Description
Gerald Gaus shows how a free society can secure a moral equilibrium endorsed by all, and how a just state respects such an equilibrium.
Drawing on the tools of game theory, social choice theory, experimental psychology, and evolutionary theory, Gerald Gaus advances a revised account of public reason liberalism, showing how a free society can secure a moral equilibrium that is endorsed by all, and how a just state respects, and develops, such an equilibrium.
Drawing on the tools of game theory, social choice theory, experimental psychology, and evolutionary theory, Gerald Gaus advances a revised account of public reason liberalism, showing how a free society can secure a moral equilibrium that is endorsed by all, and how a just state respects, and develops, such an equilibrium.
In this innovative and important work, Gerald Gaus advances a revised and more realistic account of public reason liberalism, showing how, in the midst of fundamental disagreement about values and moral beliefs, we can achieve a moral and political order that treats all as free and equal moral persons. The first part of this work analyzes social morality as a system of authoritative moral rules. Drawing on an earlier generation of moral philosophers such as Kurt Baier and Peter Strawson as well as current work in the social sciences, Gaus argues that our social morality is an evolved social fact, which is the necessary foundation of a mutually beneficial social order. The second part considers how this system of social moral authority can be justified to all moral persons. Drawing on the tools of game theory, social choice theory, experimental psychology and evolutionary theory, Gaus shows how a free society can secure a moral equilibrium that is endorsed by all, and how a just state respects, and develops, such an equilibrium.
1. The fundamental problem; Part I. Social Order and Social Morality: 2. The failure of instrumentalism; 3. Social morality as the sphere of rules; 4. Emotion and reason in social morality; Part II. Real Public Reason: 5. The justificatory problem and the deliberative model; 6. The rights of the moderns; 7. Moral equilibrium and moral freedom; 8. The moral and political orders; Appendix A: the plurality of morality; Appendix B: Mozick's attempt to solve the prisoner's dilemma; Appendix C: deontic utility functions; Appendix D: the Kantian coordination game; Appendix E: protection of property rights and economic freedom in states that do best at protecting civil rights.
'The Order of Public Reason is one of the most ambitious and accomplished works in moral philosophy of the first decade of the new century. Gaus's command of the relevant literature in philosophy, economics, psychology, and elsewhere is daunting, and his ability to orchestrate a sustained argument leading from foundational postulates of the logic of practical reason to prescriptions for effective politics is altogether masterful.' Loren Lomasky, University of Virginia
'Gerald Gaus has written a refreshingly ambitious book that is both analytically rigorous and conscientiously engaged with the history of political philosophy. Drawing upon considerations from economics, psychology, evolutionary theory, social epistemology, and meta-ethics, Gaus advances an original view of the moral principles that provide the groundwork for a liberal society. He then endeavors to show that these basic principles can be justified to all, despite the enduring moral disagreements that are inevita
Chapter
3.4 THE SECOND PUZZLE ABOUT MORAL AUTHORITY
PART ONE: SOCIAL ORDER AND SOCIAL MORALITY
II The Failure of Instrumentalism
4 The Instrumentalist Approach to Social Order
4.1 THE CRISIS OF SOCIAL MORALITY
4.2 INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY
4.3 THREE FUNDAMENTAL FEATURES OF INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY
(a) More Is Better than Less
5.1 THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA AS A MODEL
5.3 REJECTING MODULAR RATIONALITY: ON BEING TIED TO THE PAST
(a) Instrumental Rationality as Effectiveness, Again
(b) Intention-Action Consistency and the Pull of the Past
6 Orthodox Instrumentalism
6.3 PREFERENCE TRANSFORMATION ACCOUNTS
III Social Morality as the Sphere of Rules
7 The Evolution of Rule-Following Punishers
7.2 THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
7.3 COMMON RULES AND EFFICIENT COOPERATION
(a) Rules as the Unit of Justification
(b) The Evolution of Agreement
7.4 SUPPORT FROM EXPERIMENTAL DATA
8.1 RULES: REGULATING THE SPECIFIC THROUGH THE GENERAL
8.2 SOCIAL RULES AND DEONTIC REASONING
9 The Rationality of Following Rules
9.1 DOES EVOLUTION BLIND US TO THE WISDOM OF THE FOOL?
9.2 THREE BROADLY INSTRUMENTAL PROPOSALS
(a) Rational Conditional Policies as Weak Rules
(b) Rules as Generalized and Abstracted Statements of Moral Reasons
(c) Goldman’s Resolution of the Paradox of Rule Following
9.3 DISSOLVING THE FIRST MYSTERY OF SOCIAL RULES: HOW RULES CREATE REASONS
(a) The Modest Version of the Rules Create Reason Thesis
(b) The More Ambitious Version
9.4 DISSOLVING THE SECOND MYSTERY OF SOCIAL RULES: THE MULTIDIMENSIONALITY OF PRACTICAL RATIONALITY
(a) The Conceptual Unity Argument
(b) Complex Decision Problems
(c) Do We Simply Value Following Rules?
(d) Utility Functions and Rule Following
9.5 CAN RATIONAL AGENTS SEE MORAL RULES AS OVERRIDING?
10 Moral Rules as Social Rules
10.1 DE JURE MORAL AUTHORITY
10.2 THE EXISTENCE OF SOCIAL RULES
10.3 AN EXISTING PRACTICE OF RECIPROCAL OBLIGATION
10.4 POSITIVE AND TRUE MORALITY
(a) What Makes a Rule Part of Positive Morality? Some Basic Features
(b) The Error of Dismissing Positive Morality
(c) On Avoiding the Opposite Error – The Moral Point of View and the Testing Conception
(d) Transcendent Morality
IV Emotion and Reason in Social Morality
11 Moral Demands and the Moral Emotions
11.1 THE INSTRUMENTALIST VIEW, RULE-FOLLOWING PUNISHERS, AND THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL MORALITY
(a) Why a Purely Instrumental Account of Social Morality Was Doomed to Fail
(b) The Standing of Rule-Following Punishers to Demand Compliance
11.2 MORAL VIOLATIONS AS EVERYONE’S BUSINESS
(a) Resentment, Indignation, and Moral Standing
(b) Internal versus External Justification of Our Moral Practice
11.3 BLAME AND PUNISHMENT
(a) Scanlon’s Relationship Account of Blame
(b) Blame and Enforcement
11.4 GUILT, MORAL AUTONOMY, AND MORAL AUTHORITY
12 Moral Emotions and Moral Autonomy
12.1 EMOTIONS AND APPROPRIATENESS
12.2 THE CHALLENGE OF THE NEW SENTIMENTALISTS
12.3 REASONS AND MORAL AUTONOMY
(a) Systematic Perversion
(b) Moral Authority and Rational Moral Autonomy
(c) Free and Equal Moral Personhood as an Endogenous Commitment of Our Morality
12.4 THE FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE ON MORAL TRUTH
(a) An Affirmation of the Centrality of the First-Person Point of View
(c) The Imperious Private Conscience
13.1 THE REASONS THERE ARE AND THAT ONE HAS
13.2 THE MYTH OF FULL RATIONALITY
(a) The Affirmation Thesis Rejected
(b) Full Rationality as the Recognition of the Reasons That Apply to One
(c) Sensitivity to the Initial Set: The Root of Indeterminacy
(d) Path-Dependency: Indeterminacy Magnified
13.3 HAVING A SUFFICIENT REASON
13.4 THE PROVISIONALITY OF REASONS, LEARNING FROM OTHERS, AND THE DEMANDS OF RATIONALITY
13.5 “RESPECTABLE” AND “MORE THAN RESPECTABLE” REASONING IN OUR MORALITY
PART TWO: REAL PUBLIC REASON
V The Justificatory Problem and the Deliberative Model
14 On Modeling Public Justification
14.1 THE PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION
14.2 THE BASIC IDEA OF THE DELIBERATIVE MODEL
(b) Two Perspectives in the Model
(c) The Deliberative Principle of Public Justification
14.3 THE TASK OF THE MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC
14.4 THE EVALUATIVE STANDARDS OF MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC
(a) A Plurality of Evaluative Standards
(b) The Mutual Intelligibility of Evaluative Standards
(c) The Shared Reasons Requirement Rejected
(d) Principles of Sincerity
15.1 MODELING LEGISLATION IN THE REALM OF ENDS
15.2 CONSTRAINTS ON PROPOSALS
(c) Conflict Resolution and Claim Validation
(d) Rules as Requirements
(e) Universalizability as Reversibility
(f) A Modest Common Good Requirement
16 Evaluating Proposals and the Problem of Indeterminacy
16.1 RANKINGS OF MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC
(a) Modeling Sufficient Reasons and Incomplete Rankings
(b) Diversity of Rankings of Proposals
16.2 DENYING AUTHORITY TO A RULE
(a) The State of Nature in Traditional Social Contract Theory
(b) Rejection on the Grounds of the Formal Constraints
(c) Rejection Based on the Excessive Costs of Moralization
(d) Blameless Liberty as the Default
16.3 THE SOCIALLY ELIGIBLE SET
(a) Kantian Legislation and the Pareto Rule
(b) A Preliminary Assessment: The Benefits of a Modest Model
(c) The Absence of a Compelling More Determinate Method
VI The Rights of the Moderns
17 Arguments from Abstraction and the Claims of Agency
17.1 A DOUBLE ABSTRACTION STRATEGY
17.2 THE PERSPECTIVE OF AGENCY
(a) The Presumption in Favor of Liberty
(c) The Rights Not to Be Coerced and Deceived
(d) The Core Status of Freedom of Thought
17.4 WELFARE, RESOURCES, AND AGENCY
17.5 THE STABILITY OF ABSTRACT RIGHTS UNDER FULL JUSTIFICATION
17.6 THE LIMITS OF ARGUMENTS FROM ABSTRACTION
18.1 THE FUNCTIONS OF RIGHTS
18.2 RIGHTS AND DEVOLUTION
18.3 THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
18.4 PRIVACY AND OTHER RIGHTS
(a) The Dimensions of Privacy
(b) Freedom of Association
18.5 WHAT SCHEME OF RIGHTS?
VII Moral Equilibrium and Moral Freedom
19 Coordinating on a Morality
19.1 THE PROCEDURAL JUSTIFICATION REQUIREMENT
19.2 MODELING COORDINATION
(a) A 2 × 2 Toy Game Analysis
19.3 THE INCREASING RETURNS OF SHARED MORAL REQUIREMENTS
19.4 FREEDOM, FAIRNESS, AND EQUILIBRIUM
(a) How a Free Morality is Chosen
(b) Fairness and Equilibrium
20 The Evolution of Morality
20.1 SOME EVOLUTIONARY FEATURES OF THE ACCOUNT
(a) A Slow Progression, and Repeated Experience of the Inconveniences of Transgressing
(b) Contingent History Can Be Justificatory
(c) The Path-Dependency of Justification
(d) Efficient Causes and Sustaining Justifications
20.2 CONTRASTS TO HAYEK’S MORE RADICAL SOCIAL EVOLUTIONARY THEORY
21 The Testing Conception
21.1 TESTING THE STATUS QUO
21.2 HUMAN RIGHTS AS TRANSCENDENT PRINCIPLES
21.3 MORAL CRITICISM AND MORAL REFORM
(a) Unjustified Moral Rules That Are Social Equilibria without Punishment
(b) Unjustified Moral Rules That Are Social Equilibria with Punishment
(c) Non-Optimal Moral Equilibria
21.4 THE DANGERS OF UTOPIANISM
VIII The Moral and Political Orders
22 The Authority of the State
22.1 SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY AND THE SUPREMACY OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY
(a) The Comparative Procedural Justification Principle
(b) The First Theorem of Liberal Democracy
(c) The Irrelevancy of the Comparative Justification Principle
22.2 THE PRIORITY OF SOCIAL MORALITY
22.3 MORAL AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY
(a) Over-Individualized Morality and Skepticism of Political Authority
(b) Minimal Authority: The Permissible Use of Force
(c) Authority as the Moral Power to Create Rights and Duties
22.4 POLITICAL AND MORAL AUTHORITY IN A WORLD OF STATES
(a) Transnational Social Morality
(b) The Authority of One’s Political Order over Others
(c) Effects of Our Actions on Those in Other Political Orders
23 The Justification of Coercive Laws
23.1 THE RIGHT AGAINST LEGAL COERCION
(b) Is Justified Legislation Exempt?
(d) Liberalism and the Rejection of Neutral Legislative Procedures
23.2 WHAT IS TO BE JUSTIFIED?
(a) The Radical Derivative Justification Thesis
23.3 COERCION AND THE LIMITS OF THE LIBERAL STATE
(a) Degrees of Coercion and the Demands of Justification
(b) A Simple Model of the Increasing Costs of Coercion
(c) The Libertarian Dictator Argument
(d) A More Complex Model: Disagreement about Coercion
(e) The Influence of Classical Liberal Standards in Public Justification
(f) A Critique of the Small State
24 Private Property and the Redistributive State
24.1 THE FUNDAMENTAL PLACE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IN A FREE SOCIAL ORDER
24.2 THE INELIGIBILITY OF SOCIALISM
24.3 CLASSICAL LIBERALISM, REDISTRIBUTION, AND THE ELIGIBLE SET
25 Further Functions of the State and Practical Paretianism
25.1 THE ABSTRACT ARGUMENT FOR PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION
25.2 QUASI-PUBLIC GOODS AND THE CONSTRAINTS OF PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION
25.3 PRACTICAL PARETIANISM
Concluding Remarks on Moral Freedom and Moral Theory
Appendix A The Plurality of Morality
Appendix B Economic Freedom in States that Best Protect Civil Rights
The Order of Public Reason
：A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World
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