Voting for Policy, Not Parties ：How Voters Compensate for Power Sharing ( Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics )

Publication subTitle ：How Voters Compensate for Power Sharing

Publication series ：Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics

Author： Orit Kedar;  

Publisher： Cambridge University Press‎

Publication year： 2009

E-ISBN: 9781316932902

P-ISBN(Paperback): 9780521764575

P-ISBN(Hardback):  9780521764575

Subject： D034.4 Election

Keyword： 政治、法律

Language： ENG

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Description

This book develops an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice, examining three electoral arenas: parliamentary, presidential, and federal. This book proposes an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice. Voters, Kedar argues, are concerned with policy, and therefore their vote reflects post-electoral compromise (e.g. multi-party government), which dilutes their vote. This simple but overlooked principle allows Kedar to explain a broad array of seemingly unrelated electoral regularities. This book proposes an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice. Voters, Kedar argues, are concerned with policy, and therefore their vote reflects post-electoral compromise (e.g. multi-party government), which dilutes their vote. This simple but overlooked principle allows Kedar to explain a broad array of seemingly unrelated electoral regularities. This book proposes an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice. Voters, Orit Kedar argues, are concerned with policy, and therefore their vote reflects the path set by political institutions leading from votes to policy. Under this framework, the more institutional mechanisms facilitating post-electoral compromise are built into the political process (e.g., multi-party government), the more voters compensate for the dilution of their vote. This simple but overlooked principle allows Kedar to explain a broad array of seemingly unrelated electoral regularities and offer a unified framework of analysis, which she terms compensatory vote. Kedar develops the compensatory logic in three electoral arenas: parliamentary, presidential, and federal. Leveraging on institutional variation in the degree of power sharing, she analyzes voter choice, conducting an empirical analysis that brings together institutional and behavioral data in a broad cross section of elections in democracies. Part I. Voting for Policy: 1. Introduction: institutional sources of voter choice; 2. A theory of compensatory vote; Part II. Empirical Evidence: How Voters Compensate for Diffusion of Power: 3. Compensatory vote in parliamentary democracies; 4. Balancing strong (and weak) presidents; 5. Compensatory vote in federations: evidence from Germany; Part III. Conclusion and Theoretical Implications: 6. Summary, extensions, and implications.

Chapter

Cover

Half-title

Series-title

Dedication

Title

Copyright

Contents

List of Tables and Figures

Tables

Figures

Acknowledgments

Part I Voting For Policy

1 Introduction: Institutional Sources of Voter Choice

1.1 Introduction

1.2 Three Regularities

1.3 What Is New

1.4 Data and Method

1.5 Plan of the book

2 A Theory of Compensatory Vote

2.1 Voter Choice: Theories and Regularities

2.2 Compensatory Vote: The Argument

2.2.1 Parliamentary Elections

2.2.2 Multi-Office Elections

2.2.2.a Presidential Elections

2.2.2.b Federal Elections

2.2.3 Prospective Voters

2.3 Can Voters Really Compensate?

2.4 The Compensatory Vote Model: A General Formal Version

2.4.1 Compensatory Vote in Parliamentary Elections

2.4.1.a A Simple Example

2.4.2 Compensatory Vote in Multi-Office Elections

2.4.2.a Compensatory Vote in Presidential Systems

2.4.2.b A Simple Example

2.4.2.c Compensatory Vote in Federations

2.5 Compensatory, Strategic, and Protest Vote

2.6 Conclusion

Appendix 2.I Analytic Solution

Appendix 2.II Simulations – Compensatory Vote in Parliamentary Democracy

Part II Empirical Evidence: How Voters Compensate for Diffusion of Power

3 Compensatory Vote in Parliamentary Democracies

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Data And Selection of Cases

3.2.1 Measurement

3.3 Proximity Voting

3.4 Compensatory Vote in Parliamentary Democracies

3.5 How Voter Decision Rule Varies by Institution

3.5.1 Measuring Power Sharing in Parliaments

3.5.2 Institutional Effect on Voter Choice

3.6 Conclusion

Appendix 3.I 1987 British Party System

Appendix 3.II Party Impacts

Appendix 3.III Model Specification

Australia

Belgium (Flanders)

Canada

Denmark

Iceland

Ireland

The Netherlands

New Zealand

Norway

Portugal

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

United Kingdom

4 Balancing Strong (and Weak) Presidents

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Policy Balancing in the United States

4.3 Electoral Cycles in Presidential Democracies: A Comparative Perspective

4.4 Empirical Analysis: Electoral Losses by Strong Presidents

4.4.1 Data

4.4.2 Analyzing Electoral Cycles

4.4.3 Presidential Powers

4.4.4 Explaining Electoral Cycles

4.4.5 Additional Tests

4.5 A Few Potential Extensions and Implications

Appendix 4.I

Appendix 4.II: Coding of Presidential Powers

5 Compensatory Vote in Federations: Evidence from Germany

5.1 Introduction

5.2 Electoral Cycles in Federations: Potential Explanations

5.3 Empirical Analysis

5.4 German Federalism as a Case Study

5.5 Vertical Divergence in Other Multi-Level Elections

5.6 Conclusion

Part III Theoretical Implications

6 Conclusion

6.1 Summary

6.2 Compensatory Vote across Institutional Regimes: Some Reflections

6.3 Compensatory Vote and Multiple Forms of Power Sharing

6.4 Theoretical Implication I: Why Voter Choice Is Menu Dependent

6.5 Theoretical Implication II: Why Parties Are So Extreme

6.6 Compensatory Vote and Representation

References

Index

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