author: Dixit Avinash K.;;;  

Publisher: Princeton University Press‎

Publication year: 2011

E-ISBN: 9781400841370

P-ISBN(Paperback): 9780691114866

Subject: F110 Policy, planning

Keyword: 世界政治,经济学,经济计划与管理

Language: ENG

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Description

How can property rights be protected and contracts be enforced in countries where the rule of law is ineffective or absent? How can firms from advanced market economies do business in such circumstances? In Lawlessness and Economics, Avinash Dixit examines the theory of private institutions that transcend or supplement weak economic governance from the state.

In much of the world and through much of history, private mechanisms--such as long-term relationships, arbitration, social networks to disseminate information and norms to impose sanctions, and for-profit enforcement services--have grown up in place of formal, state-governed institutions. Even in countries with strong legal systems, many of these mechanisms continue under the shadow of the law. Numerous case studies and empirical investigations have demonstrated the variety, importance, and merits, and drawbacks of such institutions.

This book builds on these studies and constructs a toolkit of theoretical models to analyze them. The models shed new conceptual light on the different modes of governance, and deepen our understanding of the interaction of the alternative institutions with each other and with the government's law. For example, one model explains the limit on the size of social networks and illuminates problems in the transition to more formal legal systems as economies grow beyond this limit. Other models explain why for-profit enforcement is inefficient. The mod

Chapter

1.8 Approach of the Book

1.8 Approach of the Book

2 Private Ordering in the Shadow of the Law

2 Private Ordering in the Shadow of the Law

2.1 Issues and Empirical Research

2.1 Issues and Empirical Research

2.2 Bargaining When the Law is a Backstop

2.2 Bargaining When the Law is a Backstop

2.3 Relational and Formal Contracts

2.3 Relational and Formal Contracts

2.4 Arbitration and Information

2.4 Arbitration and Information

2.5 Assessment and Prospects

2.5 Assessment and Prospects

2.6 Mathematical Appendix

2.6 Mathematical Appendix

3 Relation-Based Contract Enforcement

3 Relation-Based Contract Enforcement

3.1 Issues and Empirical Research

3.1 Issues and Empirical Research

3.2 Relation-Based and Rule-Based Governance

3.2 Relation-Based and Rule-Based Governance

3.3 Limits of Relation-Based Governance

3.3 Limits of Relation-Based Governance

3.4 Related Theoretical Models

3.4 Related Theoretical Models

3.5 Assessment and Prospects

3.5 Assessment and Prospects

3.6 Mathematical Appendix

3.6 Mathematical Appendix

4 Profit-Motivated Contract Enforcement

4 Profit-Motivated Contract Enforcement

4.1 Issues and Empirical Research

4.1 Issues and Empirical Research

4.2 The Structure of the Model

4.2 The Structure of the Model

4.3 Information Intermediaries

4.3 Information Intermediaries

4.4 Enforcement Intermediaries

4.4 Enforcement Intermediaries

4.5 Assessment and Prospects

4.5 Assessment and Prospects

4.6 Mathematical Appendix

4.6 Mathematical Appendix

5 Private Protection of Property Rights

5 Private Protection of Property Rights

5.1 Issues and Empirical Research

5.1 Issues and Empirical Research

5.2 Production and Protection under Anarchy

5.2 Production and Protection under Anarchy

5.3 For-Profit Private Protection

5.3 For-Profit Private Protection

5.4 A Predatory State and Its Citizens

5.4 A Predatory State and Its Citizens

5.5 Assessment and Prospects

5.5 Assessment and Prospects

5.6 Mathematical Appendix

5.6 Mathematical Appendix

6 Conclusion

6 Conclusion

6.1 Implications for Institutions and Policies

6.1 Implications for Institutions and Policies

6.2 Implications for Future Research

6.2 Implications for Future Research

References

References

Index

Index

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