The New Dynamic Public Finance :The New Dynamic Public Finance ( The Toulouse Lectures in Economics )

Publication subTitle :The New Dynamic Public Finance

Publication series :The Toulouse Lectures in Economics

Author: Kocherlakota Narayana R.;;;  

Publisher: Princeton University Press‎

Publication year: 2010

E-ISBN: 9781400835270

P-ISBN(Paperback): 9780691139159

Subject: F811.0 Policy

Keyword: 经济学,财政、金融

Language: ENG

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Description

Optimal tax design attempts to resolve a well-known trade-off: namely, that high taxes are bad insofar as they discourage people from working, but good to the degree that, by redistributing wealth, they help insure people against productivity shocks. Until recently, however, economic research on this question either ignored people's uncertainty about their future productivities or imposed strong and unrealistic functional form restrictions on taxes. In response to these problems, the new dynamic public finance was developed to study the design of optimal taxes given only minimal restrictions on the set of possible tax instruments, and on the nature of shocks affecting people in the economy. In this book, Narayana Kocherlakota surveys and discusses this exciting new approach to public finance.

An important book for advanced PhD courses in public finance and macroeconomics, The New Dynamic Public Finance provides a formal connection between the problem of dynamic optimal taxation and dynamic principal-agent contracting theory. This connection means that the properties of solutions to principal-agent problems can be used to determine the properties of optimal tax systems. The book shows that such optimal tax systems necessarily involve asset income taxes, which may depend in sophisticated ways on current and past labor incomes. It also addresses the implications of this new approach for qualitative properties of optimal monetary policy, optimal govern

Chapter

2.4 Problems with the Ramsey Approach

2.5 Summary

2.6 Technical Notes

References

3 Basics of Dynamic Social Contracting

3.1 Class of Environments

3.2 Incentive-Compatibility

3.3 Remarks on Incentive-Compatibility

3.4 Pareto Optimal Allocations

3.5 The Reciprocal Euler Equation

3.6 Dynamics of Pareto Optimal Consumption

3.7 Long-Run Properties of Pareto Optima

3.8 Summary

3.9 Technical Notes

References

4 Dynamic Optimal Taxation: Lessons for Macroeconomists

4.1 A Nonlinear Tax Problem

4.2 Any Tax Equilibrium Is Incentive-Compatible

4.3 Building an Optimal Tax System

4.4 Properties of the Optimal Tax System

4.5 Remarks about the Optimal System

4.6 Summary

4.7 Technical Notes

References

5 Optimal Intergenerational Taxation

5.1 An Intergenerational Tax Problem

5.2 Another Reciprocal Euler Equation

5.3 Properties of Socially Optimal Allocations

5.4 Optimal Bequest Taxation

5.5 Summary

5.6 Technical Notes

References

6 Quantitative Analysis: Methods and Results

6.1 Immortal Agents in an Open Economy

6.2 A Closed Overlapping Generations Economy

6.3 Summary

References

7 The Way Forward

7.1 More Widely Applicable Tax Systems

7.2 New Solution Methods

7.3 Inputs from the Data

7.4 Summary

7.5 Technical Notes

References

Index

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D

E

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