State Strategies in International Bargaining :Play by the Rules or Change Them? ( Cambridge Studies in International Relations )

Publication subTitle :Play by the Rules or Change Them?

Publication series :Cambridge Studies in International Relations

Author: Heather Elko McKibben;  

Publisher: Cambridge University Press‎

Publication year: 2015

E-ISBN: 9781316916292

P-ISBN(Paperback): 9781107086098

P-ISBN(Hardback):  9781107086098

Subject: D81 international relations

Keyword: 外交、国际关系

Language: ENG

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Description

This book demonstrates why states' behavior varies so widely across different international negotiations, analyzing multiple real-world cases in the process. Drawing on original qualitative and quantitative evidence, this book demonstrates how the rules of the game influence the cooperative or coercive nature of the strategies adopted by all states in a negotiation. It provides a rich understanding of the nuances of states' behavior in international bargaining processes. Drawing on original qualitative and quantitative evidence, this book demonstrates how the rules of the game influence the cooperative or coercive nature of the strategies adopted by all states in a negotiation. It provides a rich understanding of the nuances of states' behavior in international bargaining processes. Bargaining between states in the international system is governed by rules which shape and constrain their bargaining behavior. However, these rules can be changed. When, why, and how do states bargain differently? Drawing on original qualitative and quantitative evidence, this book demonstrates how the rules of the game influence the cooperative or coercive nature of the strategies adopted by all states in a negotiation. These effects influence each state's incentives regarding whether to play by the rules or to change them. Examining these incentives, as well as the conditions under which states can act on them, McKibben explains the wide variation in states' bargaining strategies. Several bargaining interactions are analyzed, including decision-making in the European Union, multilateral trade negotiations, climate change negotiations, and negotiations over the future status of Kosovo. This book provides a rich understanding of the nuances of states' behavior in international bargaining processes. 1. Introduction: it's a question of strategies; Part I. Rule-Compliant/Rule-Changing Framework: 2. Typology of bargaining strategies; 3. How states play by the rules; 4. When and why states change the rules; Part II. Research Design and Empirical Tests: 5. Playing by the rules in European Union negotiations; 6. Playing by the rules in GATT/WTO negotiations; 7. Changing the rules in climate change negotiations; 8. Changing the rules in the Kosovo status process; 9. Bargaining strategies, and beyond. 'Uses extensive empirical research to cast fresh light on the understudied question of why states use different bargaining strategies at different times. Other scholars should read this interesting contribution.' John Odell, University of Southern California 'McKibben offers the most systematic rationalist treatment of bargaining strategies in international relations seen so far. Beautifully and parsimoniously argued, and applied to no fewer than four different issue areas, it is a model for research on international negotiation.' Brian Rathbun, University of Southern California

Chapter

Two key implications

Where does it fit?

Game-theoretic literature

Negotiation analysis literature

Institutions literature

The argument: building on this literature

Overview of this book

Part I: Rule-compliant/rule-changing framework

2 Typology of bargaining strategies

Rule-compliant strategies

Highly confrontational strategies

Somewhat confrontational strategies

Highly cooperative strategies

Somewhat cooperative strategies

Rule-changing bargaining strategies

BATNA-altering strategies

Issue linkage strategies

Summary of the typology

3 How states play by the rules

Contextual rule 1: issue linkage structure

Implications for state bargaining strategies

Empirical illustration: Kyoto Protocol negotiations

Contextual rule 2: set of alternatives to agreement

Implications for bargaining strategies

Empirical illustration: Malta–United Kingdom navalbase negotiations

Contextual rule 3: absolute/relative gains context

Implications for bargaining strategies and illustrative examples

Summary of rule-compliant predictions

4 When and why states change the rules

Rule-compliant versus rule-changing strategies

Factor 1: characteristics of the bargaining setting

Factor 2: states' material capabilities

Factor 3: states' incentives to change the negotiation

Variation in rule-changing strategies

Negotiations between interdependent states

Negotiations between non-interdependent states

Summary of rule-changing predictions

Part II: Research design and empirical tests

5 Playing by the rules in European Union negotiations

Background on EU decision-making

The bargaining rules in the EU context

Issue linkage structure

Beneficial BATNA

Absolute/relative gains context

Statistical analysis: bargaining strategies in the European Union

Set-up of statistical analysis

Statistical results

Illustrative case: Services Directive negotiations

Illustrative case: Financial Perspective negotiations

Financial perspective: bargaining power and absolute gains

Financial perspective: strategies adopted

Remember, bargaining is complex

6 Playing by the rules in GATT/WTO negotiations

Background of the Uruguay Round negotiations

“Rules of the game” in the Uruguay Round context

Explaining Uruguay Round bargaining strategies: empirical analysis

Dependent variable: cooperative v. confrontational strategies

Set-up of empirical analysis

Testing hypotheses 1 and 2

Testing hypothesis 3

Why not change the rules? The single undertaking

The relation between playing by the rules and changing them

Summary of the Uruguay Round negotiations

7 Changing the rules in climate change negotiations

Choosing an issue linkage strategy

Empirical analysis: statistical tests

Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, 2009

Background: issues and sources of contention at Copenhagen

Bargaining strategies in the Copenhagen high-level segment

Conclusions from climate change negotiations

8 Changing the rules in the Kosovo status process

The Kosovo status process: background

Negotiation 1: Kosovo–Serbia talks, 2006

Negotiation 1: bargaining strategies adopted

Additional background

Negotiation 2: Kosovo–Serbia negotiations over the Ahtisaari proposal, 2007

Negotiation 2: bargaining strategies adopted

Negotiation 3: UN Security Council negotiations over draft resolution, May 2007

Negotiation 3: bargaining strategies adopted

Negotiation 4: Kosovo–Serbia talks, late 2007

Negotiation 4: bargaining strategies adopted

Forcing new UN Security Council negotiations

Negotiation 5: UN Security Council negotiations on UNMIK reconfiguration, July 2008

Negotiation 5: bargaining strategies adopted

Negotiation 6: UN Security Council negotiations on UNMIK reconfiguration, November 2008

Negotiation 6: bargaining strategies adopted

Conclusion: comparisons to highlight key effects

Summary of the analysis

9 Bargaining strategies and beyond

Implications of the argument

Implication 1: power in international bargaining

Implication 2: the role of time in international bargaining

Bargaining strategies and beyond

Appendix: sources and coding

References

Index

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