Who Opts out of the Statutory Health Insurance? A Discrete Time Hazard Model for Germany

E-ISSN： 1099-1050|24|10|1331-1347

ISSN： 1057-9230

Source： HEALTH ECONOMICS, Vol.24, Iss.10, 2015-10, pp. : 1331-1347

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