Getting Incentives Right :Improving Torts, Contracts, and Restitution

Publication subTitle :Improving Torts, Contracts, and Restitution

Author: Cooter Robert D.;Porat Ariel;;  

Publisher: Princeton University Press‎

Publication year: 2014

E-ISBN: 9781400850396

P-ISBN(Paperback): 9780691151595

Subject: D9 Law;D90 theory of law (jurisprudence);D91 Legal departments;D923.6 Contract Law of the Peoples Republic of China;F0 Economics

Keyword: 法律,经济学

Language: ENG

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Description

Lawyers, judges, and scholars have long debated whether incentives in tort, contract, and restitution law effectively promote the welfare of society. If these incentives were ideal, tort law would reduce the cost and frequency of accidents, contract law would lubricate transactions, and restitution law would encourage people to benefit others. Unfortunately, the incentives in these laws lead to too many injuries, too little contractual cooperation, and too few unrequested benefits. Getting Incentives Right explains how law might better serve the social good.

In tort law, Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat propose that all foreseeable risks should be included when setting standards of care and awarding damages. Failure to do so causes accidents that better legal incentives would avoid. In contract law, they show that making a promise often causes the person who receives it to change behavior and undermine the cooperation between the parties. They recommend several solutions, including a novel contract called "anti-insurance." In restitution law, people who convey unrequested benefits to others are seldom entitled to compensation. Restitution law should compensate them more than it currently does, so that they will provide more unrequested benefits. In these three areas of law, Getting Incentives Right demonstrates that better law can promote the well-being of people by providing better incentives for the private regulation of conduct.

Chapter

2. The Injurer’s Self-Risk Puzzle

2. The Injurer’s Self-Risk Puzzle

3. Negligence Per Se and Unaccounted Risks

3. Negligence Per Se and Unaccounted Risks

4. Lapses and Substitution

4. Lapses and Substitution

5. Total Liability for Excessive Harm

5. Total Liability for Excessive Harm

II. Contracts and Victims’ Incentives

II. Contracts and Victims’ Incentives

6. Unity in the Law of Torts and Contracts

6. Unity in the Law of Torts and Contracts

7. Anti-Insurance

7. Anti-Insurance

8. Decreasing Liability Contracts and the Assistant Interest

8. Decreasing Liability Contracts and the Assistant Interest

III. Restitution and Positive Externalities

III. Restitution and Positive Externalities

9. A Public Goods Theory of Restitution

9. A Public Goods Theory of Restitution

10. Liability Externalities and Mandatory Choices

10. Liability Externalities and Mandatory Choices

11. The Relationship between Nonlegal Sanctions and Damages

11. The Relationship between Nonlegal Sanctions and Damages

Conclusion

Conclusion

Table of Cases

Table of Cases

Table of Books and Articles

Table of Books and Articles

Subject Index

Subject Index

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