Timing of Penalties, Tax Rates, and Tax Evasion

Author： Lee Kangoh  

Publisher： Mohr Siebeck

E-ISSN： 1614-0974|71|1|37-52

ISSN： 0015-2218

Source： FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Vol.71, Iss.1, 2015-03, pp. : 37-52

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