Forensic Evidence in Court :Evaluation and Scientific Opinion

Publication subTitle :Evaluation and Scientific Opinion

Author: Craig Adam  

Publisher: John Wiley & Sons Inc‎

Publication year: 2016

E-ISBN: 9781119054429

P-ISBN(Paperback): 9781119054412

P-ISBN(Hardback):  9781119054412

Subject: D90-05 the relationship with other subjects of law

Keyword: Forensic Expert opinion Evidence Bayes Evaluation Admissibility Likelihood ratio Statistics Expert witness Miscarriage of justice  Forensic Expert opinion Evidence Bayes Evaluation Admissibility Likelihood ratio Statistics Expert witness Miscarriage of justice  

Language: ENG

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Description

The interpretation and evaluation of scientific evidence and its presentation in a court of law is central both to the role of the forensic scientist as an expert witness and to the interests of justice. This book aims to provide a thorough and detailed discussion of the principles and practice of evidence interpretation and evaluation by using real cases by way of illustration. The presentation is appropriate for students of forensic science or related disciplines at advanced undergraduate and master's level or for practitioners engaged in continuing professional development activity.

The book is structured in three sections. The first sets the scene by describing and debating the issues around the admissibility and reliability of scientific evidence presented to the court. In the second section, the principles underpinning interpretation and evaluation are explained, including discussion of those formal statistical methods founded on Bayesian inference. The following chapters present perspectives on the evaluation and presentation of evidence in the context of a single type or class of scientific evidence, from DNA to the analysis of documents. For each, the science underpinning the analysis and interpretation of the forensic materials is explained, followed by the presentation of cases which illustrate the variety of approaches that have been taken in providing expert scientific opinion.

Chapter

1.6.3 The Evidence was Wrong

1.6.4 Exaggerated Evaluation by the Expert

1.6.5 Unethical Behaviour

1.6.6 Human Error

1.6.7 Non-validated Methodology

1.6.8 Overconfidence in New Techniques

1.7 The Scientist and the Laboratory

1.8 Conclusions

References

Further Reading

Chapter 2 Admissibility from the Legal Perspective

2.1 Admissibility, Relevance and Reliability of Evidence

2.2 Admissibility in the United States

2.2.1 Reliability and the Frye Test

2.2.2 Meeting the Frye Criterion: US v Stifel 1970

2.2.3 Admissibility and the Gatekeeper Role: The Daubert Test

2.2.4 The Daubert Trilogy

2.2.5 General Electric v Joiner 1997

2.2.6 Kumo Tire Company v Patrick Carmichael 1999

2.2.7 Post-Daubert Hearings: US v Dennis Mooney 2002

2.3 Admissibility in Canada

2.3.1 R v Mohan 1994

2.3.2 R v Abbey 2009

2.3.3 R v Trochym 2007

2.4 Admissibility in Australia

2.4.1 R v Bonython 1984

2.4.2 Makita v Sprowles 2001

2.4.3 Dasreef Pty Limited v Hawchar 2011

2.5 Admissibility in England and Wales

2.5.1 R v Turner 1975

2.5.2 R v Gilfoyle 2001

2.5.3 R v Luttrell 2004

2.6 Conclusions on Admissibility

2.6.1 Relevance and Expertise

2.6.2 The Scientific Basis of the Opinion

2.6.3 Weight of Evidence

References

Further Reading

Chapter 3 Forensic Science and the Law: The Path Forward

3.1 National and Legal Developments in the United States

3.1.1 Federal Rules of Evidence

3.1.2 Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States 2009

3.1.3 US Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence

3.2 National and Legal Developments in Canada

3.2.1 Legal Enquiries into Miscarriages of Justice

3.2.2 The Science Manual for Canadian Judges

3.3 National and Legal Developments in Australia

3.3.1 The Uniform Rules of Evidence

3.4 National and Legal Developments in England and Wales

3.4.1 Forensic Science on Trial 2005

3.4.2 The Law Commission Report 2011

3.4.3 The Royal Statistical Society Guides

3.4.4 HCSTSC Report Forensic Science 2013

3.4.5 UK Government Response (2013) to the Law Commission Report

3.5 Conclusions

References

Further Reading

Chapter 4 Scientific Opinion and the Law in Practice

4.1 Scientific Opinion and the Judicial System

4.1.1 Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems of Justice

4.1.2 Scientific Evidence Within the Inquisitorial System

4.1.3 Inquisitorial Versus Adversarial

4.2 The Scientist in Court

4.3 The Role and Duties of the Scientific Expert Witness

4.3.1 Definitions of the Role

4.3.2 Duties and Responsibilities of the Expert Witness

4.4 Quality Control of Analysis and Opinion

4.4.1 An Australian Standard for Forensic Analysis

4.4.2 Regulation of Forensic Science in the United Kingdom

4.4.3 Codes of Conduct and Practice

4.4.4 Accreditation of the Expert

4.5 Conclusion

References

Further Reading

Part 2

Chapter 5 Fundamentals of the Interpretation and Evaluation of Scientific Evidence

5.1 Analysis, Interpretation and Evaluation

5.2 The Role and Outcomes of Forensic Investigation

5.2.1 Investigative Forensic Science

5.2.2 Evaluative Forensic Science

5.3 Fact and Opinion

5.3.1 Categorisation of Opinions

5.3.2 Factual Opinion

5.3.3 Investigative Opinion

5.4 Expert Opinion and the Forensic Science Paradigm

5.4.1 Categorical Opinion

5.4.2 Posterior Probabilities

5.4.3 Explanations

5.4.4 Where Does this Take Us?

5.5 What are Propositions?

5.5.1 The Hierarchy of Propositions

5.5.2 The Importance of Activity Level

5.6 Competing Propositions in the Court

Chapter 6 Case Studies in Expert Opinion

6.1 Case Study 1: Facial Comparison Evidence

6.1.1 The Crime and Conviction

6.1.2 Expert Evidence and Opinion

6.1.3 Opinion in Atkins

6.2 Case Study 2: Ear-mark Identification

6.2.1 The Crime and the Evidence

6.2.2 Interpreting the Evidence and Challenges to the Opinion

6.2.3 The Conclusion of the Appeal

6.2.4 Opinion in Dallagher

6.3 Case Study 3: Glass and Gunshot Residue

6.3.1 The Crime and Trial

6.3.2 Analysis and Interpretation of the Scientific Evidence

6.3.3 Propositions for Evaluation

6.3.4 Evaluative Opinion: Glass

6.3.5 Evaluative Opinion: GSR

6.3.6 Opinion in Bowden

6.4 Conclusions

References

Further Reading

Chapter 7 Formal Methods for Logical Evaluation

7.1 Frequentist and Bayesian Approaches to Evaluation

7.1.1 The Frequentist Approach to Formulating Opinion

7.1.2 The Logical Evaluation of Evidence

7.1.3 The Debate on Formulating Opinion

7.2 The Likelihood Ratio Method

7.3 Expressing Opinion Through Likelihood Ratio

7.3.1 Statements of Evaluative Opinion

7.3.2 Likelihood Ratio and Verbal Equivalent Statements

7.4 Evaluation and Bayes’ Theorem

7.4.1 Bayes’ Theorem: Prior and Posterior Odds

7.4.2 Combining Likelihood Ratios

7.5 Prior Odds

7.6 Posterior Probabilities

7.6.1 Opinion and Posterior Probabilities

7.6.2 The Prosecutor’s Fallacy

7.7 Working Out Conditional Probabilities and Likelihood Ratio

7.7.1 Likelihood Ratio at Source Level

7.7.2 Likelihood Ratio at Activity Level

7.8 Conclusions

References

Further Reading

Chapter 8 Case Studies in Probabilistic Opinion

8.1 People v Collins 1968

8.2 R v Michael Shirley 2003

8.2.1 A Logical Evaluation of Scientific Evidence

8.2.2 The Outcome of the Appeal

8.3 R v D J Adams 1996, 1998

8.3.1 The Crime and the Evidence

8.3.2 A Probabilistic Analysis of the Evidence: Prior Odds

8.3.3 The Non-Scientific Evidence

8.3.4 The Scientific Evidence

8.3.5 Total Likelihood Ratio and Posterior Odds

8.3.6 The Appeals

8.3.7 Review of the Issues in R v D J Adams

8.4 The Defendant’s Fallacy: R v J 2009

8.5 Conclusion

References

Further Reading

Chapter 9 Cognitive Bias and Expert Opinion

9.1 Cognitive Bias

9.2 Contextual Bias

9.2.1 Confirmation Bias

9.2.2 Expectation Bias

9.2.3 Motivational Bias

9.2.4 Anchoring

9.3 Other Sources of Bias

9.4 Fingerprint Examination: A Case Study in Bias

9.4.1 The Review of the Brandon Mayfield Case 2004

9.4.2 The Fingerprint Inquiry Scotland 2009

9.4.3 Bias Within Fingerprint Examination

9.5 Mitigating Bias

9.6 Mitigating Bias Versus Research on Traces

9.7 Conclusions

References

Further Reading

Part 3

Chapter 10 The Evaluation of DNA Profile Evidence

10.1 DNA Profiling Techniques – A Brief History

10.2 Databases in DNA Profiling

10.2.1 Allele Frequency Databases

10.2.2 Identification Databases

10.3 Interpretation and Evaluation of Conventional DNA Profiles

10.3.1 Combined Probability of Inclusion (CPI) or Exclusion (CPE)

10.3.2 Random Match Probability (RMP)

10.3.3 Likelihood Ratio

10.4 Suspect Identification from a DNA Database

10.4.1 The Frequentist Interpretation

10.4.2 The Likelihood Ratio Approach

10.4.3 Database Search Evidence in Court

10.5 Case Studies of DNA in the Court

10.5.1 R v Andrew Philip Deen 1994

10.5.2 Issues Raised by Expert Opinion in R v Deen

10.5.3 R v Alan Doheny 1996

10.5.4 The Doheny Trial

10.5.5 The Doheny Appeal

10.5.6 R v Gary Adams 1996

10.5.7 Challenges to the Interpretation of DNA Profiles: US v Shea 1997

10.6 Current Practice for Evaluating DNA Profile Evidence

10.6.1 The Impact of Doheny and Adams in the United Kingdom

10.6.2 Current Practice in the United Kingdom

10.6.3 Current Practice in Australia

10.7 DNA – The Only Evidence

10.8 Errors and Mistakes in Forensic DNA Analysis

10.8.1 Adam Scott 2012

10.8.2 R v S 2013

10.8.3 Laboratory Error Rates Versus the RMP

10.9 Conclusions

References

Further Reading

Chapter 11 Low Template DNA

11.1 Technical Issues

11.1.1 Terminology

11.1.2 Samples

11.1.3 Technical Issues in Interpretation

11.1.4 Quantitative Evaluation in LTDNA Profiles

11.2 Importance of the Chain of Custody: Queen v Sean Hoey 2007

11.3 The Caddy Report 2008

11.4 Case Studies in LTDNA opinion in the UK Courts

11.4.1 Partial Profiles

11.4.2 Quantities of DNA; Interpretive Issues on Transfer

11.4.3 Very Low Quantities of DNA

11.4.4 Opinion Without Statistics

11.4.5 Experts Differ in Opinion

11.5 LTDNA in Jurisdictions Outside the United Kingdom

11.5.1 United States

11.5.2 Australia

11.6 Conclusions

References

Further Reading

Chapter 12 Footwear Marks in Court

12.1 The Analysis and Interpretation of Footwear Marks

12.2 Match Opinion: R v D S Hall 2004

12.2.1 The Crime and the Evidence

12.2.2 Footwear Mark Evidence and Opinion

12.2.3 Review of Expert Opinion in R v Hall

12.3 The Likelihood Ratio Approach to Evaluation of Footwear Marks

12.4 Standardising Scales for Expert Opinion

12.4.1 SWGTREAD Scales of Opinion

12.4.2 ENFSI Scales of Opinion

12.5 Challenges to Opinion on Footwear Evidence: R v T 2010

12.5.1 Outline of the Footwear Mark Evidence in R v T

12.5.2 The Expert Witness’ Notes

12.5.3 Evaluation Using an Alternative Database

12.5.4 The Summary by the Appeal Court Judge

12.6 Discussion of R v T

12.6.1 Terminology, Probabilities and Statistical Methodology

12.6.2 Footwear Databases

12.6.3 Was the Jury Told the Basis of the Expert Opinion?

12.6.4 The Appeal Court Ruling: Bayes, Mathematics and Formulae

12.7 Footwear Mark Evidence After R v T: R v South 2011

12.7.1 The Crime and Evidence

12.7.2 Evaluation of the Footwear Evidence

12.7.3 Review of the Expert Opinion

12.8 ENFSI Recommendations on Logical Evaluation 2015

12.9 Conclusions

References

Further Reading

Chapter 13 Fingerprints and Finger-Marks – Identifying Individuals?

13.1 Fingerprint Identification on Trial

13.2 ACE-V: A Scientific Method?

13.3 Evaluation Criteria

13.3.1 Thresholds for Categorical Evaluation

13.3.2 The Balthazard Model

13.3.3 Identification Thresholds and the Points Standard in the United Kingdom

13.3.4 The Basis of the Non-Numeric (Holistic) Approach

13.3.5 Identification Thresholds in Other Jurisdictions

13.3.6 R v Buckley 1999

13.4 Evolution of the Basis of Fingerprint Opinion in the Court

13.5 A Critical Summary of Fingerprint Identification

13.6 Challenges to Fingerprint Testimony

13.6.1 R v P K Smith 2011

13.6.2 Shirley McKie and the Scottish Fingerprint Inquiry 1997–2011

13.7 Identifying a Mark from a Database

13.7.1 AFIS Versus Manual Systems

13.7.2 The Madrid Bombing Case (Brandon Mayfield) 2004

13.8 Admissibility of Fingerprint Evidence

13.8.1 US v Byron Mitchell 2004

13.8.2 US v Llera Plaza 2002

13.9 Towards a Probabilistic Evaluation of Fingerprint Evidence

13.10 Conclusions

References

Further Reading

Chapter 14 Trace Evidence, Databases and Evaluation

14.1 Analytical Methodologies for Glass, Fibres and GSR

14.1.1 Glass Analysis

14.1.2 Fibre Analysis

14.1.3 GSR Analysis

14.2 Databases for Source and Activity Levels

14.2.1 Source Level

14.2.2 Activity Level

14.2.3 Glass

14.2.4 Fibres

14.2.5 GSR

14.2.6 Statistical Models and Case Pre-Assessment

14.3 Glass Evidence in Court

14.3.1 R v Abadom 1983

14.3.2 R v Lewis‐Barnes 2014

14.3.3 R v L and Others 2010

14.3.4 People v Smith 2012

14.3.5 Review of the Evaluation of Trace Glass Evidence

14.4 Fibre Evidence in Court: R v Dobson 2011, R v Norris 2013

14.4.1 Fibre Evidence: Dobson

14.4.2 Fibre Evidence: Norris

14.4.3 Review of the Evaluation of the Fibre Evidence

14.5 Gunshot Residue (GSR) Evidence in Court

14.5.1 R v Wooton and Others 2012

14.5.2 R v Gjikokaj 2014

14.5.3 Review of the Evaluation of GSR Evidence

14.5.4 R v George 2007

14.6 Conclusions

References

Further Reading

Chapter 15 Firearm and Tool-Mark Evidence

15.1 Pattern Matching of Mechanical Damage

15.2 The Interpretation and Evaluation of Tool‐Mark Evidence

15.2.1 US Opinion

15.2.2 UK Opinion

15.3 Critical Review of Tool-Mark Evaluation

15.4 Consecutive Matching Striations

15.5 Databases

15.6 Tool-Marks and Evaluation by Likelihood Ratio

15.7 Firearms Evidence in the US Courts

15.7.1 United States v Hicks 2004

15.7.2 United States v Darryl Green et al. 2005

15.7.3 US v Glynn 2008

15.8 Concluding Comments on Firearms Cases

References

Further Reading

Chapter 16 Expert Opinion and Evidence of Human Identity

16.1 Introduction to Ear-Marks

16.2 R v Kempster 2003, 2008

16.2.1 The First Appeal 2003

16.2.2 The Second Appeal 2008

16.2.3 Conclusions From R v Kempster

16.3 State v Kunze 1999

16.3.1 The Frye Hearing

16.3.2 The Trial

16.3.3 The Appeal

16.4 Review of Ear-Mark Cases

16.5 Introduction to Bite‐Mark Evidence

16.6 The ABFO Guidelines and Expert Opinion

16.7 Bite-Mark Cases in the United States

16.7.1 People v Marx 1975

16.7.2 The Appeal

16.7.3 State v Garrison 1978

16.7.4 State v Stinson 1986

16.7.5 Bite-Mark Testimony in the Courts

16.8 Body Biometrics: Facial Mapping and Gait

16.8.1 R v Hookway 1999

16.8.2 R v Otway 2011

16.9 Conclusion

References

Further Reading

Chapter 17 Questioned Documents

17.1 Handwriting and Signature Comparison – A Scientific Methodology?

17.2 Scales of Expert Opinion

17.3 Jarrold v Isajul and Others 2013

17.3.1 Dr Strach’s Testimony

17.3.2 Mr Holland’s Testimony

17.3.3 Mr Lacroix’s Testimony

17.3.4 The Appeal Court Judge’s Conclusion

17.4 Gale v Gale 2010

17.4.1 ESDA Analysis

17.4.2 Signature Analysis

17.5 The Bridgewater Four (R v Hickey and Others) 1997

17.5.1 Molloy’s ‘Confession’

17.6 R v Previte 2005

17.7 Admissibility and Other Issues in Handwriting and Signature Evidence

17.8 Admissibility and Evaluation in the US Courts

17.8.1 US v Starzecpyzel 1995

17.8.2 US v Velasquez 1995

17.9 Conclusions

References

Further Reading

Chapter 18 Bloodstain Pattern Analysis

18.1 The Nature of Bloodstain Pattern Evidence

18.2 Issues for BPA Expert Opinion in the Courts

18.2.1 The Scientific Basis of BPA

18.2.2 Who is the Expert?

18.2.3 The Courts’ and Lawyers’ Knowledge of BPA

18.2.4 The Evaluation and Significance of BPA Evidence

18.3 The Scientific Basis of Bloodstain Pattern Analysis: The Murder of Marilyn Sheppard

18.4 Three Approaches to the Presentation of Blood Evidence

18.4.1 Activity and Propositions: R v Thompson 2013

18.4.2 No Expert Testimony: R v White 1998

18.4.3 Reconstructing Activity as a Narrative: R v Hall 2010

18.5 The Problem of Expirated Blood

18.5.1 R v O’Grady 1995, 1999

18.5.2 R v Jenkins: The Trial and First Appeal 1999

18.5.3 R v Jenkins: The Second Appeal (2004) and Two More Retrials

18.6 Experts in Disagreement: R v Perlett 2006

18.7 Conclusions

References

Further Reading

Chapter 19 Conflicting Expert Opinion: SIDS and the Medical Expert Witness

19.1 Eminent Experts: Issues and Conflicts

19.2 R v Clark 2000, 2003

19.2.1 The Testimony of Meadow

19.2.2 The Second Appeal 2003

19.3 A Bayesian Analysis: Murder or SIDS?

19.3.1 Pr(H2) – The Probability of Two SIDS Deaths in the Same Family

19.3.2 Pr(H1) – The Probability of Two Murdered Infants in the Same Family

19.3.3 The Posterior Odds

19.4 R v Cannings 2004

19.5 Trupti Patel 2003

19.5.1 The Rib Fracture Evidence

19.5.2 The Judge’s Summing Up

19.6 Conclusions

References

Further Reading

Appendix: Some Legal Terminology

Index of Cases, Individuals and Inquiry Reports

General Index

EULA

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