Future's Back ：Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability after the Cold War

Publication subTitle ：Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability after the Cold War

Author： Harvey   Frank P.  

Publisher： McGill-Queen's University Press‎

Publication year： 1994

E-ISBN: 9780773566569

P-ISBN(Paperback): 9780773516052

Subject： D815.2 the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons

Keyword： 世界史

Language： ENG

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Description

Given the likely proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the future, and the failure of "non-proliferation" regimes to provide effective barriers to the spread of nuclear technology in the past, efforts towards greater understanding of nuclear rivalry are crucial. The Future's Back provides a valuable framework for organizing and evaluating research on superpower rivalry and nuclear deterrence.

Chapter

Contents

Tables and Figures

Acknowledgments

Introduction

1 Cumulation in International Relations: Methodological Constraints and Solutions

2 Nuclear Deterrence: The Record of Aggregate Testing

3 New Directions for Aggregate Testing

4 Game Theory and Superpower Rivalry, 1948–88

5 U.S.-Soviet Rivalry and Nuclear Deterrence

6 Nuclear Stability after the Cold War

7 Conventional Deterrence and Compellence Theory: Perspectives on Testing after the Cold War

Notes

Bibliography

Index

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

K

L

M

N

O

P

R

S

T

V

W

Y

Z

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