Worse Than a Monolith :Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia ( Princeton Studies in International History and Politics )

Publication subTitle :Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia

Publication series :Princeton Studies in International History and Politics

Author: Christensen Thomas J.;;;  

Publisher: Princeton University Press‎

Publication year: 2011

E-ISBN: 9781400838813

P-ISBN(Paperback): 9780691142609

Subject: D8 Diplomacy, International Relations;E0 Military Theory;E9 Military Technology;K3 Asian History

Keyword: 外交、国际关系,军事理论,亚洲史

Language: ENG

Access to resources Favorite

Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.

Description

In brute-force struggles for survival, such as the two World Wars, disorganization and divisions within an enemy alliance are to one's own advantage. However, most international security politics involve coercive diplomacy and negotiations short of all-out war. Worse Than a Monolith demonstrates that when states are engaged in coercive diplomacy--combining threats and assurances to influence the behavior of real or potential adversaries--divisions, rivalries, and lack of coordination within the opposing camp often make it more difficult to prevent the onset of conflict, to prevent existing conflicts from escalating, and to negotiate the end to those conflicts promptly. Focusing on relations between the Communist and anti-Communist alliances in Asia during the Cold War, Thomas Christensen explores how internal divisions and lack of cohesion in the two alliances complicated and undercut coercive diplomacy by sending confusing signals about strength, resolve, and intent. In the case of the Communist camp, internal mistrust and rivalries catalyzed the movement's aggressiveness in ways that we would not have expected from a more cohesive movement under Moscow's clear control.

Reviewing newly available archival material, Christensen examines the instability in relations across the Asian Cold War divide, and sheds new light on the Korean and Vietnam wars.

While recognizing clear differences between the Cold War and post-Cold War environments, he investigates how efforts to adjust burden-sharing roles among the United States and its Asian security partners have complicated U.S.-China security relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Chapter

Chapter 3 Alliance Problems, Signaling, and Escalation of Asian Conflict

Chapter 3 Alliance Problems, Signaling, and Escalation of Asian Conflict

Chapter 4 The Benefits of Communist Alliance Coordination and the Continuing Costs of U.S. Alliance Formation, 1951–56

Chapter 4 The Benefits of Communist Alliance Coordination and the Continuing Costs of U.S. Alliance Formation, 1951–56

Chapter 5 The Sino-Soviet Split and Problems for the United States in Asia, Europe, and the Americas, 1956–64

Chapter 5 The Sino-Soviet Split and Problems for the United States in Asia, Europe, and the Americas, 1956–64

Chapter 6 From Escalation in Vietnam to Sino-American Rapprochement, 1964–72

Chapter 6 From Escalation in Vietnam to Sino-American Rapprochement, 1964–72

Chapter 7 The Fall and Revival of Coercive Diplomacy: Security Partnerships and Sino-American Security Relations, 1972–2009

Chapter 7 The Fall and Revival of Coercive Diplomacy: Security Partnerships and Sino-American Security Relations, 1972–2009

Chapter 8 Conclusion

Chapter 8 Conclusion

Bibliography

Bibliography

Index

Index

The users who browse this book also browse


No browse record.