Cover

Half-title

Title

Copyright

Dedication

Contents

Foreword

Acknowledgments

Prologue

Part One The Contextual Background

1 Facts Regarding Iraqi Oil and Gas Reserves and Their Legal Status Prior to Self-Governance

I. Introduction

II. Iraqi Oil and Gas Production

III. Main Iraqi Pipelines

IV. Iraqi Refineries

V. Legal Status of Iraqi Oil and Gas Reserves Prior to Self-Governance

VI. Conclusion

2 The Provisions of the Iraqi Constitution Addressing Oil and Gas Activities: Of the Role of Subcentral Governing Entities, Handling of Revenues, and “Present” versus “Future” Fields

I. Introduction

II. Structure of the Iraqi Constitution

III. Revenue Sharing: Articles 112 and 121

IV. Authority of Subcentral Units to Enter Oil and Gas Development Agreements: An Assessment of the Constitutionality of Efforts by the KRG

V. Constitutional Authority of Subcentral Units and the Matter of “Present” versus “Future” Fields

VI. Conclusion

Part Two The Complications Associated with Iraqi Legislative Measures

3 Federal Oil and Gas Framework Law and Subcentral Government Responses

I. Introduction

II. Basics of the Federal Oil and Gas Framework Law

III. Significant Legal Issues

IV. The KRGs Oil and Gas Law No. (22) of 2007

V. Problems Associated with Preexisting Oil and Gas Contracts

VI. Conclusion

4 A Primer on the Federal Model Exploration and Production Contracts and the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Model Production-Sharing Contract

I. Introduction

II. Federal Government Model Exploration and Production Contracts

III. The KRG’s Model Form of PSC: The Principal Provisions Subgroup

Substance and Nature of the PSC

The Host Government’s Right of Participation

Work Duties Imposed on the Contract Holder

Financial Obligations Associated with the Contract

IV. The KRG’s Model Form of PSC: The Adjectival Provisions Subgroup

The Making of Decisions

Handling of Land and Assets

The Matter of Contract Stabilization

Important Miscellaneous Adjectival Provisions

V. Conclusion

5 The Federal Oil and Gas Revenue-Sharing Law: Its Many Problems

I. Introduction

II. Context of Iraqi Revenue-Sharing Law

III. Overview of the Revenue-Sharing Law

IV. Difficulties Associated with the Collection of Revenues

V. Difficulties Associated with Distribution of Oil and Gas Revenues

VI. Conclusion

6 Measures to Reconstitute the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) and Reorganize the Ministry of Oil

I. Introduction

II. The Relevant Terms of the Iraqi Constitution

III. The Federal Oil and Gas Framework Approach: Articles 6 and 7, as Well as 5D and 5E

Articles 6 and 7

Articles 5D and 5E

IV. Federal Oil and Gas Framework Approach: Scattered Articles

V. Relevant Insights on the Restructuring of INOC and the Ministry of Oil From the KRGs 2007 Oil and Gas Law

VI. Basic Conditions and Current Thinking Associated with Reconstituting INOC and Reorganizing the Ministry of Oil

VII. Conclusion

Part Three Current Issues and Potential Future Problems

7 The Matter of Creditor Claims: An Examination of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1790 (18 Dec. 2007) and 1859 (22 Dec. 2008), and Their Predecessors

I. Introduction

II. Primer on the Predecessors of Resolutions 1790 and 1859

III. Security Council Resolutions 1790 (18 Dec. 2007) and 1859 (22 Dec. 2008)

IV. Analytical Significance of Protection from Legal Claims

V. Conclusion

8 Central Government Authority to Strike Oil and Gas Development Agreements in the Absence of a Federal Framework Law

I. Introduction

II. The Constitutional Context

III. Evaluating the Article 110 Arguments

IV. Article 114's Shared Powers Arguments

V. Article 112: Direct Reference to Oil and Gas

VI. Power Carried Over from Saddam-Era Measures

VII. Conclusion

9 Distributing Profits in the Absence of a Federal Revenue-Sharing Law

I. Introduction

II. The Solidarity and Diversity Provisions: Articles 1, 3, and 14 of the Constitution

III. Economic and Social Security Provisions: Articles 27, 30, and 34 of the Constitution

IV. Oil, Gas, and Natural Resources Provisions: Articles 111, 112, and 121 of the Constitution

V. A Constitutional Sharing Obligation for Revenues Collected at the Subcentral Level?

VI. Inadequacies of the Relevant Constitutional Provisions

VII. Proposed Constitutional Amendments: How They Would Affect Revenue Distribution

VIII. Other Sources of Law Suggestive of an Obligation to Distribute Revenues

IX. Conclusion

10 Changing the Mix: Transition Fails and the Face of Iraq Is Altered

I. Introduction

II. KRG and Central Government Apply Their Own Approaches

Kurdistan Regional Government

Central Government

III. The Country Splits Apart

Kurdistan as a Separate Nation-State

Separate State(s) in the Balance of Iraq

IV. Conclusion

Epilogue

Index