Foreign and Domestic Investment in Argentina
：The Politics of Privatized Infrastructure
Publication subTitle ：The Politics of Privatized Infrastructure
Author： Alison E. Post;
Publisher： Cambridge University Press
Publication year： 2014
E-ISBN: 9781316912195
P-ISBN(Paperback): 9781107048041
P-ISBN(Hardback): 9781107048041
Subject： D Political and Legal
Keyword： 政治、法律
Language： ENG
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Description
This book argues that for infrastructure privatization programs, differences in firm organizational structure explain the viability of privatization contracts in weak institutional environments. Political economy scholarship suggests that private sector investment, and thus economic growth, is more likely to occur when formal institutions allow states to provide investors with credible commitments to protect property rights. This book argues that this maxim does not hold for infrastructure privatization programs. Political economy scholarship suggests that private sector investment, and thus economic growth, is more likely to occur when formal institutions allow states to provide investors with credible commitments to protect property rights. This book argues that this maxim does not hold for infrastructure privatization programs. Political economy scholarship suggests that private sector investment, and thus economic growth, is more likely to occur when formal institutions allow states to provide investors with credible commitments to protect property rights. This book argues that this maxim does not hold for infrastructure privatization programs. Rather, differences in firm organizational structure better explain the viability of privatization contracts in weak institutional environments. Domestic investors - or, if contracts are granted subnationally, domestic investors with diverse holdings in their contract jurisdiction - work most effectively in the volatile economic and political environments of the developing world. They are able to negotiate mutually beneficial adaptations to their contracts with host governments because cross-sector diversification provides them with informal contractual supports. The book finds strong empirical support for this argument through an analysis of fourteen water and sanitation privatization contracts in Argentina and a statistical analysis of sector trends in developing countries. Introduction; 1. Informal contractual supports in weak institutional environments; 2. An overview of the Argentine privatizations; 3. The fragility of nonlocal contracts prior to the crisis; 4. Smoother sailing for all investors in less competitive provinces; 5. Home court advantages magnify after the crisis; 6. Diverse local holdings also prevail in calm political contexts; 7. Explaining contractual resilience in low- and middle-income countries; 8. Conclusion. 'Post's book is must-reading for anyone interested in the private provision of infrastructure services, and particularly the epidemic of cancelled concession contracts. The existing literature emphasizes the role of institutional features - such as international legal guarantees, independent regulators, and other formal property rights protections - in discouraging cancellation. But Post's in-depth study of 14 water concessions in Argentina suggests that informal property rights protections are more important. In particular, concessions led by domestic firms with diversified local holdings are much more resilient than those led by multi-national companies specializing in infrastructure because the domestic companies are more socially and politically embedded and have a wider variety of negotiating options.' José A. Gómez-Ibáñez, Derek C. Bok Professor of Urban Planning and Public Policy, Harvard University 'Development studies has recently turned its attention to the legal environment facing business. Does greater accountability of government improve the rule of
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