Front Cover

Blinding as a Solution to Bias

Copyright

Contents

List of Contributors

Foreword

I - Introduction and overview

Introduction

OVERVIEW

BOOK ORGANIZATION

Introduction

Biomedical Sciences

Forensic Sciences

Legal Institutions

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

II - Blinding and Bias

1 - A Primer on the Psychology of Cognitive Bias

A Primer on the Psychology of Cognitive Bias

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF HUMAN COGNITION

CONTEXT EFFECTS

Initial Impressions

Judgments

Types of Decision-Making Activities

The Bias Snowball Effect

MITIGATING THE EFFECT OF CONTEXT

CONCLUSION

2 - Why Blinding? How Blinding? A Theory of Blinding and Its Application to Institutional Corruption

BLINDING AS DISAGGREGATION

THE BREADTH OF BLINDING

INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION AND THE FAILURE OF COMMON SOLUTIONS

BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION

BLINDING APPLIED TO LITIGATION, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS

CONCLUSION

III - Biomedical Science

Rigor in Biomedical Science

References

3 - From Trials to Trials: Blinding, Medicine, and Honest Adjudication

INTRODUCTION

BLINDING OF PATIENTS

BLINDING OF RESEARCHERS

BLINDING IN MEDICINE MOVES TO THE COURTROOM

4 - Blinding in Biomedical Research: An Essential Method to Reduce Risk of Bias

INTRODUCTION

TERMINOLOGY AND REPORTING

MECHANISMS FOR INTRODUCING BIAS IN NONBLINDED STUDIES

EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS OF THE IMPACT OF BLINDING

Blinding of Outcome Assessors

Blinding of Patients

Blinding of Health-Care Providers

RISK OF UNBLINDING

BLINDING IN NONRANDOMIZED STUDY DESIGNS

Animal Studies

Epidemiology: Case–Control and Cohort Studies

Diagnostic Studies

Systematic Reviews and Other Study Designs

CONCLUSION

5 - Blind Peer Review by Academic Journals

INTRODUCTION

OVERVIEW OF PEER REVIEW

Process of Peer Review

Types of Peer Review

A Note on the Evidence

DOUBLE-BLINDING AS A MEANS OF ENHANCING FAIRNESS

Fairness to Authors from Less-Prestigious Institutions

Fairness to Non-US Authors

Fairness to Prolific Authors

Fairness to Female Authors

The Perception of Fairness

BLINDING AS A MEANS OF IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF REVIEWS

Effects of (Not) Revealing Author Identity

Effects of (Not) Revealing Reviewer Identity

BREAKING THE (DOUBLE) BLIND

How Double-Blinding Is Accomplished

Blinding Success Rates

Impact of Technology on Blinding

PREFERENCES FOR OPEN, SINGLE-, OR DOUBLE-BLIND REVIEW

CONCLUSION

6 - Clinical Trial Blinding in the Age of Social Media

INTRODUCTION

RESEARCHER-LED UNBLINDING

PATIENT-LED UNBLINDING

A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT

7 - The Ethics of Single-Blind Trials in Biomedicine

INTRODUCTION

INTERNAL MAMMARY ARTERY LIGATION: AN INSTRUCTIVE CASE STUDY

JUSTIFYING INVASIVE PLACEBO CONTROLS: RISK–BENEFIT ASSESSMENT

DECEPTION AND INFORMED CONSENT

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

8 - “Money Blinding” as a Solution to Biased Design and Conduct of Scientific Research

THE PROBLEM OF COMMERCIAL BIAS IN SCIENCE

MODELS FOR INDEPENDENT SCIENCE

MONEY BLINDING AS A SOLUTION

LIMITS AND DISADVANTAGES

AVENUES FOR REFORM

ASSESSING THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST MONEY BLINDING

CONCLUSION

Acknowledgment

IV - Forensic Science: Criminal and civil

Rigor in Forensic Science

References

9 - Determining the Proper Evidentiary Basis for an Expert Opinion: What Do Experts Need to Know and When Do They Know Too Much?

INTRODUCTION

WHAT SHOULD ANCILLARY EXPERTS KNOW? DILEMMAS IN THREE FIELDS

Forensic Science

Scientific Assessments in National Intelligence Investigations

Clinical Information Bias in Medicine

A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Task-Relevant Context

Dangers of Exposing Ancillary Experts to Task-Irrelevant Information

EXPERTS WHO ARE ALSO DECISION MAKERS

CONCLUSION

Acknowledgments

10 - Minimizing and Leveraging Bias in Forensic Science

INTRODUCTION

HIERARCHICAL VERSUS DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM

MINIMIZING BIAS VERSUS LEVERAGING BIAS

FINDING THE OPTIMAL MIX

WHY IT MAY BE HARD TO GET THE OPTIMAL MIX

Incentives of Crime Labs to Convict

Regulatory Capture

CONCLUSION

11 - What Do Statisticians Really Need to Know, and When Do They Need to Know It?

INTRODUCTION

CAUSAL INFERENCE FROM OBSERVATIONAL DATA

BLINDING: LOCK THE OUTCOME VARIABLES IN A CLOSET

CAN WE INSTITUTIONALIZE THIS KIND OF ANALYSIS?

12 - Using Blind Reviews to Address Biases in Medical Malpractice

INTRODUCTION

EXPERT WITNESSES

Informational Biases

Framing Bias

Retrospective (Hindsight) Bias

Outcome Bias

Visual Hindsight Bias

Litigation Biases

Selection Bias

Undersampling Bias

Compensation Bias

ELIMINATING EXPERT BIAS

Eliminate the Search for Fault

Eliminate the Expert

Blind the Expert

The Sub Rosa Method

The Second Read and Oversight Methods

Application of Expert Witness Bias Solutions to Clinical Scenarios

Narrow Focus versus Broad Focus Clinical Scenarios

Applying Methods to Reduce Expert Witness Bias to the Clinical Scenarios

Limitations of Applying Expert Witness Blinding Approaches

CONCLUSION

13 - Mock Juror and Jury Assessment of Blinded Expert Witnesses

INTRODUCTION

LITERATURE REVIEW

Biased Expert Witnesses

Blinding as a Solution to Bias

IMPACT OF BLINDED EXPERT WITNESSES ON CIVIL JURY VERDICTS

Methods

Results

Verdict Preferences by Experimental Group

Expert Witness Evaluation in Control Condition

Expert Witness Evaluation in Experimental Condition

COMPENSATION BIAS

SELECTION BIAS

IMPACT OF BLINDED EXPERT ON JURY DELIBERATIONS

Discussions of Personal Responsibility

DEFINING PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY

PLAINTIFF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY VERSUS BLINDED EXPERT’S OPINION THAT PHYSICIAN COMMITTED MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

PLAINTIFF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY VERSUS MEDICAL EXPERTISE

THE ROLE OF PLAINTIFF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN JURY DECISIONS

Discussion

MOCK JURORS’ ASSESSMENTS OF BLINDED EXPERTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS

Methods

Stimulus and Design

Instrument

Participants and Randomization

Results

Descriptive Statistics

Logistic Regression

Discussion

CONCLUSION

14 - Disclosure Discretion and Selection Bias in Blinding of Experts

INTRODUCTION

SELECTION BIAS AND THE ATTORNEY WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE

THE FALLACIES OF DISCLOSURE DISCRETION

SYSTEMATIC EFFECTS

DUAL, ADVERSARIAL USE

IMPLICATIONS

V - Blinding in legal Institutions

Legal Applications of the Disclose-or-Blindfold Question

15 - Why Eyes? Cautionary Tales from Law’s Blindfolded Justice

IMPARTIALITY—OR IGNORANCE, CAPRICE, AND OBSTINACY

REVISING THE VALENCE OF THE BLINDFOLD

THE PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF SIGHT: A BLIND MAN “MADE TO SEE”

SEPARATING POWERS, COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTIONS, AND VEILS OF IGNORANCE

THE MULTIPLE VANTAGE POINTS OF JUSTICE

16 - A Theory of Anonymity*

INTRODUCTION

A TAXONOMY OF ANONYMITY RULES

A THEORY OF PRODUCTION

Creation

Evaluation

Allocation

IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW AND POLICY

The Production of Goods

The Production of Liberal Legal Subjects

CONCLUSION

17 - The Cases for and against Blindfolding the Jury1

INTRODUCTION

THE JURY AS ACTIVE INFORMATION PROCESSOR

ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL JURIES

ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF BLINDFOLDING AND INSTRUCTIONS

THE ROLE OF EXPECTATIONS IN JURY DECISION MAKING

THE CASE AGAINST BLINDFOLDING

WHEN BLINDFOLDING IS REQUIRED

MINIMIZING HARMFUL EFFECTS WHEN BLINDFOLDING IS NOT A PLAUSIBLE STRATEGY

CONCLUSIONS

18 - The Compliance Equation: Creating a More Ethical and Equitable Campaign Financing System by Blinding Contributions to Federal Candidates

INTRODUCTION

ANONYMITY: AN ALTERNATIVE TO MANDATORY DISCLOSURE

DEFINING CORRUPTION

Systemic Corruption

The Deeper Issue

HOW DISCLOSURE CONTRIBUTES TO LEGALIZED CORRUPTION

Intimidation Corruption

BENEFICIARIES OF FECA’s MANDATORY PUBLIC REPORTING SYSTEM

Candidates

Journalists

Academicians

Interest Groups and Lobbyists

WHAT CONTRIBUTIONS DO AND DO NOT BUY

AN ANONYMITY-BASED CAMPAIGN FINANCE SYSTEM

Requirements of the System

THE COMPLIANCE EQUATION: LEVERAGING HUMAN NATURE

Strict Sanctions—Whistle-Blowing

Contribution Limits

Enforcement

Incentives

ADDITIONAL BENEFITS OF ANONYMITY-BASED CAMPAIGN FINANCING

Making Room for the Little Guy

THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

CLOSING OBSERVATION

19 - Blinding Eyewitness Identifications

INTRODUCTION

LINEUPS AS EXPERIMENTS

THE LAW OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS

THE BLIND LINEUP

BEYOND BLINDING

BLINDED LINEUPS

ADOPTING BLIND LINEUPS

20 - Blind Appointments in Arbitration

INTRODUCTION

BLIND APPOINTMENTS AND THE DEBATE OVER UNILATERALS

THE CASE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION

The Basics on ICSID

Evidence

DEBIASING PARTY APPOINTMENTS AND THE CASE FOR BLINDING

Alternatives to Party Appointments

Blind Appointments: Possibilities and Challenges

CONCLUSIONS

APPENDIX

21 - Psychological Obstacles to the Judicial Disqualification Inquiry, and Blinded Review as an Aid

INTRODUCTION

THE LAW OF JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION

The Model Code of Judicial Conduct

Dual Aims of Disqualification: Actual Bias and Appearances

The Impartiality Hypothetical

PSYCHOLOGICAL OBSTACLES TO DIAGNOSING BIAS

Asymmetric Information in Self- versus Other-Diagnoses

The Introspection Illusion

Motivated Processes in Diagnosing Bias

Naïve Realism

THIRD-PARTY DISQUALIFICATION REVIEW

BLINDED DISQUALIFICATION REVIEW

22 - Masking Information Source within the Internal Revenue Service

THE TAX SYSTEM WE HAVE

A POTENTIAL SOLUTION IN THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM

BIAS AGAINST WHISTLEBLOWERS

COGNITIVE BIAS

COGNITIVE BIAS AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

STRATEGIES FOR COMBATING COGNITIVE BIAS FROM PRIOR LITERA

REMOVING COGNITIVE BIAS INSTEAD OF MITIGATING ITS EFFECTS

BLINDING IN THE IRS WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM

23 - Blinding the Law: The Potential Virtue of Legal Uncertainty*

INTRODUCTION

LEGAL IGNORANCE AS BLISS

Theoretical Framework

Moral Hazards and the Ex post versus Ex ante Functions of the Law

Ensuring Genuine Choice

Shielding Altruistic Motivation

LEGAL UNCERTAINTY AS A VEIL OF IGNORANCE

Behavioral Consequences of Legal Uncertainty

THE INADVERTENT CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL UNCERTAINTY

Excessive Litigation

Distributive Concerns

The Ex ante Distributive Effect on Uncertainty

Bargaining in the Shadow of Uncertainty

WITHIN THE LAW

Rules versus Standards

Moral Hazard and the Ex ante versus Ex post Distinction

Bankruptcy Law

Ensuring Genuine Choices

Employment Law

Tax Law and Tax Shelters

CONCLUSION

Index

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

L

M

N

O

P

Q

R

S

T

U

V

W

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