Cover

Half-title

Title

Copyright

Contents

List of Tables and Figures

Preface

Introduction

1. INTRODUCTION

Abating Global Warming

The Commons

Coase’s Theorem

Policy Instruments for Global Warming

2. GLOBAL WARMING

Increase in Global Average Surface Air Temperature

Atmospheric Concentrations of Greenhouse Gases

Global Carbon Cycle

Atmospheric Concentrations of Greenhouse Gases

3. GLOBAL WARMING AND ECONOMIC THEORY

1 Global Warming and Carbon Taxes

1. INTRODUCTION

2. THE MODEL OF GLOBAL WARMING IN THE STATIC CONTEXT

Specifications for Utility Functions

The Consumer Optimum

Specifications for Production Possibility Sets

The Producer Optimum

Activity Analysis and Technological Possibility Sets

The Producer Optimum

The Case of Simple Linear Technologies

3. GLOBAL WARMING AND DEFERENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM

Global Warming and Competitive Equilibrium

Deferential Equilibrium and Proportional Carbon Taxes

4. UNIFORM CARBON TAXES AND SOCIAL OPTIMUM

5. GLOBAL WARMING AND LINDAHL EQUILIBRIUM

6. UTILITY MEASURED IN CO2 STANDARDS

7. KUHN–TUCKER THEOREM ON CONCAVE PROGRAMMING

The Lagrangian Method

Maximum Problem and Saddlepoint Problem

Saddlepoint Implies the Optimality

The Kuhn–Tucker Theorem on Concave Programming

8. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3

9. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4

2 Pareto Optimality and Social Optimum

1. INTRODUCTION

2. PARETO OPTIMALITY AND SOCIAL OPTIMUM

Pareto Optimality in a Purely Private Economy

3. SOCIAL OPTIMUM AND IMPUTED PRICES

4. COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM AND SOCIAL OPTIMUM

5. PUBLIC GOODS AND LINDAHL EQUILIBRIUM

An Economy with Public Goods

Lindahl Equilibrium

6. GLOBAL WARMING AND LINDAHL EQUILIBRIUM

7. TRADABLE EMISSION PERMITS AND LINDAHL EQUILIBRIUM

3 Global Warming and Tradable Emission Permits

1. INTRODUCTION

2. MARKET EQUILIBRIUM FOR TRADABLE EMISSION PERMITS

3. WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF TOTAL ALLOTMENT OF TRADABLE EMISSION PERMITS

Social Optimum Problem

4. WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF THE INITIAL ALLOTMENT OF TRADABLE EMISSION PERMITS

5. LINDAHL EQUILIBRIUM AND TRADABLE EMISSION PERMITS

Conditions for Lindahl Equilibrium

6. ADJUSTMENT PROCESSES FOR THE ALLOTMENTS OF TRADABLE EMISSION PERMITS

The Second Stage of the Adjustment Process

7. EGALITARIAN INDEX FOR THE INITIAL ALLOTMENT OF EMISSION PERMITS

4 Dynamic Analysis of Global Warming

1. INTRODUCTION

2. CARBON DIOXIDE ACCUMULATION IN THE ATMOSPHERE: A SIMPLE DYNAMIC MODEL

Changes of CO2 Accumulations due to Natural Causes

Specifications for Utility Functions

Specifications for Production Possibility Sets

3. MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND GLOBAL WARMING

Deferential Equilibrium in the Dynamic Context

4. UNIFORM CARBON TAXES AND SOCIAL OPTIMUM

Social Optimum in the Dynamic Context

5. THE DYNAMIC STABILITY OF THE ATMOSPHERIC CONCENTRATION OF CO2

5 Dynamic Optimality and Sustainability

1. INTRODUCTION

2. REVIEW OF THE OPTIMUM THEORY OF CAPITAL ACCUMULATION

The Penrose Effect

Marginal Efficiency of Investment

Dynamic Optimality and Imputed Price of Capital

3. GLOBAL WARMING AND THE DYNAMIC OPTIMALITY OF CAPITAL ACCUMULATION

4. SUSTAINABLE TIME-PATHS OF CONCUMPTION AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION

Introducing the Concept of Sustainability

Sustainability in the Simple Case

Sustainable Levels of Consumption and Investment

The Case in Which Several Kinds of Private Capital Exist

5. GLOBAL WARMING AND SUSTAINABILITY

6. SOCIAL OVERHEAD CAPITAL AND SUSTAINABILITY

6 Global Warming and Forests

1. INTRODUCTION

2. THE MODEL OF GLOBAL WARMING AND FORESTS

Specifications for Utility Functions

Specifications for Production Possibility Sets

The Producer Optimum

3. FORESTS AND DEFERENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM

Imputed Prices of Atmospheric Concentrations of CO2 and Forests

Forests and Deferential Equilibrium

4. UNIFORM CARBON TAXES AND SOCIAL OPTIMUM

7 Global Warming as a Cooperative Game

1. INTRODUCTION

2. THE MODEL OF GLOBAL WARMING

Postulates for Utility Functions

Postulates for Production Possibility Sets

Value of Coalition

Equilibrium of Coalitions

3. PROPOSITIONS CONCERNING CONCAVE PROGRAMMING AND COOPERATIVE GAMES

4. THE CORE OF THE GLOBAL WARMING GAME WITH TRANSFERABLE UTILITY

Nonemptiness of the Core of n-person Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility

5. AN ALTERNATIVE DEFINITION OF COOPERATIVE GAME ASSOCIATED WITH GLOBAL WARMING

“Balancedness” of Coalitions for the Global Warming Game

6. LINDAHL EQUILIBRIUM AND THE CORE OF THE GLOBAL WARMING GAME WITH NONTRANSFERABLE UTILITY

Lindahl Equilibrium Is in the Core of the Global Warming Game with Nontransferable Utility

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS

1. CONCAVE PROGRAMMING PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE GLOBAL WARMING GAME

2. FUNDAMENTAL PROPOSITIONS FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES

3. PROOF OF BONDAREVA–SHAPLEY'S THEOREM

4. PROOF OF THEOREM 1

Summary and Concluding Notes

STATIC ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL WARMING

Markets for Tradable Emission Permits

Dynamic Analysis of Global Warming

Deferential Equilibrium in the Dynamic Context

Dynamic Optimality and Sustainabililty

Global Warming and Forests

Global Warming as a Cooperative Game

Extensions and Qualifications

The International Fund for Atmospheric Stabilization

References

Index