Sovereign Defaults before International Courts and Tribunals ( Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law )

Publication series :Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law

Author: Michael Waibel;  

Publisher: Cambridge University Press‎

Publication year: 2011

E-ISBN: 9781316921388

P-ISBN(Paperback): 9780521196994

P-ISBN(Hardback):  9780521196994

Subject: D912.2 财政法

Keyword: 法律

Language: ENG

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Description

The last 150 years of international dispute resolution on sovereign debt offer lessons for the next wave of sovereign defaults. As public debt soars, a new wave of sovereign defaults looms. Michael Waibel examines 150 years of international dispute resolution on sovereign defaults. The observed continuity in the law and policy governing sovereign defaults suggests avenues for building durable institutions capable of resolving future sovereign defaults. As public debt soars, a new wave of sovereign defaults looms. Michael Waibel examines 150 years of international dispute resolution on sovereign defaults. The observed continuity in the law and policy governing sovereign defaults suggests avenues for building durable institutions capable of resolving future sovereign defaults. International law on sovereign defaults is underdeveloped because States have largely refrained from adjudicating disputes arising out of public debt. The looming new wave of sovereign defaults is likely to shift dispute resolution away from national courts to international tribunals and transform the current regime for restructuring sovereign debt. Michael Waibel assesses how international tribunals balance creditor claims and sovereign capacity to pay across time. The history of adjudicating sovereign defaults internationally over the last 150 years offers a rich repository of experience for future cases: US state defaults, quasi-receiverships in the Dominican Republic and Ottoman Empire, the Venezuela Preferential Case, the Soviet repudiation in 1917, the League of Nations, the World War Foreign Debt Commission, Germany's 30-year restructuring after 1918 and ICSID arbitration on Argentina's default in 2001. The remarkable continuity in international practice and jurisprudence suggests avenues for building durable institutions capable of resolving future sovereign defaults. 1. Sovereign debt crises and defaults; 2. Political responses to sovereign defaults; 3. Quasi-receivership of highly indebted countries; 4. Monetary reform and sovereign debt; 5. Financial necessity; 6. National settlement institutions; 7. Arbitration on sovereign debt; 8. Arbitration clauses in sovereign debt instruments; 9. Creditor protection in international law; 10. ICSID arbitration on sovereign debt; 11. Overlapping jurisdiction over sovereign debt; 12. Sovereign default as trigger of responsibility; 13. Compensation on sovereign debt; 14. Building durable institutions for adjudicating sovereign defaults. 'A remarkable book - to our knowledge, it is the first comprehensive and systematic treatment of this subject. The book combines historical analysis with careful research of case law and other practice. The result is an impressive and original treatment of a subject that is of the utmost relevance for the present state of the international economic system.' Eyal Benvenisti, Jutta Brunnee and Francesco Francioni, jury for the 2012 ESIL Book Prize '… the text remains one of the few books which tackle a pressing and topical issue competently, presciently and thoroughly, and ultimately makes a robust case for lawyers to subsequently 're-energise the field'.' Adnan Amkhan Bayno, British Yearbook of International Law 'Michael Waibel's book is a timely, elegant, and rich study of the adjudication of sovereign defaults by international courts and tribunals.' Carlos Espósito, European Journal of International Law 'Sovereign Defaults [before International Courts and Tribunals] is comprehensible e

Chapter

Table of treaties

Abbreviations

Part I: Sovereign defaults across time

1 Sovereign debt crises and defaults

A. US state defaults and arbitration

B. Sovereign defaults as a perennial feature of sovereign lending

C. Sovereign debt

D. Sovereign debt restructurings

Argentinas default and restructuring

E. Outlook

2 Political responses to sovereign defaults

A. Discretionary support by creditor governments

B. Diplomatic protection

C. Loan sanctions

D. The use of force

The Venezuelan Preferential Case

The Drago Doctrine

E. Diplomatic settlements

3 Quasi-receivership of highly indebted countries

A. Serbias Autonomous Administration of Monopolies

B. The Greek International Financial Commission of Control

C. Egypts Caisse de la Dette

D. Fiscal Administration in Haiti

E. The Dominican Republic´s receivership

Private fiscal control

The Santo Domingo Improvement Company arbitration

The US receivership

4 Monetary reform and sovereign debt

A. The `Serbian Loans´ and `Brazilian Loans Cases´

B. The `Norwegian Loans Case´

Dissent by Judge Read

Dissent by Judge Lauterpacht

C. The `Canevaro Brothers Case´

D. The `Young Loan Arbitration´

E. Conciliation

F. Evaluation

5 Financial necessity

A. The `Russian Indemnity Case´

B. `Société Commerciale de Belgique´

C. ICSID cases arising out of Argentinas default

6 National settlement institutions

A. Creditor organisations

B. World War Foreign Debt Commission

Dealing with the wars debt overhang

The World War Foreign Debt Commissions mandate and method of operation

The British settlement

Settlements with other European debtors

Contemporary relevance

C. Foreign claims commissions

D. National courts

7 State succession and the capacity to pay

A. Arbitrations on succession into sovereign debt

The Ottoman Public Debt Arbitration

Austria-Hungary

State succession before mixed commissions

B. Odious debt

Costa Rica and the Tinoco Arbitration

French Claims against Peru

Universal Postal Convention arbitration

Ecuadors audit of sovereign debt

C. Payment capacity in arbitration

Germanys three-decade long restructuring, 1918-1953

The Dawes Loan

The Young Loan and the BIS

The London Debt Conference in 1953

Dawes Plan Arbitral Tribunal

Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debt

Itoh v Peoples Republic of the Congo

FG Hemisphere v DRC

Bulbank v A.I Trade

8 Arbitration clauses in sovereign debt instruments

A. Arbitration clauses before the twentieth century

B. Arbitration clauses 1900-1945

C. Arbitration clauses after 1945

D. Reasons for the lack of arbitration clauses after 1945

9 Creditor protection in international law

A. Creditor claims before mixed claims commissions

Mixed claims commissions generally

Jurisdiction over sovereign debt

Summary

B. Creditor claims before the ECHR

The notion of possessions

Sovereign debt claims

C. Creditor claims before the Iran-US Claims Tribunal

D. Creditor claims before foreign claims commissions

Settled sovereign bonds

Jurisdiction over sovereign bonds

Liability on sovereign bonds

Lack of standing

Trustees

UK Foreign Compensation Commission

Settling the Tsarist debt

The Anglo-Soviet Claims Agreement of 1968

Settling sovereign debt claims arising out of Chinas repudiation

The British settlements with Czechoslovakia and Hungary

E. Creditor claims in arbitration

Contractual rights generally

Sovereign debt as property

Part II: The future role of arbitration on sovereign debt

10 ICSID arbitration on sovereign debt

A. ICSID arbitration generally

B. The advantages of ICSID arbitration

C. ICSID jurisdiction over sovereign debt

The relationship between Article 25 and BIT consent

Divergent notions of `investment´

Sovereign debt as `investments´

Fedax and CSOB as precedents for ICSID arbitration on sovereign debt

D. The objective core of ICSID jurisdiction

The typical characteristics of investments

Typical elements of an investment and sovereign debt

(a) Positive impact on development

(b) Long-term transfer of financial resources

(c) Sharing of commercial risk

(d) Territorial link with the host country

(e) Association with a commercial undertaking

E. Sovereign debt instruments under BITs

Territorial requirements in BITs

F. Summary and conclusion

11 Overlapping jurisdiction over sovereign debt

A. Contractual versus treaty causes of action

Lack of a specific connection to ICSID

Treaty and contract claims are intertwined

B. Choice of forum in sovereign bonds

Exclusive and non-exclusive domestic jurisdiction clauses

Preserving the unity of the contractual bargain

C. Waiver of the right to arbitration

Waiver in mixed commissions awards

Waivers in ICSID arbitration

12 Sovereign default as trigger of responsibility

A. Most-favoured nation and national treatment

Bundling creditor claims

B. Expropriation

State versus commercial acts

Non-payment

Repudiation

C. Coercion in sovereign debt restructurings

Fair and equitable treatment

D. Summary

13 Compensation on sovereign debt

A. International laws philosophy of creditor protection

Non-compensable risks in investment arbitration

International law does not insure against default risk

Protection of legitimate expectations

B. Partial compensation

State practice on compensation for sovereign defaults

C. Speculation and partial compensation

D. Assignment of sovereign debt

Assignment in ICSID arbitration

E. Compensation on secondary market purchases of debt

Compensation net of default risk

Partial compensation to encourage collective action

Case law on partial compensation

14 Building durable institutions for the international adjudication of sovereign debt

A. The effectiveness of ICSID arbitration

B. Creditor incentives to participate in restructurings

C. Arbitrating sovereign capacity to pay

The League of Nations International Loans Tribunal

D. Balancing creditor protection and a fresh start for debtor countries

Bibliography

Index

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