Description
“It is the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority,” wrote Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers. The balance of power between Congress and the president has been a powerful thread throughout American political thought since the time of the Founding Fathers. And yet, for all that has been written on the topic, we still lack a solid empirical or theoretical justification for Hamilton’s proposition.
For the first time, William G. Howell, Saul P. Jackman, and Jon C. Rogowski systematically analyze the question. Congress, they show, is more likely to defer to the president’s policy preferences when political debates center on national rather than local considerations. Thus, World War II and the post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq significantly augmented presidential power, allowing the president to enact foreign and domestic policies that would have been unattainable in times of peace. But, contrary to popular belief, there are also times when war has little effect on a president’s influence in Congress. The Vietnam and Gulf Wars, for instance, did not nationalize our politics nearly so much, and presidential influence expanded only moderately.
Built on groundbreaking research, The Wartime President offers one of the most significant works ever written on the wartime powers presidents wield at home.
Chapter
1. War and the American Presidency
1. War and the American Presidency
1. War and the American Presidency
1.3 Sifting through the Claims
1.3 Sifting through the Claims
1.3 Sifting through the Claims
1.4 Quantitative Studies on War and Presidential Power
1.4 Quantitative Studies on War and Presidential Power
1.4 Quantitative Studies on War and Presidential Power
Part II: Theorizing about Interbranch Bargaining during War
Part II: Theorizing about Interbranch Bargaining during War
Part II: Theorizing about Interbranch Bargaining during War
2. The Policy Priority Model
2. The Policy Priority Model
2. The Policy Priority Model
2.1 Theoretical Building Blocks: Policies, Outcomes, and Interbranch Bargaining
2.1 Theoretical Building Blocks: Policies, Outcomes, and Interbranch Bargaining
2.1 Theoretical Building Blocks: Policies, Outcomes, and Interbranch Bargaining
3. The Model’s Predictions about Modern U.S. Wars
3. The Model’s Predictions about Modern U.S. Wars
3. The Model’s Predictions about Modern U.S. Wars
3.2 Which Equilibrium Are We Playing?
3.2 Which Equilibrium Are We Playing?
3.2 Which Equilibrium Are We Playing?
3.3 Measuring the Prioritization of National Outcomes
3.3 Measuring the Prioritization of National Outcomes
3.3 Measuring the Prioritization of National Outcomes
3.4 Characterizing the Wars
3.4 Characterizing the Wars
3.4 Characterizing the Wars
3.6 Competing Explanations
3.6 Competing Explanations
3.6 Competing Explanations
3.7 A closing Note on Theory Testing
3.7 A closing Note on Theory Testing
3.7 A closing Note on Theory Testing
Part III: Empirical Investigations
Part III: Empirical Investigations
Part III: Empirical Investigations
4. Spending in War and in Peace
4. Spending in War and in Peace
4. Spending in War and in Peace
4.3 Strategic Proposal Making
4.3 Strategic Proposal Making
4.3 Strategic Proposal Making
4.4 Distinguishing between Two Theoretically Informed Causal Mechanisms
4.4 Distinguishing between Two Theoretically Informed Causal Mechanisms
4.4 Distinguishing between Two Theoretically Informed Causal Mechanisms
4.5 A Comment on Endogenous War Making
4.5 A Comment on Endogenous War Making
4.5 A Comment on Endogenous War Making
5. Voting in War and in Peace
5. Voting in War and in Peace
5. Voting in War and in Peace
5.2 Post- 9/11 Wars and the 107th Congress
5.2 Post- 9/11 Wars and the 107th Congress
5.2 Post- 9/11 Wars and the 107th Congress
5.4 World War I and the Relevance of Stateside Attacks
5.4 World War I and the Relevance of Stateside Attacks
5.4 World War I and the Relevance of Stateside Attacks
6. Case Studies I: Illustrations
6. Case Studies I: Illustrations
6. Case Studies I: Illustrations
6.2 Pearl Harbor and National Labor Policy
6.2 Pearl Harbor and National Labor Policy
6.2 Pearl Harbor and National Labor Policy
6.3 Roosevelt and All the Resplendence of a War time Presidency
6.3 Roosevelt and All the Resplendence of a War time Presidency
6.3 Roosevelt and All the Resplendence of a War time Presidency
6.4 The Immigration Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act
6.4 The Immigration Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act
6.4 The Immigration Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act
7. Case Studies II: Challenges
7. Case Studies II: Challenges
7. Case Studies II: Challenges
7.1 The Federal Government Enters the Public Education Business
7.1 The Federal Government Enters the Public Education Business
7.1 The Federal Government Enters the Public Education Business
7.2 The Great Society and the 1965 Decision to Send Ground Troops into Vietnam
7.2 The Great Society and the 1965 Decision to Send Ground Troops into Vietnam
7.2 The Great Society and the 1965 Decision to Send Ground Troops into Vietnam
7.3 Bush’s War time Effort to Reform Social Security
7.3 Bush’s War time Effort to Reform Social Security
7.3 Bush’s War time Effort to Reform Social Security
8. Summaries, Speculations, and Extensions
8. Summaries, Speculations, and Extensions
8. Summaries, Speculations, and Extensions
8.3 A Future for the Policy Priority Model
8.3 A Future for the Policy Priority Model
8.3 A Future for the Policy Priority Model
A. Technical Details, Chapter 2
A. Technical Details, Chapter 2
A. Technical Details, Chapter 2
B. Alternative Bridging Criteria, Chapter 5
B. Alternative Bridging Criteria, Chapter 5
B. Alternative Bridging Criteria, Chapter 5
C. Summary Tables, Chapter 5
C. Summary Tables, Chapter 5
C. Summary Tables, Chapter 5
D. Robustness Checks, Chapter 5
D. Robustness Checks, Chapter 5
D. Robustness Checks, Chapter 5
The Wartime President
：Executive Influence and the Nationalizing Politics of Threat
( Chicago Series on International and Domestic Institutions )
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