Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements :Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements

Publication subTitle :Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements

Author: Mansfield Edward D.;Milner Helen V.;;  

Publisher: Princeton University Press‎

Publication year: 2012

E-ISBN: 9781400842537

P-ISBN(Paperback): 9780691135298

Subject: F744 国际贸易条约和协定

Keyword: 贸易经济,政治、法律,外交、国际关系

Language: ENG

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Description

Preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) play an increasingly prominent role in the global political economy, two notable examples being the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement. These agreements foster economic integration among member states by enhancing their access to one another's markets. Yet despite the importance of PTAs to international trade and world politics, until now little attention has been focused on why governments choose to join them and how governments design them. This book offers valuable new insights into the political economy of PTA formation. Many economists have argued that the roots of these agreements lie in the promise they hold for improving the welfare of member states. Others have posited that trade agreements are a response to global political conditions. Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner argue that domestic politics provide a crucial impetus to the decision by governments to enter trade pacts. Drawing on this argument, they explain why democracies are more likely to enter PTAs than nondemocratic regimes, and why as the number of veto players--interest groups with the power to block policy change--increases in a prospective member state, the likelihood of the state entering a trade agreement is reduced. The book provides a novel view of the political foundations of trade agreements.

Chapter

CHAPTER 2 A Political Economy Theory of International Trade Agreements

CHAPTER 2 A Political Economy Theory of International Trade Agreements

A Political Economy Theory of PTAs

A Political Economy Theory of PTAs

Examining the Assumptions Underlying the Theory

Examining the Assumptions Underlying the Theory

An Alternative Argument about PTAs and Domestic Politics: The Role of Interest Groups

An Alternative Argument about PTAs and Domestic Politics: The Role of Interest Groups

Regime Type, Domestic Political Costs, and PTAs

Regime Type, Domestic Political Costs, and PTAs

Two Cases of Democracy and PTA Formation: SADC and Mercosur

Two Cases of Democracy and PTA Formation: SADC and Mercosur

Veto Players, Transaction Costs, and PTAs

Veto Players, Transaction Costs, and PTAs

Some Illustrations of the Effects of Veto Players on PTA Formation

Some Illustrations of the Effects of Veto Players on PTA Formation

Further Effects of Domestic Politics on International Trade Agreements: Auxiliary Hypotheses

Further Effects of Domestic Politics on International Trade Agreements: Auxiliary Hypotheses

Conclusion

Conclusion

CHAPTER 3 Systemic Influences on PTA Formation

CHAPTER 3 Systemic Influences on PTA Formation

International Influences on PTA Formation

International Influences on PTA Formation

The Models and Estimation Procedures

The Models and Estimation Procedures

Estimates of the Parameters

Estimates of the Parameters

The GATT/WTO and PTA Formation

The GATT/WTO and PTA Formation

Conclusions

Conclusions

CHAPTER 4 Regime Type, Veto Players, and PTA Formation

CHAPTER 4 Regime Type, Veto Players, and PTA Formation

Two Theoretical Propositions

Two Theoretical Propositions

Empirical Tests of the Hypotheses

Empirical Tests of the Hypotheses

Results of the Empirical Analysis

Results of the Empirical Analysis

Robustness Checks

Robustness Checks

Conclusions

Conclusions

CHAPTER 5 Auxiliary Hypotheses about Domestic Politics and Trade Agreements

CHAPTER 5 Auxiliary Hypotheses about Domestic Politics and Trade Agreements

PTAs and the Longevity of Political Leaders

PTAs and the Longevity of Political Leaders

Partisanship and PTAs

Partisanship and PTAs

Regime Type and Exposure to the International Economy

Regime Type and Exposure to the International Economy

Autocracies, Political Competition, and PTAs

Autocracies, Political Competition, and PTAs

The Extent of Proposed Integration and Enforcement

The Extent of Proposed Integration and Enforcement

Ratification Delay and Veto Players

Ratification Delay and Veto Players

Conclusions

Conclusions

CHAPTER 6 Conclusions

CHAPTER 6 Conclusions

The Argument and Evidence in Brief

The Argument and Evidence in Brief

Some Implications for the Study of International Relations

Some Implications for the Study of International Relations

PTAs and the World Economy

PTAs and the World Economy

PTAs and the International Political Economy: Power and Politics

PTAs and the International Political Economy: Power and Politics

Bibliography

Bibliography

Index

Index

A

A

B

B

C

C

D

D

E

E

F

F

G

G

H

H

I

I

J

J

K

K

L

L

M

M

N

N

O

O

P

P

R

R

S

S

T

T

U

U

V

V

W

W

Y

Y

Z

Z

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