Description
This work discusses and shows through statistics how the choice and design of electoral system/changes in electoral systems can have significant and lasting direct consequences for party proliferation, proportionality of party representation, racial representation, within-party and cross-party competition and collusion, voter turnout, and incentives to cultivate a personal vote through particularistic appeals.
Bernard Grofman has edited or co-edited sixteen books, three with Arnold Lijphart. Two of their collaborations won the Hallett Prize of the American Political Science Association (the prize is granted for works that have proved to have a lasting impact in the field, at least ten years beyond the date of publication: Lijphart and Grofman, Choosing an Electoral System, 1984; Grofman and Lijphart, Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, 1986).
This volume is one of four collections on electoral systems originating in Conferences on Political Economy at the University of California at Irvine. The others deal with elections using the single non-transferable vote (Michigan, 1999), single transferable vote (Michigan, 2000), and mixed-member arrangements (Oxford, 2000).
Many political scientists in English-speaking countries tend to think of Proportional Representation in terms of the underlying concepts of proportionality and examples that institutionalize it in relative pure form, such as Israel. Reading these chapters, one gains a more sophisticated understanding of the variety and complexities of real PR systems, including the interaction of geographical representation with the principle of proportionality, the practical stakes behind the seemingly technical choice of allocation formulas, the origin of the "modified" St. Laguë divisors, the functioning of apparentement and other vote-pooling devices, the interaction of strategic advantage and normative principles in the development of the Proportional Representation systems, the role of partisan manipulation, etc.
A model of comparative, cumulative political science, and of "embedded system" research design, the book is part of a major project by both Grofman and Lijphart to bring a vast improvement in rigor and systemicity in the analysis of electoral laws and their impacts.
Each chapter offers a narration of the history of, and political (largely partisan) maneuvering behind, the evolution of electoral laws in the five Nordic countries. In this respect, it is in the tradition of A Short History of Electoral Systems in Western Europe, by Carstairs, 1980 (out of print). Yet, it differs from that work, and represents a significant advance on it, by focusing on fewer countries and thus going into greater depth and wider history span.
Table of Contents
1. Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, Introduction
2. Jorgen Elklit, Denmark
3. Jan Sundberg, Finland
4. Olafur Hardarrson, Iceland
5. Bernt Aardal, Norway
6. Bo Sarlvik (with the assistance of Peter Eisaisson and Ola Jodal), Sweden
Chapter
The Politics of Electoral System Development and Change: The Danish Case
Department of Political Science
University of Aarhus, Denmark
Table 1: The Six National, Lower House Electoral Systems in Denmark Since 1849
Table 2: Major Parties and Governing Coalitions in Denmark 1849-1990s
Table 3: Suffrage in Denmark Since the 1830s (for the Consultative Assemblies, the Constitutional Convention, and the Folketing). Per Cent of Entire Population
1920-1990s (or: DEN-III to DEN-VI)
3. Electoral System Development and Politics in Denmark from the Early 1830s to the late 1990s
3.1. From 1849 to 1915, or: DEN-I
3.2 The First Major Change, 1915-20, or: DEN-II
3.3. The Subsequent Change in 1920, or: DEN-III
3.4. The 1947-48 Punitive Action Against the Liberals, or: DEN-IV
Table 4: Vote and Seat Shares for the Two Largest Parties (the Social Democrats and the Liberals) in the General Elections 1945-50. Percentages of National Totals
3.5. The 1953 Constitutional and Elections Act Amendments, or DEN-V
3.6. Softer Legal Thresholds Since 1964 and Possible Effects Thereof, or: DEN-VI
Table 5: Average Measures of Disproportionality and Fractionalization for Six Danish Electoral Systems
4. Electoral Laws and Their Consequences
4.1 The Link between Electoral System and Party System
Table 6: Smallest and Biggest Constituency in Selected Years 1849-1915 (and the Numerical Relationship Between the Two)
6. Is a Conclusion Possible?
Table A-1-A-1. Folketing Election Results 1887-July 1920
Table A-1-A-2. Folketing Election Results 1918- September 1920
Table A-1-A-3. Folketing Election Results 1924 - 1957
Table A-1-A-4. Folketing Election Results 1960 - 1971
Table 7: Table A-1-A-5. Folketing Election Results 1973 - 1988
Table A-1-A-6 Folketing Election Results 1990-1998
The Electoral System of Finland: Old, and Working Well
Department of Political Science
University of Helsinki, Finland
2. The Turn to Universal Suffrage
4. Electoral Laws and Their Consequences
Table 1: The Increase in the Electorate Since 1907
5. The Effects of the D’Hondt System
Table 2: Disproportionality and fragmentation in Finnish elections since 1907
6. Constituency Malapportionment
Table 3: Disproportionality at constituency level at the parliamentary elections 1966, 1979 and 1995 as measured by least-squares index
Table A-1: Electoral systems in Finland since 1906
The Icelandic Electoral System 1844-1999
Department of Political Science
University of Iceland, Reykjavík
Table 1: The ten Icelandic electoral systems 1844-1999
Table 2: Parties represented in the Althingi and Government 1845-1999
1843-1857: Strict Property Requirements (Ice1)
A Liberal Interlude: Election to the National Assembly 1851
1857-1903: Tax qualifications, especially in towns and villages - most farmers get the vote (Ice2 and Ice3).
1903-1915: Extended Suffrage for Town Workers and Fishermen (Ice4)
1915-1920: Women and Servants Obtain the Vote: Special Age Qualifications (Ice5)
Table 3: Suffrage: Size of electorate as percent of population 1874-1999
1920-1933: Special Age Limits for Women and Servants Abolished (Ice6)
1933-1999: Suffrage for Recipients of Poor Relief and Lowering Age Limits (Ice7 to Ice10)
3. The ten electoral systems
1844-1852 (Ice1): Simple Plurality (20 members) in Single-Member Constituencies + 6 Royal Members
1858-1869 (Ice2): Absolute Majority (up to 3 rounds) in 21 Single-Member Constituencies + 6 Royal Members
1874-1903 (Ice3): Absolute Majority (up to 3 rounds) in Single-Member and Two-Member Constituencies (30 members) + 6 Royal Members
1908-1914 (Ice4): First-Past-the-Post in Single-Member and Two-Member Constituencies (34 members) + 6 Royal Members
1920-1933 (Ice6): First-Past-the-Post in Single-Member and Two-Member Constituencies (32 members) + PR (d’Hondt) in Reykjavík (4 members) + PR (d’Hondt) in a Special Country At- Large Election (6 members for a 8-year term)
New Century - New System: Decreasing (but Remaining) Malapportionment
4. Impact of the electoral systems
Table 4: Disproportionality for individual parties in the Althingi 1916-1999
Electoral Systems in Norway
Institute for Social Research, Oslo
and Department of Political Science,
University of Oslo, Norway
Table 1: Electoral Systems in Norway since 1814
2. Party System and Cleavage Structure
Table 2a. Parties represented in the Storting 1882-1997
Table 2b: Governing Parties in Norway 1884-1997
1814-1905: Indirect, plurality elections
Majority Runoff Elections 1906-1918
Proportional Elections - the d’Hondt Method 1919-52
Redistricting and the Sainte-Laguë Method 1953-88
The 1988 Reform: Two-Tier Districting, 8 Adjustment Seats
5. Electoral Laws and Their Consequences
7. Parties Behaving Strategically
Party and Electoral System in Sweden
Department of Political Science
University of Goteborg, Sweden
Table 1: Electoral system eras and the details of system usage. Sweden 1866 - 1998
Table 2: Parties in the second chamber, their seats in percent and the formal governing coalitions categorized in majority and minority governments based on their strength in the second chamber 1911 - 1998
Table 3: Electoral participation as a percentage of adults eligible to vote. The expansion of suffrage is shown in footnotes
1. From Four-Estate Parliament to Two-Chamber Parliament: The First Two Electoral Eras in Sweden
Extension of the Suffrage With Proportional Representation as a Conservative Guarantee
2. Proportional Representation in Practice: Second Chamber Elections in the Third Electoral Era, 1911-1920
Constitutional Democratization and Electoral System Change
Table 4: Party Division of Seats in the First Chamber: 1917-1925
Consequences of the d’Hondt Formula in the Fourth Electoral Era, 1921 - 1948
Elections to the First Chamber
Table 5: Party Division in the First Chamber 1929 - 1968
3. Proportional Representation Without Electoral Cartels: The Modified Sainte-Laguë Formula Replaces d’Hondt in the Fifth Electoral Era, 1952-1968
Elections to the First Chamber and the Operation of the Two Chamber System
Table 6: The Social Democrats’ Parliamentary Bases in the Two Chambers, 1932-1970
4. The Sixth Electoral Era, 1970-1998
Constitutional Reform: A One-Chamber Parliament and Increased Proportionality through Additional Seats
The Ice Thaws and Breaks Up at the Edges: New Parties Pass the Threshold, Uncertain Coalitions, and Minority Governments
Electoral System Change: Candidate Preference Voting Within the Party List System
Table A1. Share of votes in percent, the number of seats for each party and share of seats in percent in the Second Chamber elections between 1911 and 1998.
Table A2. Percent constituencies with direct elected members to the Second Chamber 1866 - 1908
Table A4. Percent share of employers in four different branches of business in Sweden between 1870 and 1994
Table A5. Percent share of the Swedish population living in densely populated areas / sparsely populated areas between 1860 and 1990*
The Evolution of Electoral and Party Systems in the Nordic Countries
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