Chapter
11.3. The role of strategies in the simplified form of a game
11.4. The meaning of the zero-sum restriction
CHAPTER III: ZERO-SUM TWO-PERSON GAMES: THEORY
12.2. The one-person game
12.3. Chance and probability
13.2. The operations Max and Min
13.3. Commutativity questions
13.4. The mixed case. Saddle points
13.5. Proofs of the main facts
14. STRICTLY DETERMINED GAMES
14.1. Formulation of the problem
14.2. The minorant and the majorant games
14.3. Discussion of the auxiliary games
14.5. Analysis of strict determinateness
14.6. The interchange of players. Symmetry
14.7. Non strictly determined games
14.8. Program of a detailed analysis of strict determinateness
*15. GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION
*15.1. Statement of purpose. Induction
*15.2. The exact condition (First step)
*15.3. The exact condition (Entire induction)
*15.4. Exact discussion of the inductive step
*15.5. Exact discussion of the inductive step (Continuation)
*15.6. The result in the case of perfect information
*15.7. Application to Chess
*15.8. The alternative, verbal discussion
16. LINEARITY AND CONVEXITY
16.1. Geometrical background
16.3. The theorem of the supporting hyperplanes
16.4. The theorem of the alternative for matrices
17. MIXED STRATEGIES. THE SOLUTION FOR ALL GAMES
17.1. Discussion of two elementary examples
17.2. Generalization of this viewpoint
17.3. Justification of the procedure as applied to an individual play
17.4. The minorant and the majorant games. (For mixed strategies)
17.5. General strict determinateness
17.6. Proof of the main theorem
17.7. Comparison of the treatment by pure and by mixed strategies
17.8. Analysis of general strict determinateness
17.9. Further characteristics of good strategies
17.10. Mistakes and their consequences. Permanent optimality
17.11. The interchange of players. Symmetry
CHAPTER IV: ZERO-SUM TWO-PERSON GAMES: EXAMPLES
18. SOME ELEMENTARY GAMES
18.2. Detailed quantitative discussion of these games
18.3. Qualitative characterizations
18.4. Discussion of some specific games. (Generalized forms of Matching Pennies)
18.5. Discussion of some slightly more complicated games
18.6. Chance and imperfect information
18.7. Interpretation of this result
*19.1. Description of Poker
*19.3. Description of Poker (Continued)
*19.4. Exact formulation of the rules
*19.5. Description of the strategy
*19.6. Statement of the problem
*19.7. Passage from the discrete to the continuous problem
*19.8. Mathematical determination of the solution
*19.9. Detailed analysis of the solution
*19.10. Interpretation of the solution
*19.11. More general forms of Poker
*19.14. Alternate bidding
*19.15. Mathematical description of all solutions
*19.16. Interpretation of the solutions. Conclusions
CHAPTER V: ZERO-SUM THREE-PERSON GAMES
21. THE SIMPLE MAJORITY GAME OF THREE PERSONS
21.1. Definition of the game
21.2. Analysis of the game: Necessity of "understandings"
21.3. Analysis of the game: Coalitions. The role of symmetry
22.1. Unsymmetric distributions. Necessity of compensations
22.2. Coalitions of different strength. Discussion
22.3. An inequality. Formulae
23.1. Detailed discussion. Inessential and essential games
24. DISCUSSION OF AN OBJECTION
24.1. The case of perfect information and its significance
24.2. Detailed discussion. Necessity of compensations between three or more players
CHAPTER VI: FORMULATION OF THE GENERAL THEORY: ZERO-SUM n-PERSON GAMES
25. THE CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION
25.1. Motivation and definition
25.2. Discussion of the concept
25.3. Fundamental properties
25.4. Immediate mathematical consequences
26. CONSTRUCTION OF A GAME WITH A GIVEN CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION
27. STRATEGIC EQUIVALENCE. INESSENTIAL AND ESSENTIAL GAMES
27.1. Strategic equivalence. The reduced form
27.2. Inequalities. The quantity γ
27.3. Inessentiality and essentiality
27.4. Various criteria. Non additive utilities
27.5. The inequalities in the essential case
27.6. Vector operations on characteristic functions
28. GROUPS, SYMMETRY AND FAIRNESS
28.1. Permutations, their groups and their effect on a game
28.2. Symmetry and fairness
29. RECONSIDERATION OF THE ZERO-SUM THREE-PERSON GAME
29.1. Qualitative discussion
29.2. Quantitative discussion
30. THE EXACT FORM OF THE GENERAL DEFINITIONS
30.2. Discussion and recapitulation
*30.3. The concept of saturation
30.4. Three immediate objectives
31.1. Convexity, flatness, and some criteria for domination
31.2. The system of all imputations. One element solutions
31.3 The isomorphism which corresponds to strategic equivalence
32. DETERMINATION OF ALL SOLUTIONS OF THE ESSENTIAL ZERO-SUM THREE-PERSON GAME
32.1. Formulation of the mathematical problem. The graphical method
32.2. Determination of all solutions
33.1. The multiplicity of solutions. Discrimination and its meaning
33.2. Statics and dynamics
CHAPTER VII: ZERO-SUM FOUR-PERSON GAMES
34.2. Formalism of the essential zero sum four person games
34.3. Permutations of the players
35. DISCUSSION OF SOME SPECIAL POINTS IN THE CUBE Q
35.1. The corner I. (and V., VI., VII.)
35.2. The corner VIII. (and II., III., IV.,). The three person game and a"Dummy"
35.3. Some remarks concerning the interior of Q
36. DISCUSSION OF THE MAIN DIAGONALS
36.1. The part adjacent to the corner VIII.: Heuristic discussion
36.2. The part adjacent to the corner VIII.: Exact discussion
*36.3. Other parts of the main diagonals
37. THE CENTER AND ITS ENVIRONS
37.1. First orientation about the conditions around the center
37.2. The two alternatives and the role of symmetry
37.3. The first alternative at the center
37.4. The second alternative It the center
37.5. Comparison of the two central solutions
37.6. Unsymmetrical central solutions
*38. A FAMILY OF SOLUTIONS FOR A NEIGHBORHOOD OF THE CENTER
*38.1. Transformation of the solution belonging to the first alternative at the center
*38.3. Interpretation of the soIutions
CHAPTER VIII: SOME REMARKS CONCERNING n ≧ 5 PARTICIPANTS
39. THE NUMBER OF PARAMETERS IN V ARIOUS CI.ASSES OF GAMES
39.1. The situation for n = 3, 4
39.2. The situation for all n ≧ 3
40. THE SYMMETRIC FIVE PERSON GAME
40.1. Formalism of the symmetric five person game
40.2. The two extreme cases
40.3. Connection between the symmetric five person game and the 1, 2, 3-symmetric four person game
CHAPTER IX: COMPOSITION AND DECOMPOSITION OF GAMES
41. COMPOSITION AND DECOMPOSITlON OF GAMES
41.1. Search for n-person games for which all solutions can be determined
41.2. The first type. Composition and decomposition
41.4. Analysis of decomposability
41.5. Desirability of a modification
42. MODIFICATION OF THE THEORY
42.1. No complete abandonment of the zero sum restriction
42.2. Strategic equivalence. Constant sum games
42.3. The characteristic function in the new theory
42.4. Imputations, domination, solutions in the new theory
42.5. Essentiality, inessentiality and decomposability in the new theory
43. TUE DECOMPOSITION PARTITION
43.1. Splitting sets. Constituents
43.2. Properties of the system of all splitting sets
43.3. Characterization of the system of all splitting sets. The decomposition partition
43.4. Properties of the decomposition partition
44. DECOMPOSABLE GAMES. FURTHER EXTENSION OF THE THEORY
44.1. Solutions of a (decomposable) game and solutions of its constituents
44.2. Composition and decomposition of imputations and of sets of imputations
44.3. Composition and decomposition of solutions. The main possibilities and surmises
44.4. Extension of the theory. Outside sources
44.6. Limitations of the excess. The non-isolated character of a game in the new setup
44.7. Discussion of the new setup. E(e[sub(0)]), F(e[sub(0)])
45. LIMITATIONS OF THE EXCESS. STRUCTURE OF THE EXTENDED THEORY
45.1. The lower limit of the excess
45.2. The upper limit of the excess. Detached and fully detached imputations
45.3. Discussion of the two limits, |г|[sub(1)], |г|[sub(2)]. Their ratio
45.4. Detached imputations and various solutions. The theorem connecting E(e[sub(0)]), F(e[sub(0)])
45.5. Proof of the theorem
45.6. Summary and conclusions
46. DETERMINATION OF ALL SOLUTIONS OF A DECOMPOSABLE GAME
46.1. Elementary properties of decompositions
46.2. Decomposition and its relation to the solutions: First results concerning F(e[sub(0)])
46.5. The complete result in E(e[sub(0)])
46.6. The complete result in E(eo)
46.7. Graphical representation of a part of the result
46.8. Interpretation: Thc normal zone. Heredity of various properties
46.10. Imbedding of a game
46.11 Significance of the normal zone
46.12. First occurrence of the phenomenon of transfer: n = 6
47. THE ESSENTIAL THREE-PERSON GAME IN THE NEW THEORY
47.1. Need for this discussion
47.2. Preparatory considerations
47.3. The six cases of the discussion. Cases (I)–(III)
47.4. Case (IV): First part
47.5. Case (IV): Second part
47.8. Interpretation of the result: The curves (one dimensional parts) in the solution
47.9. Continuation: The areas (two dimensional parts) in the solution
48. WINNING AND LOSING COALITIONS AND GAMES WHERE THEY
48.1. The sceond type of 41.1. Decision by coalitions
48.2. Winning and Losing Coalitions
49. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE SIMPLE GAMES
49.1 General concepts of winning and losing coalitions
49.2. The special role of one element sets
49.3. Characterization of the systems W, L of actual games
49.4. Exact definition of simplicity
49.5. Some elementary properties of simplicity
49.6. Simple games and their W, L. The Minimal winning Coalitions: W[sup(m)]
49.7. The solutions of simple games
50. THE MAJORITY GAMES AND THE MAIN SOLUTION
50.1. Examples of simple games: The majority games
50.3. A more direct use of the concept of imputation in forming solutions
50.4. Discussion of this direct approach
50.5. Connections with the general theory. Exact formulation
50.6. Reformulation of the result
50.7. Interpretation of the result
50.8. Connection with the Homogeneous Majority game
51. METHODS FOR THE ENUMERATION OF ALL SIMPLE GAMES
51.1. Preliminary Remarks
51.2. The saturation method: Enumeration by means of W
51.3. Reasons for passing from W to W[sup(m)]. Difficulties of using W[sup(m)]
51.4. Changed Approach: Enumeration by means of W[sup(m)]
51.5. Simplicity and decomposition
51.6. Inessentiality, Simplicity and Composition. Treatment of the excess
51.7. A criterium of decomposability in terms of W[sup(m)]
52. THE SIMPLE GAMES FOR SMALL n
52.1. Program. n = 1, 2 play no role. Disposal of n = 3
52.2. Procedure for n ≧ 4: The two element sets and their role in classifying the W[sup(m)]
52.3. Decomposability of cases C*, C[sub(n–2)], C[sub(n–1)]
52.4. The simple games other than [1, . . . 1, n – 2][sub(h)] (with dummies): The Cases C[sub(k)], k = 0, 1, . . . , n – 3
52.5. Disposal of n = 4, 5
53. THE NEW POSSIBILITIES OF SIMPLE GAMES FOR n ≧ 6
53.1. The Regularities observed for n ≧ 6
53.2. The six main counter examples (for n = 6, 7)
54. DETERMINATION OF ALL SOLUTIONS IN SUITABLE GAMES
54.1. Reasons to consider other solutions than the main solution in simple games
54.2. Enumeration of those gamea for which all solutions are known
54.3. Reasons to consider the simple game [1, . . . , 1, n – 2][sub(λ)]
*55. THE SIMPLE GAME [1, . . . , 1, n – 2][sub(h)]
*55.1. Preliminary Remarks
*55.2. Domination. The chief player. Cases (I) and (II)
*55.3. Disposal of Case (I)
*55.4. Case (II): Determination of V
*55.5. Case (II): Determination of V
*55.6. Case (II): a and S[sub(*)]
*55.7. Case (II′) and (II″). Disposal of Case (II′)
*55.8. Case (II″): a and V′. Domination
*55.9. Case (II″): Determination of V′
*55.10. Disposal of Case (II″)
*55.11. Reformulation of the complete result
*55.12. Interpretation of the result
CHAPTER XI: GENERAL NON-ZERO-SUM GAMES
56. EXTENSION OF THE THEORY
56.1. Formulation of the problem
56.2. The fictitious player. The zero sum extension Γ
56.3. Questions concerning the character of Γ
56.4. Limitations of the use of Γ
56.5. The two possible procedures
56.6. The discriminatory solutions
56.7. Alternative possibilities
56.9. Reconsideration of the case when Γ is a zero sum game
56.10. Analysis of the concept of domination
56.11. Rigorous discussion
56.12. The new definition of a solution
57. THE CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION AND RELATED TOPICS
57.1. The characteristic function: The extended and the restricted form
57.2. Fundamental properties
57.3. Determination of all characteristic functions
57.4. Removable sets of players
57.5. Strategic equivalence. Zero-sum and constant-sum games
58. INTERPRETATION OF THE CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION
58.1. Anslysis of the definition
58.2. The desire to make a gain vs. that to inflict a loss
59. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
59.1. Discussion of the program
59.2. The reduced forms. The inequalities
60. THE SOLUTIONS OF ALL GENERAL GAMES WITH n ≦ 3
60.4. Comparison with the zero sum games
61. ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS FOR n = 1, 2
61.2. The Case n = 2. The two person market
61.3. Discussion of the two person market and its characteristic function
61.4. Justification of the standpoint of 58
61.5. Divisible goods. The "marginal pairs"
61.6. The price. Discussion
62. ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS FOR n = 3: SPECIAL CASE
62.1. The case n = 3, special case. The three person market
62.2. Preliminary discussion
62.3. The solutions: First subcase
62.4. The solutions: General form
62.5. Algebraical form of the result
63. ECOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS FOR n = 3: GENERAL CASE
63.2. Analysis of the inequalities
63.3. Preliminary discussion
63.5. Algebraical form of the result
64.1. Formulation of the problem
64.2. Some special properties. Monopoly and monopsony
CHAPTER XII: EXTENSION OF THE CONCEPTS OF DOMINATION AND SOLUTION
65. THE EXTENSION. SPECIAL CASES
65.1. Formulation of the problem
65.3. Orderings, transitivity, acyclicity
65.4. The solutions: For a symmetric relation. For a complete ordering
65.5. The solutions: For a partial ordering
65.6. Acyclicity and strict aeyclicity
65.7. The solutions: For an acyclic relation
65.8. Uniquenss of solutions, acyclicity and strict acyclicity
65.9. Application to games: Discreteness and continuity
66. GENERALIZATION OF THE CONCEPT OF UTILITY
66.1. The generalization. The two phases of the theoretical treatment
66.2. Discussion of the first phase
66.3. Discussion of the second phase
66.4. Desirability of unifying the two phases
67. DISCUSSION OF AN EXAMPLE
67.1. Description of the example
67.2. The solution and its interpretation
67.3. Generalization: Different discrete utility scales
67.4. Conclusions concerning bargaining
APPENDIX: THE AXIOMATIC TREATMENT OF UTILITY
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
：Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
( Princeton Classic Editions )
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