Decision Making :Descriptive, Normative, and Prescriptive Interactions

Publication subTitle :Descriptive, Normative, and Prescriptive Interactions

Author: David E. Bell; Howard Raiffa; Amos Tversky  

Publisher: Cambridge University Press‎

Publication year: 1988

E-ISBN: 9781139240123

P-ISBN(Paperback): 9780521368513

Subject: C934 Decision Theory

Keyword: 心理过程与心理状态

Language: ENG

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Decision Making

Description

The analysis of decision making under uncertainty has again become a major focus of interest. This volume presents contributions from leading specialists in different fields and provides a summary and synthesis of work in this area. It is based on a conference held at the Harvard Business School. The book brings together the different approaches to decision making - normative, descriptive, and prescriptive - which largely correspond to different disciplinary interests. Mathematicians have concentrated on rational procedures for decision making - how people should make decisions. Psychologists have examined how poeple do make decisions, and how far their behaviour is compatible with any rational model. Operations researchers study the application of decision models to actual problems. Throughout, the aim is to present the current state of research and its application and also to show how the different disciplinary approaches can inform one another and thus lay the foundations for the integrated analysis of decision making. The book will be of interest to researchers, teachers - for use as background reading for a decision theory course - students, and consultants and others involved in the practical application of the analysis of decision making. It will be of interest to specialists and students in statistics, mathematics, economics, psychology and the behavioural sciences, operations research, and management science.

Chapter

NOTE

REFERENCES

3 RATIONALITY AS PROCESS AND AS PRODUCT OF THOUGHT

RATIONALITY IN AND OUT OF ECONOMICS

Rationality in economics

Rationality in the other social sciences: functional analysis

Functional analysis in economics

Summary

ON APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF RATIONALITY

Toward qualitative analysis

Procedural rationality

MIND AS THE SCARCE RESOURCE

Search and teams

Rational search procedures

Attention as the scarce resource

CONCLUSION

NOTES

REFERENCES

4 NORMATIVE THEORIES OF DECISION MAKING UNDER RISK AND UNDER UNCERTAINTY

1. INTRODUCTION

2. THE THEORY OF VON NEUMANN AND MORGENSTERN

3. PROBLEMS IN THE FOUNDATIONS

4. NEW DIRECTIONS

5. APPLICATIONS

6. SUBJECTIVE EXPECTED UTILITY

7. MORE PROBLEMS IN THE FOUNDATIONS

8. MORE NEW DIRECTIONS

REFERENCES

5 RISKY CHOICE REVISITED

THE PROBLEM

MONOTONICITY AND STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE

DECREASING MARGINAL VALUE AND CUMULATIVE ADVANTAGE

COMPLETE COMPARABILITY AND UTILITY

NOTES

6 BEHAVIORAL DECISION THEORY: PROCESSES OF JUDGMENT AND CHOICE

INTRODUCTION

ARE OPTIMAL DECISIONS REASONABLE?

Task vs. optimal model of task

Environment vs. problem space

Intuitive responses and optimal models

STRATEGIES AND MECHANISMS OF JUDGMENT AND CHOICE

The role of acquisition in evaluation

Acquisition

Evaluating/action

Conflict in judgment

Judgment = choice?

Conflict in action

LEARNING/FEEDBACK

METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS

CONCLUSION

NOTE

REFERENCES

7 REPLY TO COMMENTARIES

NOTE

REFERENCES

8 RESPONSE MODE, FRAMING, AND INFORMATION-PROCESSING EFFECTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT

CONCRETENESS AND THE FRAMING OF ACTS

PROTECTIVE ACTION AND THE FRAMING OF CONTINGENCIES

Pseudocertainty

Seat belts

INSURANCE DECISIONS AND THE FRAMING OF OUTCOMES

RESPONSE MODE, FRAMING, AND INFORMATION PROCESSING

Justification and choice

Anchoring and adjustment

Compatibility bias

IMPLICATIONS FOR RISK ASSESSMENT

Eliciting labile values

Informing people about risk

NOTES

REFERENCES

9 RATIONAL CHOICE AND THE FRAMING OF DECISIONS

A HIERARCHY OF NORMATIVE RULES

FAILURES OF INVARIANCE

FRAMING AND EVALUATION OF OUTCOMES

The value function

Framing outcomes

Discounts and surcharges

THE FRAMING AND WEIGHTING OF CHANCE EVENTS

Nontransparent dominance

Certainty and pseudocertainty

DISCUSSION

Descriptive and normative considerations

Bolstering assumptions

NOTES

REFERENCES

10 SAVAGE REVISITED

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Savage's normative interpretation

1.2 The existence and construction of preferences

1.3 The car radio

1.4 Outline

2. SAVAGE'S THEORY

2.1 Small worlds

2.2 The postulates

2.3 The representation theorem

3. THE CONSTRUCTIVE NATURE OF PREFERENCE

3.1 Indecision and indifference

3.2 Where should we put our effort?

3.3 The empirical claim

3.4 Constant and other imaginary acts

3.5 The empirical evidence

4. THE CONSTRUCTIVE NATURE OF SMALL WORLDS

4.1 Can value be purged of belief?

4.2 Can belief be discovered from preference?

4.3 The independence postulate

4.3.1 The counterexamples

4.3.2 Is the postulate absolutely convincing?

4.3.3 The sure thing principle

4.3.4 The mixing argument

4.3.5 The imaginary protocol

4.3.6 Goals and commodities

5. THE PROBLEM OF SMALL WORLDS

5.1 Are all utilities really expected utilities?

5.2 Refining small worlds

5.3 Savage's problem of small worlds

NOTE

REFERENCES

III BELIEFS AND JUDGMENTS ABOUT UNCERTAINTIES

11 LANGUAGES AND DESIGNS FOR PROBABILITY JUDGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

1. EXAMPLES

1.1 The free-style race

1.2 The hominids of East Turkana

2. TWO PROBABILITY LANGUAGES

2.1 The Bayesian language

Bayesian semantics

Bayesian syntax

2.2 The language of belief functions

Semantics for belief functions

(i) A sometimes reliable truth machine

(ii) A two-stage truth machine

Syntax for belief functions

3. BAYESIAN DESIGN

3.1 Total-evidence designs

Two total-evidence designs for the free-style race

Total-evidence designs based on frequency semantics

3.2 Conditioning designs

Likelihood-based conditioning designs

A likelihood-based observational design: the search for Scorpion

The choice of new evidence

A partitioning design that is not likelihood-based

3.3 Other Bayesian designs

4. BELIEF-FUNCTION DESIGN

4.1 The free-style race

4.2 The hominids of East Turkana

5. THE NATURE OF PROBABILITY JUDGMENT

NOTE

REFERENCES

12 UPDATING SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Belief revision

1 .2 Bibliographical note on probability revision

2. JEFFREY'S RULE OF CONDITIONING

2.1 Bayesian conditioning

2.2 Jeffrey conditionalization and sufficiency

3. SUCCESSIVE UPDATING

3.1 The problem

3.2 Commutativity

3.3 Jeffrey independence

4. COMBINING SEVERAL BODIES OF EVIDENCE

4.1 Coherence of P*

4.2 Extending P*

5. MECHANICAL UPDATING

5.1 Minimum distance properties

5.2 I projections and the IPFP

5.3 Comparing different metrics

6. ABSTRACT PROBABILITY KINEMATICS

NOTE

REFERENCES

13 PROBABILITY, EVIDENCE, AND JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

THE CONSTRUCTIVE/PRESCRIPTIVE ATTITUDE

WHO IS THE MODELER/ANALYST/DECISION MAKER?

HARD AND SOFT PROBABILITIES

THE EFFECTIVES OF UNUSUAL EVENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

REFERENCES

DISCUSSION

H. RUBIN {Purdue University)

T. SEIDENFELD (Washington University, St. Louis)

REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION

NOTES

REFERENCES IN THE DISCUSSION

14 THE EFFECTS OF STATISTICAL TRAINING ON THINKING ABOUT EVERYDAY PROBLEMS

EXPERIMENT 1

Testing method

Instructions

Problem types and problem structure

Coding system

Training procedures

Rule training condition

Examples training condition

Full training condition

Demand condition

Subjects and procedure

Results

Overview of data analysis

Effect of training on frequency of statistical reasoning

Effect of training on quality of statistical reasoning

The effect of problem type on the use of statistical principles

Relationship between training and problem type

False alarms

EXPERIMENT 2

Method

Subjects

Design and procedure

Results

Effect of training

Effect of problem type

Relationships between training domain and test domain

Discussion

EXPERIMENT 3

Subjects and method

Results

Discussion

EXPERIMENT 4

Subjects

Method

Results and discussion

GENERAL DISCUSSION

APPENDIX A

Probabilistic - structure 1

Probabilistic - structure 2

Probabilistic - structure 3

Probabilistic — structure 4

Probabilistic - structure 5

Probabilistic - structure 6

Objective — structure 1

Objective — structure 2

Objective - structure 3

Objective - structure 4

Objective — structure 5

Objective — structure 6

Subjective - structure 1

Subjective - structure 2

Subjective - structure 4

Subjective — structure 5

Subjective - structure 6

APPENDIX B

Example 1 (structure 1)

Example 2 {structure 3)

Example 3 (structure 5)

NOTES

REFERENCES

IV VALUES AND UTILITIES

15 THE MIND AS A CONSUMING ORGAN

NOTES

16 DISAPPOINTMENT IN DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY

1. A SIMPLE MODEL OF DISAPPOINTMENT

The joy of winning

2. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

3. ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES

Risk prone behavior

Supporting the underdog

An example: reacting to the odds

4. SENSITIVITY TO METHOD OF UNCERTAINTY RESOLUTION

Ellsberg's paradox

Breaking good/bad news

Auctions

5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

NOTES

REFERENCES

17 MARGINAL VALUE AND INTRINSIC RISK AVERSION

INTRODUCTION

1. VALUE FUNCTIONS, STRENGTH-OF-PREFERENCE FUNCTIONS, AND UTILITY FUNCTIONS

2. INTERPRETING STRENGTH OF PREFERENCE

2.1 Preferences for increments: a gambling interpretation

2.2 Preferences for increments: a conjoint interpretation

3. FROM STRENGTH OF PREFERENCE TO UTILITY

3.1 Strength of preference: using the derivative concept

3.2 Strength of preference: using the primitive concept

4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

NOTES

REFERENCES

APPENDIX

18 KNOWING WHAT YOU WANT: MEASURING LABILE VALUES

WHEN AND HOW PEOPLE MIGHT NOT KNOW WHAT THEY WANT

PSYCHOPHYSICS OF VALUE

OVERVIEW

DEFINING THE ISSUE

Is there a problem?

What options and consequences are relevant?

How should options and consequences be labeled?

How should values be measured?

CONTROLLING THE RESPONDENT'S PERSPECTIVE

Altering the salience of perspectives

Altering the importance of perspectives

Choosing the time of inquiry

CHANGING CONFIDENCE IN EXPRESSED VALUES

Misattributing the source

Changing the apparent degree of coherence

CHANGING THE RESPONDENT

Destroying existing perspectives

Creating perspectives

Deepening perspectives

IMPLICATIONS FOR RESPONDENTS

IMPLICATIONS FOR ELICITORS

CONCLUSION

NOTES

REFERENCES

19 SOURCES OF BIAS IN ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES FOR UTILITY FUNCTIONS

INTRODUCTION

ELICITATION METHODS

RESPONSE MODE BIAS

Experiment 1

RISK DIMENSIONS

Experiment 2

DOMAIN OF LOTTERIES

Experiment 3

TRANSFER VS. ASSUMPTION OF RISK

Experiment 4

CONTEXT EFFECTS

Experiment 5

DISCUSSION

NOTES

REFERENCES

20 SIMPLICITY IN DECISION ANALYSIS: AN EXAMPLE AND A DISCUSSION

PRIORITIZING RESEARCH PROJECTS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING RESEARCH LABORATORY

Problem

Structuring

Weighting

Judging location measures

Results

FOUR THEMES FOR SIMPLIFICATION

Keeping the analyst's eye on the ball

Pruning radically

Using strengths of preferences

Exploiting flatness of decision-theoretical maxima

OTHER FORMS OF SIMPLICITY: BEHN AND VAUPEL

NOTE

REFERENCES

21 VALUE-FOCUSED THINKING AND THE STUDY OF VALUES

1. IDENTIFYING DECISION OPPORTUNITIES

2. ELEMENTS OF SYSTEMATIZED THINKING ABOUT VALUES

Objectives

Objectives hierarchy

Attributes

Single-attribute utility functions

Multiattribute utility functions

3. INTERRELATED HIERARCHIES OF OBJECTIVES

4. QUANTIFYING VALUES

Making the assessee comfortable

Providing insight quickly

Assessing the utility function

Identifying value dependencies

Involving the decision makers

State-of-the-knowledge utility assessments

5. CREATING ALTERNATIVES USING VALUES

Focusing thinking on particularly desirable alternatives

One-sided bargaining

Clarifying individual preferences for group action

Coordinated alternatives

Advantages of value-focused thinking for creating alternatives

6. A DISCIPLINE TO STUDY VALUES

Procedures for systematically identifying values

Quantification of values

Personal use of values

Group and societal value structures

Deep value probing

Public involvement

Conflict identification and consensus building

Generic value structures

Fundamental objectives for a firm or organization

Legal value structures

Ethical value issues

Communication and education about values

7. CONCLUSIONS

NOTE

REFERENCES

V AREAS OF APPLICATION

22 BEHAVIOR UNDER UNCERTAINTY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

THE EXPECTED UTILITY HYPOTHESIS

MISCALCULATION OF PROBABILITIES

PREFERENCE REVERSAL

FRAMING

NOTES

REFERENCES

23 THE RELEVANCE OF QUASI RATIONALITY IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS

RATIONALITY, QUASI RATIONALITY, AND FRAMING

MARKETS WITH QUASI-RATIONAL AGENTS

Markets for characteristics

Short selling

Production

Comparison with results in finance

AN EXAMPLE

Dishwashing liquid

Arbitrage and entry

Education

Tied sales

NOTES

REFERENCES

24 HOW SENIOR MANAGERS THINK

WHAT SENIOR MANAGERS THINK ABOUT

A focus on process

The overriding concern

HOW SENIOR MANAGERS THINK

Using intuition

Defining the problem

Making a network of problems

Tolerating ambiguity

Perceiving and understanding novelty

WHAT TO DO ABOUT THINKING

Program rationality into the organization

Hone intellectual skills

Think while doing

Manage time by managing problems

Some suggestions

NOTES

25 PROBLEMS IN PRODUCING USABLE KNOWLEDGE FOR IMPLEMENTING LIBERATING ALTERNATIVES

LIBERATING ALTERNATIVES AND DOUBLE-LOOP LEARNING

RESPONDENTS DIAGNOSE Y's ACTIONS AS INEFFECTIVE

PARTICIPANTS' RESPONSES ARE ALSO COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

REASONING PROCESSES THAT PRODUCE COUNTERPRODUCTIVITY

AN EXPLANATION OF THE X-Y RESULTS

MODEL I THEORY-IN-USE

FACTORS THAT INHIBIT ORGANIZATIONAL DOUBLE-LOOP LEARNING

IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH METHODOLOGY OF PRODUCING LIBERATING ALTERNATIVES

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH FEATURES PRODUCING KNOWLEDGE ABOUT DOUBLE-LOOP ISSUES

DISCONFIRMABILITY OF PROPOSITIONS

NOTE

REFERENCES

26 ON THE FRAMING OF MEDICAL DECISIONS

STUDY 1 : LUNG CANCER

Format S (for survival):

Format M (for mortality):

Format MS (for mortality and survival):

STUDY 2 : GENETIC COUNSELING

Format A (for abnormal):

Format N (for normal):

Format AN (for abnormal and normal):

Format C/A (conditional/abnormal):

DISCUSSION

NOTE

REFERENCES

27 WHETHER OR NOT TO ADMINISTER AMPHOTERICIN TO AN IMMUNOSUPPRESSED PATIENT WITH HEMATOLOGIC MALIGNANCY AND UNDIAGNOSED FEVER

CASE DESCRIPTION

THE PROBLEM STATED

SUMMARY OF AVAILABLE DATA

Incidence of fungal infection

Efficacy of therapy

Complications of amphotericin therapy

ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION

Assumptions

Structure of the analysis

Probabilities and utilities

Calculation of expected utilities

Sensitivity analysis

NOTE

REFERENCES

COMMENTS

28 THE EFFECT OF PRIVATE ATTITUDES ON PUBLIC POLICY: PRENATAL SCREENING FOR NEURAL TUBE DEFECTS AS A PROTOTYPE

METHODS

RESULTS

DISCUSSION

NOTE

REFERENCES

29 DISCUSSION AGENDA FOR THE SESSION ON MEDICAL DECISION MAKING and MINUTES OF A GROUP DISCUSSION ON CLINICAL DECISION MAKING

DISCUSSION OUTLINE: DESCRIPTIVE/PRESCRIPTIVE/NORMATIVE INTERACTIONS IN MEDICAL DECISION MAKING

A. Issues relating to values and preferences

B. Issues relating to beliefs and probabilities

C. Issues relating to conceptions of choice

EXTRACTS FROM PLENARY DISCUSSION FOLLOWING MEDICAL PAPERS

Krantz:

Pauker:

Pratt:

Pauker:

Thaler:

Slovic:

Schelling:

Pauker:

Fineberg:

Pauker:

Kahneman:

Pauker:

Kahneman

Fineberg:

Shafer:

Edwards:

Weinstein:

Thaler

Meyer:

Kaplan:

Zeckhauser:

Weinstein:

Schelling:

Fineberg:

Schelling:

Argyris:

Pauker:

Fischhof

Pratt:

Pauker:

Pratt:

Pauker:

Luce:

Zeckhauser:

Meyer:

Bell:

Argyris:

Keeney:

Kahneman:

Argyris:

Edwards:

Keeney:

Meyer:

Edwards:

Pauker:

Tversky:

Kahneman:

Raiffa:

Argyris:

Kahneman:

Keeney:

Tversky:

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