Cover

Half-title

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Contents

Contributors

Developing Countries in the WTO System

1 The Legal Status of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions under the WTO Agreements

I. Introduction

II. The Concept of Special and Differential Treatment

1. Background

2. The Origins of Special and Differential Treatment

III. Legal Status of S & D Provisions under the WTO Agreements

1. S & D Provisions in the Uruguay Round Agreements

2. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

3. The Five Classes of S & D Provisions

3.1. Provisions Aimed at Increasing Trade Opportunities

3.2. Provisions That Require WTO Members to Safeguard the Interests of Developing Countries

3.3. Provisions Permitting Developing Countries to Assume Lesser Obligations

3.4. Provisions Relating to Transitional Time Periods

3.5. Provisions Relating to Technical Assistance

IV. Conclusion

2 Trade Preferences to Small Developing Countries and the Welfare Costs of Lost Multilateral Liberalization

Introduction

I. Preferences as a Stumbling Block to MTL

II. Welfare Estimates of Preferences as a Stumbling Block to MTL

Methodology

Empirical Results

III. Implementation, Scope, and Refinement of the Subsidy Scheme

IV. Conclusion

Appendix

Preferences to Small Countries as a Stumbling Block to MTL

Side Conditions in Preferential Agreements

Acknowledgments

References

3 China in the WTO 2006: ``Law and Its Limitations" in the Context of TRIPS

I. Introduction

A Commitments on Accession

B Commitments on Intellectual Property

II. WTO Dispute Settlement

A. Legal Rules

B. Application of the Legal Rules

C. Remedies

III. China, TRIPS, and the Maskus Curve

A. China's Economic Interests

B. The Timeline of WTO Dispute Settlement

C. U.S. Interests and Constraints

IV. Policy Implications

A. Law and Its Limitations Revisited?

1. Constraints on Unilateral Measures

2. China Is Not Paraguay

3. The WTO TRIPS Council and Dispute Settlement Mechanism

B. Alternative Approaches

1. Better Negotiation at the WTO

2. Alternative

3. Aggressive Unilateralism

Conclusion

4 Developing Countries in the WTO Services Negotiations: Doing Enough?

Introduction

1. Services, Development, and the Cost of Protection

2. Developing Countries in Previous Multilateral Services Negotiations

3. Developing Countries in the Current Round of Services Negotiations

4. Developing Countries in the Services Negotiations: Doing Enough?

4.1. To Commit or Not to Commit? That Is the Question

4.2. Seeking Enhanced Access in Foreign Markets: Where and How

4.3. The Mode 4 Agenda

4.4. Reaping the Benefits of Outsourcing

4.5. Domestic Regulation: Taking Care of Special Circumstances

5. Concluding Remarks

References

Comment on Juan Marchetti’s “Developing Countries in the WTO Services Negotiation: Doing Enough?”

5 Developing Countries and the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights: Current Issues in the WTO

Introduction

Why Did Developing Countries Accept the TRIPS Agreement in the Uruguay Round?

Pre-TRIPS National IP Laws in Developing Countries

Forum for Lodging an Intellectual Property Agreement

Developing Country Concerns in the TRIPS Council

Clarifications and Further Flexibility Provided by the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health

Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Declaration

Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge

Transfer of Technology

Concluding Remarks

ANNEX: Existing flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement: some examples

6 Participation of Developing Countries in the WTO – New Evidence Based on the 2003 Official Records

1. Introduction

2. The World Trade Organization

2.1. Organization

2.2. Decision Making

3. Participation

3.1. The Action in 2003

3.2. Representation in Geneva

3.3. Written Submissions

4. Analysis

4.1. The Regression Model

4.2. Size and Income Matter

4.3. Trade Stakes

4.4. Regional and Preferential Trade Agreements

4.5. Market Access Conditions

5. Participation in the DDA Negotiations

6. Participation Across Areas and Subjects

7. Conclusion

References

Comment on Nordstrom's "Developing Countries and the WTO: What’s Wrong with Inactivity?”

I. The Trouble with Numbers

II. Should Developing States Participate in WTO Activities?

III. What's So Great about Participation Anyway?

Conclusion

7 Developing Countries and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement

I. Introduction

II. Argument

III. Empirical Tests

IV. Implications

8 Representing Developing Countries in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings

1. Introduction

2. The Dispute Settlement System and Developing Countries

3. Dispute Settlement Proceedings

(a) To Litigate or to Negotiate

(b) The Costs of Dispute Settlement Proceedings

(c) The Costs of Failure to Prevail in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings

(d) The Probability of Success in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings

(e) The Benefits of the Available Remedies

(f) Concluding Thoughts

Comment on Niall Meagher’s “Representing Developing Countries in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings”

I. Introduction

II. The Role of Economics in Providing Assistance to Developing Countries in WTO Litigation

A The Use of Economics in the Pre-Litigation Phase

B The Use of Economics During the WTO Litigation Phase

III. Alternatives to the ACWL Model and Implications

9 Compensation and Retaliation: A Developing Country's Perspective

I. Introduction

II. Brief Overview of the Mexican Proposal

A Early Determination and Application of Nullification or Impairment

B Retroactive Determination of Nullification or Impairment

C Preventive Measures

D Negotiable Remedies

III. Why Is the Mexican Proposal Good for Developing Countries?

A It Is in the Developing Countries' Own Interest to Enhance the Remedies Part of the DSU

B Three Main Areas in Which the Mexican Proposal Will Serve to Enhance the Remedies Part of the DSU

IV. Remaining Aspects to be Solved

(a) Whether Retaliation Induces Compliance or Not

(b) Whether Retaliation Is Trade Disruptive and Whether It Hurts the Complaining Party

(c) Whether Retaliation Rebalances the Level of Rights and Obligations between Members

(d) Whether the Industry Affected by the WTO-Illegal Measure Can Obtain Relief through Retaliation

V. Conclusion

Getting Compliance Just Right: Comment on Mateo Diego-Fernández’s “Compensation and Retaliation: A Developing Country’s

10 A Preference for Development: The Law and Economics of GSP

1. Introduction

2. Legal Background

2.1 GSP Scope and Conditionality in the United States and Europe

2.1.1. GSP in the United States

2.1.2. GSP in the European Communities

2.2 India's Complaint and Its Legal Basis

2.3 The European Response and the Panel Decision

2.4 The Appellate Body Decision

2.5 The New European GSP Scheme

3. Legal Commentary

3.1. An Assessment of the WTO Outcome

3.2. Implications of the Appellate Body Decision for Other Aspects of Existing GSP Schemes

4. Economic Analysis

4.1. Economic Effects of Tariff Preferences

4.2. Does GSP Promote Development?

4.3. Differential Treatment and Conditionality in Tariff Preference Schemes

References

When – and Why – Do Hard Cases Make Bad Law? The GSP Dispute: Comment on Grossman and Sykes’ “A Preference for Development

I. Relationship between the Enabling Clause and Article XX

II. Role of the Appellate Body (AB) in Hard Cases like the GSP Dispute

III. Purpose of the GSP Programs

IV. Conclusion

The Remodeled European Community GSP+: A Positive Response to the WTO Ruling ?

1. Introduction

2. EC Development Policy and Trade Preferences – A Neat Fit?

3. The GSP+– Meeting Legitimate Development Needs?

11 The GSP Fallacy: A Critique of the Appellate Body's Ruling in the GSP Case on Legal, Economic, and Political/Systemic Grounds

A. Introduction

1. Background to the Dispute

2. Reflection: The GSP Fallacy

B. Critique of the Appellate Body’s Ruling

1. Legal Grounds

2. Economic Grounds

3. Political/Systemic Grounds

C. Conclusion

12 Is the WTO Doing Enough for Developing Countries?

I. Introduction

II. International Cooperation and Economic Welfare

Terms of Trade and International Cooperation

Political Economy Considerations

The “Commitment” Value of International Cooperation

Developing Countries and International Cooperation

III. Costs and Benefits from the WTO for Developing Countries

The Rule-Making Function

The Growth of New Rules-Related Obligations

The Implementation Debate and Special and Differential Treatment

The Impact of Rules Depends in Part on HowMembers Behave

Setting the Agenda in Rules-Related Negotiations

Influencing the Agenda: Multilateral and Regional Arrangements

The Conditions of Market Access

Access to Major ExportMarkets

Reliance on Preferences to Circumvent MFN

Scope for Gains from Further Liberalization in ForeignMarkets

Market Access Issues in Developing Country Markets

Developing Countries and Dispute Settlement

Lessening Information Asymmetries in the Trading System

I. Summary and Conclusions

References

Comment on Patrick Low’s “Is the WTO Doing Enough for Developing Countries?”

Index