Chapter
2.3.5 Income level and size regression findings
2.3.6 Behind the income results: preferential arrangements
2.4 Conclusions and policy implications
2.4.3 EPZs and a heterodox trade strategy: the example of Mauritius
Appendix 2.1 Annotated bibliography
Armstrong and Read (1995)
Armstrong, De Kervenoael and Read (1998)
Armstrong and Johnes (1993)
Atkins,Mazi and Easter (2001)
Bhaduri,Mukhedi and Sengupta (1982)
Easterly and Kraay (2001)
Khatkhate and Short (1980)
Milner and Westaway (1993)
Venables and Redding (2001)
3 When comparative advantage doesn’t matter: business costs in small economies
3.3 The business cost data
3.4 The regressions results
3.5 The disadvantages of smallness: cost inflation factors and income penalties
4 Can small states compete in manufacturing?
4.2 Current benchmarking initiatives and their appropriateness for small states
4.3 A small-states specific competitiveness index
4.3.1 Country-level findings
4.3.2 Findings by region, income group and country size
4.3.3 Comparison of results with other indices
4.4 Explaining industrial competitiveness performance
4.4.1 T-test and variables
Appendix 4.1 Construction of the SSMECI
Data definitions and sources
Definition of ‘manufacturing’
Definition of small states and countries used
Construction of the SSMECI
5 The economics of isolation and distance
5.1 The direct costs of distance
5.1.1 Distance and economic interactions
5.1.2 The magnitude of shipping costs
5.1.3 Determinations of shipping costs
5.1.4 Landlocked countries
5.1.5 The costs of time in transit
5.2 Remoteness and real income
5.2.1 Quantifying the effects
5.3 New technologies: the death of distance?
5.3.1 Weightless inputs and outputs
5.3.2 ICT and the costs of remote management
5.3.3 The speeding up of production
5.3.4 Clustering still matters
6 The trade performance of small states
6.2 Small states in world trade: volume, growth rate and share
6.2.1 Trade in merchandise goods
6.2.2 Exports of commercial services
6.2.3 Total export (merchandise plus commercial services) trade
6.2.4 Total trade transactions
6.3 Performance of individual countries
6.3.2 Recent performance of individual countries
6.4 Why is marginalisation of small states a cause for concern?
6.5 Marginalisation in merchandise export trade: a statistical analysis
6.5.1 Understanding marginalisation
6.5.2 A simple model of marginalisation of small states
6.5.4 Empirical estimation of the model
6.5.4.1 Tests for unit roots and cointegration
6.5.4.2 Testing the variables for unit roots
6.5.4.3 Estimation strategy
6.5.4.4 Test for existence of a long-run relationship
6.5.4.5 Estimating the long-run relationship
6.5.4.6 Short-run dynamics
6.6 Implications for long-term trade and development of small states and concluding remarks
7 Small economies and special and differential treatment: strengthening the evidence, countering the fallacies
7.2 The costs of being small
7.3 The costs of vulnerability
7.3.1 Vulnerability to external economic shocks
7.3.2 Vulnerability to natural disasters
7.4 The costs of governance
7.5 Characteristics in combination
7.6 The limits of regionalism
7.7 Being ill-equipped to benefit from globalisation
7.8 Being vulnerable to harm from globalisation
7.9 Small economies’ predicament as a trade concern
7.10 The feasibility of favourable treatment for small economies
7.11 Small states, negotiating weaknesses
PART II WTO and small economies
8 Small vulnerable economy issues and the WTO
8.2 Small states, globalisation and the WTO
8.3 WTO precedents on sub-categorisation of Members, including small economies
8.4 A small matter of definition
8.5 Small economy issues in the dedicated sessions of the WTO
9 Special and differential treatment for small developing economies
9.2 Why SDT for small developing economies?
9.3 Evolution and status of special and differential treatment
9.4 Debate over the efficacy of SDT
9.5 Characteristics of small developing economies
9.5.1 Acute vulnerability
9.5.1.1 High degree of openness
9.5.1.2 Export concentration
9.5.1.3 Export market concentration
9.5.1.4 Export marketing monopoly
9.5.3 Small size of firms
9.5.4 Dependence on trade taxes
9.5.5 Limited institutional capacity
9.6 Implications of small size
9.6.2 Sub-optimal resource use, allocation and mobilisation
9.6.3 Constrained international competitiveness
9.6.4 Disarticulated adjustment capacity
9.7 Special and differential treatment for small developing economies
9.7.2.1 Differentiated obligations
9.7.2.2 Asymmetrically phased implementation
9.7.2.3 Exemptions from commitments in certain areas
9.7.2.4 Flexibility in application and adherence of disciplines under prescribed circumstances
9.7.2.5 Temporary suspension of obligations in prescribed circumstances
9.7.2.6 Development promoting policy
9.7.2.7 Technical assistance and training
9.7.2.8 Enabling access to mediation
9.7.2.9 Development funding for implementation and trade capacity-building
9.8 How SDT addresses the characteristics and problems of SDEs
9.9 Identification of small developing economies
9.10.1 Differentiated treatment
9.10.2 Implementation, adjustment and graduation
10 A study of alternative special and differential arrangements for small economies
10.3 The use of ‘objective’ variables
10.5 Line-by-line analysis
Appendix 10.2 Cluster and discriminant analysis
Appendix 10.3 Results of line-by-line de minimis analysis
Appendix 10.4 Notes on data sources
PART III WTO dispute settlement
11 Small states in the banana dispute: implications of EU reforms for Eastern Caribbean islands and lessons for the future
11.1.1 What was the dispute?
11.1.2 Why was there a problem?
11.1.3.1 The first phase of the banana wars
11.1.3.2 The early challenges
11.1.4 Resolution of the dispute and subsequent reforms
11.1.7 Impact of the changes
11.1.8 2004 – Enlargement
11.1.9 How is the Caribbean adapting?
11.2 Subsequent challenges
11.2.1 2006 – Abolition of the quota system
11.2.2 2008 – End of the Cotonou trade preferences
11.3 Lessons to be learned
11.3.1 Implications of the banana challenge for other commodity protocols and preferences
11.3.2 Strategy and tactics
11.3.3 Other systemic lessons
12 Impact of changes in the European Union’s policy for banana imports on the Eastern Caribbean Region (1992–2002)
12.2 Economic importance of banana exports in the Eastern Caribbean
12.2.1 Contribution to real GDP
12.2.2 Contribution to employment
12.2.3 Contribution to the current account of the BOP
12.3 Social importance of banana exports in the Eastern Caribbean
12.4 WTO proceedings against the EU banana regime
12.5 Changes to the EU regime for banana imports prior to and since the WTO ruling
12.6 Extent of decline of the Eastern Caribbean region’s banana industry
12.7 Impact of industry decline on the Windward Islands export revenue
12.8 Impact of industry decline on individual countries and the OECS region
12.8.1 Impact of industrial decline on economic growth
12.8.2 Impact on the current account of the BOP
12.8.3 Impact on (un)employment
12.9 Economic and social outlook for the OECS economies (2004–2006)
13 Jamaica and the case in the WTO against the European Communities regime for the importation, sale and distribution of bananas, 1992–2001
13.2 The GATT Banana Panels 1992–19946
13.3 The banana dispute in the WTO
13.4 Jamaica and other Caribbean countries seeking to protect their interests
13.5 Testing the WTO dispute settlement mechanism
13.6 The quest for a WTO-consistent banana regime
13.7 The new banana regime (EC Regulation 896/2001)
13.8 The banana dispute and the negotiations for a new Partnership Agreement between the ACP and the EU (the Cotonou Agreement)
13.9 The request for a waiver in the WTO’s Council for Trade in Goods
13.10 Breaking the waiver deadlock at the Doha Ministerial Conference
13.11 The impact of the banana dispute on Jamaica’s banana industry
14 WTO complaints by Australia and Brazil regarding the EU sugar regime
14.2 The EU Common Market Organisation for sugar
14.2.4 Export and production refunds
14.2.6 Preferential import programme
14.3 Basis for WTO complaints
14.3.1 Export subsidies in excess of commitments
14.3.1.2 Agriculture Agreement
14.3.2 Intervention price constitutes a national treatment violation
14.4 Policy arguments in support of complaints
14.5 Impact on ACP countries
14.6 Third party participation in WTO proceedings
14.6.1 Joining consultations
14.6.2 Third-party participation before a panel and/or the Appellate Body
15 Reform of EU export subsidies on sugar: the legal and economic implications for the ACP countries
15.2.1 Implications of the sugar regime
15.3 Impact of current EU sugar regime on Sugar Protocol countries
15.4 The impact of EU policy regime on EU and world prices
15.4.1 The impact of an import tariff
15.4.2 The impact of a unit export refund
15.4.3 Evaluation of policy reforms
15.5 Impact of reduction of EU export subsidies on ACP countries
15.5.2 Other wider reforms
15.5.3 Alternative simulated reform effects on Sugar Protocol exporters
15.5.4 Alternative perspectives: effects on non-protocol ACP sugar exporters and importers
16 Analysis of the impact of opening up the EU import market for canned tuna on ACP countries
16.1 Introduction: background to the WTO decision
16.2 The European market for tuna
16.3 Case study 1: Senegal
16.3.1 Development of the sector
16.3.2 Key features of the canning industry
16.3.3 Role of tuna in the export market
16.3.4 Key constraints facing the industry
16.4.1 Development of the sector
16.4.2 Key features of the canning industry
16.4.3 Role of tuna in the export sector
16.4.4 Key constraints facing the industry
16.5 Case study 3:Mauritius
16.5.1 Development of the sector
16.5.2 Structure of the canning sector
16.5.3 Role of tuna in the export sector
16.5.4 Key constraints facing the industry
16.6 Case study 4: The Seychelles
16.6.1 Development of the sector
16.6.2 Structure of the canning sector
16.6.3 Role of tuna in export sector
16.6.4 Key constraints facing the industry
16.7 Summary of case studies
16.8 Potential and actual impacts of opening the European market to Asian canned tuna
PART IV Negotiating issues and institutional arrangements
17 WTO fisheries subsidies negotiations: implications for ACP fisheries access arrangements and sustainable management
17.2 Existing economic theory and empirical evidence on subsidies
17.3 Existing WTO rules on subsidies
17.4 The post-Doha fisheries negotiations and the concerns of developing coastal states
17.4.2 The concerns of small vulnerable coastal states
17.4.2.1 Revenue generation from access fees
17.4.2.2 Domestic and foreign fishers operating for export in the EEZ and territorial sea to supply canneries, loining facilities and domestic processing facilities
17.4.2.3 Artisanal fisheries for export and domestic markets
17.5 Fisheries subsidies disciplines: the case of Pacific ACP fisheries access arrangements
17.5.1 Fisheries access arrangements with the USA
17.5.2 EU fisheries partnership agreements
17.5.3 Japan, Korea and Taiwan
17.5.4 Revenue estimates from Pacific ACP access arrangements
17.6 Implications of WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies
18 Plurilateral financial standards and their regulation: the experience of small developing states
Part I 18.2 Overview of characteristics of the standard-setting bodies
18.3 Small developing states’ experiences with standard-setting bodies
18.3.1 Membership and participation
18.3.1.3 The Basel Committee
18.4 Effective implementation: obstacles and impacts
18.4.3 The Basel Committee
18.5 Assessment, compliance and small developing states
18.5.3 The Basel Committee
Part II 18.6 Financial services in the WTO
18.6.1 Background to domestic regulation at the WTO
18.6.2 Domestic regulation: GATS Article VI(4) and (5) and Article (2)(a) of the FSA
18.6.3 International standardisation and harmonisation
19 Export processing zones and the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
19.2 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
19.2.1 Definition of subsidy
19.2.2 Prohibited export subsidies
19.2.3 Some further examples of measures likely to constitute prohibited export subsidies
19.2.4 Actionable subsidies
19.2.5 Some examples of measures likely to constitute actionable subsidies
19.2.6 Non-actionable subsidies
19.2.9 What are the main issues for Commonwealth Governments with EPZ?
19.2.9.1 Illegal prohibited export subsidies
19.2.9.2 Illegal local content requirements
19.2.9.3 Introduced prohibited export subsidies
19.2.9.4 Extended time-limits for specific prohibited export subsidies
19.2.9.5 Illegal actionable subsidies
19.2.9.6 Failure to notify subsidies
19.2.9.7 New round of negotiations
20 The accession of Vanuatu to the WTO: lessons for the multilateral trading system
20.3 The process of accession
20.3.1 Systemic and protocol issues: from WTO to ‘WTO plus’
20.3.1.1 The trade regime
20.3.1.2 The investment regime
20.3.1.3 Other protocol issues
20.3.2 Bilateral issues: goods o.er and service commitments
20.3.2.2 Service sector commitments
20.3.2.3 Bilateral negotiations
WTO at the Margins
：Small States and the Multilateral Trading System
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