Physicalism, or Something Near Enough ：Physicalism, or Something Near Enough ( Princeton Monographs in Philosophy )

Publication subTitle ：Physicalism, or Something Near Enough

Publication series ：Princeton Monographs in Philosophy

Author： Kim Jaegwon;;;  

Publisher： Princeton University Press‎

Publication year： 2007

E-ISBN: 9781400840847

P-ISBN(Paperback): 9780691113753

Subject： B022 Theory of consciousness.

Keyword： 心理学,哲学、宗教

Language： ENG

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Description

Contemporary discussions in philosophy of mind have largely been shaped by physicalism, the doctrine that all phenomena are ultimately physical. Here, Jaegwon Kim presents the most comprehensive and systematic presentation yet of his influential ideas on the mind-body problem. He seeks to determine, after half a century of debate: What kind of (or "how much") physicalism can we lay claim to? He begins by laying out mental causation and consciousness as the two principal challenges to contemporary physicalism. How can minds exercise their causal powers in a physical world? Is a physicalist account of consciousness possible?

The book's starting point is the "supervenience" argument (sometimes called the "exclusion" argument), which Kim reformulates in an extended defense. This argument shows that the contemporary physicalist faces a stark choice between reductionism (the idea that mental phenomena are physically reducible) and epiphenomenalism (the view that mental phenomena are causally impotent). Along the way, Kim presents a novel argument showing that Cartesian substance dualism offers no help with mental causation.

Mind-body reduction, therefore, is required to save mental causation. But are minds physically reducible? Kim argues that all but one type of mental phenomena are reducible, including intentional mental phenomena, such as beliefs and desires. The apparent exceptions are the intrinsic, felt qualities of conscious experiences

Chapter

Cover

Contents

Preface

Synopsis of the Arguments

1: Mental Causation and Consciousness: Our Two Mind-Body Problems

Mental Causation and Consciousness

The Supervenience/Exclusion Argument

Can We Reduce Qualia?

The Two World-Knots

2: The Supervenience Argument Motivated, Clarified, and Defended

Nonreductive Physicalism

The Fundamental Idea

The Supervenience Argument Refined and Clarified

Is Overdetermination an Option?

The Generalization Argument

Block’s Causal Drainage Argument

3: The Rejection of Immaterial Minds: A Causal Argument

Cartesian Dualism and Mental Causation

Causation and the “Pairing” Problem

Causality and Space

Why Not Locate Souls in Space?

Concluding Remarks

4: Reduction, Reductive Explanation, and Closing the “Gap”

Reduction and Reductive Explanation

Bridge-Law Reduction and Functional Reduction

Explanatory Ascent and Constraint (R)

Functional Reduction and Reductive Explanation

Kripkean Identities and Reductive Explanation

Remarks about Block and Stalnaker’s Proposal

5: Explanatory Arguments for Type Physicalism and Why They Don’t Work

Are There Positive Arguments for Type Physicalism?

Hill’s and McLaughlin’s Explanatory Argument

Do Psychoneural Identities Explain Psychoneural Correlations?

Block and Stalnaker’s Explanatory Argument

Another Way of Looking at the Two Explanatory Arguments

6: Physicalism, or Something Near Enough

Taking Stock

Physicalism at a Crossroads

Reducing Minds

Living with the Mental Residue

Where We Are at Last with the Mind-Body Problem

References

Index

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