Chapter
1.6.3 The Evidence was Wrong
1.6.4 Exaggerated Evaluation by the Expert
1.6.5 Unethical Behaviour
1.6.7 Non-validated Methodology
1.6.8 Overconfidence in New Techniques
1.7 The Scientist and the Laboratory
Chapter 2 Admissibility from the Legal Perspective
2.1 Admissibility, Relevance and Reliability of Evidence
2.2 Admissibility in the United States
2.2.1 Reliability and the Frye Test
2.2.2 Meeting the Frye Criterion: US v Stifel 1970
2.2.3 Admissibility and the Gatekeeper Role: The Daubert Test
2.2.4 The Daubert Trilogy
2.2.5 General Electric v Joiner 1997
2.2.6 Kumo Tire Company v Patrick Carmichael 1999
2.2.7 Post-Daubert Hearings: US v Dennis Mooney 2002
2.3 Admissibility in Canada
2.4 Admissibility in Australia
2.4.2 Makita v Sprowles 2001
2.4.3 Dasreef Pty Limited v Hawchar 2011
2.5 Admissibility in England and Wales
2.6 Conclusions on Admissibility
2.6.1 Relevance and Expertise
2.6.2 The Scientific Basis of the Opinion
Chapter 3 Forensic Science and the Law: The Path Forward
3.1 National and Legal Developments in the United States
3.1.1 Federal Rules of Evidence
3.1.2 Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States 2009
3.1.3 US Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence
3.2 National and Legal Developments in Canada
3.2.1 Legal Enquiries into Miscarriages of Justice
3.2.2 The Science Manual for Canadian Judges
3.3 National and Legal Developments in Australia
3.3.1 The Uniform Rules of Evidence
3.4 National and Legal Developments in England and Wales
3.4.1 Forensic Science on Trial 2005
3.4.2 The Law Commission Report 2011
3.4.3 The Royal Statistical Society Guides
3.4.4 HCSTSC Report Forensic Science 2013
3.4.5 UK Government Response (2013) to the Law Commission Report
Chapter 4 Scientific Opinion and the Law in Practice
4.1 Scientific Opinion and the Judicial System
4.1.1 Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems of Justice
4.1.2 Scientific Evidence Within the Inquisitorial System
4.1.3 Inquisitorial Versus Adversarial
4.2 The Scientist in Court
4.3 The Role and Duties of the Scientific Expert Witness
4.3.1 Definitions of the Role
4.3.2 Duties and Responsibilities of the Expert Witness
4.4 Quality Control of Analysis and Opinion
4.4.1 An Australian Standard for Forensic Analysis
4.4.2 Regulation of Forensic Science in the United Kingdom
4.4.3 Codes of Conduct and Practice
4.4.4 Accreditation of the Expert
Chapter 5 Fundamentals of the Interpretation and Evaluation of Scientific Evidence
5.1 Analysis, Interpretation and Evaluation
5.2 The Role and Outcomes of Forensic Investigation
5.2.1 Investigative Forensic Science
5.2.2 Evaluative Forensic Science
5.3.1 Categorisation of Opinions
5.3.3 Investigative Opinion
5.4 Expert Opinion and the Forensic Science Paradigm
5.4.1 Categorical Opinion
5.4.2 Posterior Probabilities
5.4.4 Where Does this Take Us?
5.5 What are Propositions?
5.5.1 The Hierarchy of Propositions
5.5.2 The Importance of Activity Level
5.6 Competing Propositions in the Court
Chapter 6 Case Studies in Expert Opinion
6.1 Case Study 1: Facial Comparison Evidence
6.1.1 The Crime and Conviction
6.1.2 Expert Evidence and Opinion
6.2 Case Study 2: Ear-mark Identification
6.2.1 The Crime and the Evidence
6.2.2 Interpreting the Evidence and Challenges to the Opinion
6.2.3 The Conclusion of the Appeal
6.2.4 Opinion in Dallagher
6.3 Case Study 3: Glass and Gunshot Residue
6.3.1 The Crime and Trial
6.3.2 Analysis and Interpretation of the Scientific Evidence
6.3.3 Propositions for Evaluation
6.3.4 Evaluative Opinion: Glass
6.3.5 Evaluative Opinion: GSR
Chapter 7 Formal Methods for Logical Evaluation
7.1 Frequentist and Bayesian Approaches to Evaluation
7.1.1 The Frequentist Approach to Formulating Opinion
7.1.2 The Logical Evaluation of Evidence
7.1.3 The Debate on Formulating Opinion
7.2 The Likelihood Ratio Method
7.3 Expressing Opinion Through Likelihood Ratio
7.3.1 Statements of Evaluative Opinion
7.3.2 Likelihood Ratio and Verbal Equivalent Statements
7.4 Evaluation and Bayes’ Theorem
7.4.1 Bayes’ Theorem: Prior and Posterior Odds
7.4.2 Combining Likelihood Ratios
7.6 Posterior Probabilities
7.6.1 Opinion and Posterior Probabilities
7.6.2 The Prosecutor’s Fallacy
7.7 Working Out Conditional Probabilities and Likelihood Ratio
7.7.1 Likelihood Ratio at Source Level
7.7.2 Likelihood Ratio at Activity Level
Chapter 8 Case Studies in Probabilistic Opinion
8.1 People v Collins 1968
8.2 R v Michael Shirley 2003
8.2.1 A Logical Evaluation of Scientific Evidence
8.2.2 The Outcome of the Appeal
8.3 R v D J Adams 1996, 1998
8.3.1 The Crime and the Evidence
8.3.2 A Probabilistic Analysis of the Evidence: Prior Odds
8.3.3 The Non-Scientific Evidence
8.3.4 The Scientific Evidence
8.3.5 Total Likelihood Ratio and Posterior Odds
8.3.7 Review of the Issues in R v D J Adams
8.4 The Defendant’s Fallacy: R v J 2009
Chapter 9 Cognitive Bias and Expert Opinion
9.3 Other Sources of Bias
9.4 Fingerprint Examination: A Case Study in Bias
9.4.1 The Review of the Brandon Mayfield Case 2004
9.4.2 The Fingerprint Inquiry Scotland 2009
9.4.3 Bias Within Fingerprint Examination
9.6 Mitigating Bias Versus Research on Traces
Chapter 10 The Evaluation of DNA Profile Evidence
10.1 DNA Profiling Techniques – A Brief History
10.2 Databases in DNA Profiling
10.2.1 Allele Frequency Databases
10.2.2 Identification Databases
10.3 Interpretation and Evaluation of Conventional DNA Profiles
10.3.1 Combined Probability of Inclusion (CPI) or Exclusion (CPE)
10.3.2 Random Match Probability (RMP)
10.4 Suspect Identification from a DNA Database
10.4.1 The Frequentist Interpretation
10.4.2 The Likelihood Ratio Approach
10.4.3 Database Search Evidence in Court
10.5 Case Studies of DNA in the Court
10.5.1 R v Andrew Philip Deen 1994
10.5.2 Issues Raised by Expert Opinion in R v Deen
10.5.3 R v Alan Doheny 1996
10.5.6 R v Gary Adams 1996
10.5.7 Challenges to the Interpretation of DNA Profiles: US v Shea 1997
10.6 Current Practice for Evaluating DNA Profile Evidence
10.6.1 The Impact of Doheny and Adams in the United Kingdom
10.6.2 Current Practice in the United Kingdom
10.6.3 Current Practice in Australia
10.7 DNA – The Only Evidence
10.8 Errors and Mistakes in Forensic DNA Analysis
10.8.3 Laboratory Error Rates Versus the RMP
Chapter 11 Low Template DNA
11.1.3 Technical Issues in Interpretation
11.1.4 Quantitative Evaluation in LTDNA Profiles
11.2 Importance of the Chain of Custody: Queen v Sean Hoey 2007
11.3 The Caddy Report 2008
11.4 Case Studies in LTDNA opinion in the UK Courts
11.4.2 Quantities of DNA; Interpretive Issues on Transfer
11.4.3 Very Low Quantities of DNA
11.4.4 Opinion Without Statistics
11.4.5 Experts Differ in Opinion
11.5 LTDNA in Jurisdictions Outside the United Kingdom
Chapter 12 Footwear Marks in Court
12.1 The Analysis and Interpretation of Footwear Marks
12.2 Match Opinion: R v D S Hall 2004
12.2.1 The Crime and the Evidence
12.2.2 Footwear Mark Evidence and Opinion
12.2.3 Review of Expert Opinion in R v Hall
12.3 The Likelihood Ratio Approach to Evaluation of Footwear Marks
12.4 Standardising Scales for Expert Opinion
12.4.1 SWGTREAD Scales of Opinion
12.4.2 ENFSI Scales of Opinion
12.5 Challenges to Opinion on Footwear Evidence: R v T 2010
12.5.1 Outline of the Footwear Mark Evidence in R v T
12.5.2 The Expert Witness’ Notes
12.5.3 Evaluation Using an Alternative Database
12.5.4 The Summary by the Appeal Court Judge
12.6.1 Terminology, Probabilities and Statistical Methodology
12.6.2 Footwear Databases
12.6.3 Was the Jury Told the Basis of the Expert Opinion?
12.6.4 The Appeal Court Ruling: Bayes, Mathematics and Formulae
12.7 Footwear Mark Evidence After R v T: R v South 2011
12.7.1 The Crime and Evidence
12.7.2 Evaluation of the Footwear Evidence
12.7.3 Review of the Expert Opinion
12.8 ENFSI Recommendations on Logical Evaluation 2015
Chapter 13 Fingerprints and Finger-Marks – Identifying Individuals?
13.1 Fingerprint Identification on Trial
13.2 ACE-V: A Scientific Method?
13.3.1 Thresholds for Categorical Evaluation
13.3.2 The Balthazard Model
13.3.3 Identification Thresholds and the Points Standard in the United Kingdom
13.3.4 The Basis of the Non-Numeric (Holistic) Approach
13.3.5 Identification Thresholds in Other Jurisdictions
13.4 Evolution of the Basis of Fingerprint Opinion in the Court
13.5 A Critical Summary of Fingerprint Identification
13.6 Challenges to Fingerprint Testimony
13.6.1 R v P K Smith 2011
13.6.2 Shirley McKie and the Scottish Fingerprint Inquiry 1997–2011
13.7 Identifying a Mark from a Database
13.7.1 AFIS Versus Manual Systems
13.7.2 The Madrid Bombing Case (Brandon Mayfield) 2004
13.8 Admissibility of Fingerprint Evidence
13.8.1 US v Byron Mitchell 2004
13.8.2 US v Llera Plaza 2002
13.9 Towards a Probabilistic Evaluation of Fingerprint Evidence
Chapter 14 Trace Evidence, Databases and Evaluation
14.1 Analytical Methodologies for Glass, Fibres and GSR
14.2 Databases for Source and Activity Levels
14.2.6 Statistical Models and Case Pre-Assessment
14.3 Glass Evidence in Court
14.3.2 R v Lewis‐Barnes 2014
14.3.3 R v L and Others 2010
14.3.4 People v Smith 2012
14.3.5 Review of the Evaluation of Trace Glass Evidence
14.4 Fibre Evidence in Court: R v Dobson 2011, R v Norris 2013
14.4.1 Fibre Evidence: Dobson
14.4.2 Fibre Evidence: Norris
14.4.3 Review of the Evaluation of the Fibre Evidence
14.5 Gunshot Residue (GSR) Evidence in Court
14.5.1 R v Wooton and Others 2012
14.5.3 Review of the Evaluation of GSR Evidence
Chapter 15 Firearm and Tool-Mark Evidence
15.1 Pattern Matching of Mechanical Damage
15.2 The Interpretation and Evaluation of Tool‐Mark Evidence
15.3 Critical Review of Tool-Mark Evaluation
15.4 Consecutive Matching Striations
15.6 Tool-Marks and Evaluation by Likelihood Ratio
15.7 Firearms Evidence in the US Courts
15.7.1 United States v Hicks 2004
15.7.2 United States v Darryl Green et al. 2005
15.8 Concluding Comments on Firearms Cases
Chapter 16 Expert Opinion and Evidence of Human Identity
16.1 Introduction to Ear-Marks
16.2 R v Kempster 2003, 2008
16.2.1 The First Appeal 2003
16.2.2 The Second Appeal 2008
16.2.3 Conclusions From R v Kempster
16.4 Review of Ear-Mark Cases
16.5 Introduction to Bite‐Mark Evidence
16.6 The ABFO Guidelines and Expert Opinion
16.7 Bite-Mark Cases in the United States
16.7.1 People v Marx 1975
16.7.3 State v Garrison 1978
16.7.4 State v Stinson 1986
16.7.5 Bite-Mark Testimony in the Courts
16.8 Body Biometrics: Facial Mapping and Gait
Chapter 17 Questioned Documents
17.1 Handwriting and Signature Comparison – A Scientific Methodology?
17.2 Scales of Expert Opinion
17.3 Jarrold v Isajul and Others 2013
17.3.1 Dr Strach’s Testimony
17.3.2 Mr Holland’s Testimony
17.3.3 Mr Lacroix’s Testimony
17.3.4 The Appeal Court Judge’s Conclusion
17.4.2 Signature Analysis
17.5 The Bridgewater Four (R v Hickey and Others) 1997
17.5.1 Molloy’s ‘Confession’
17.7 Admissibility and Other Issues in Handwriting and Signature Evidence
17.8 Admissibility and Evaluation in the US Courts
17.8.1 US v Starzecpyzel 1995
17.8.2 US v Velasquez 1995
Chapter 18 Bloodstain Pattern Analysis
18.1 The Nature of Bloodstain Pattern Evidence
18.2 Issues for BPA Expert Opinion in the Courts
18.2.1 The Scientific Basis of BPA
18.2.2 Who is the Expert?
18.2.3 The Courts’ and Lawyers’ Knowledge of BPA
18.2.4 The Evaluation and Significance of BPA Evidence
18.3 The Scientific Basis of Bloodstain Pattern Analysis: The Murder of Marilyn Sheppard
18.4 Three Approaches to the Presentation of Blood Evidence
18.4.1 Activity and Propositions: R v Thompson 2013
18.4.2 No Expert Testimony: R v White 1998
18.4.3 Reconstructing Activity as a Narrative: R v Hall 2010
18.5 The Problem of Expirated Blood
18.5.1 R v O’Grady 1995, 1999
18.5.2 R v Jenkins: The Trial and First Appeal 1999
18.5.3 R v Jenkins: The Second Appeal (2004) and Two More Retrials
18.6 Experts in Disagreement: R v Perlett 2006
Chapter 19 Conflicting Expert Opinion: SIDS and the Medical Expert Witness
19.1 Eminent Experts: Issues and Conflicts
19.2 R v Clark 2000, 2003
19.2.1 The Testimony of Meadow
19.2.2 The Second Appeal 2003
19.3 A Bayesian Analysis: Murder or SIDS?
19.3.1 Pr(H2) – The Probability of Two SIDS Deaths in the Same Family
19.3.2 Pr(H1) – The Probability of Two Murdered Infants in the Same Family
19.3.3 The Posterior Odds
19.5.1 The Rib Fracture Evidence
19.5.2 The Judge’s Summing Up
Appendix: Some Legal Terminology
Index of Cases, Individuals and Inquiry Reports